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Summary Overview of the Remaining Chapters
Chapter Two**
I. The Current Legal Context
The primary challenge in shaping the law that governs allocation of re-
sponsibility for children is to determine how to facilitate thoughtful planning by
cooperative parents while minimizing the harm to children who are caught in a
cycle of conflict.  Several unavoidable tensions in the law’s objectives and its de-
sign complicate this task.
a. Predictability v. individualized decision-making.  There is a significant ten-
sion in custody law between the goals of predictability and individualization.  The
predictability of outcomes helps to reduce litigation, as well as strategic and
manipulative behavior by parents.  Predictable outcomes are insufficient, how-
ever, unless they are also sound.  And it is difficult to imagine sound outcomes
in custody cases unless the diverse range of circumstances in which family
breakdown occurs are taken into account.  Predictability is important, and so is
the customization of a result to the individual, sometimes unique, facts of a case.
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The goals of predictability and individualization point the policymaker in
different directions.  Predictable results require clear, determinate, easily ap-
plied rules.  Individualized results require open-ended standards allowing
judges to respond to the infinite variety of individual circumstances that these
cases present.  Determinate rules facilitate efficient, predictable decisionmaking,
but curtail the judicial discretion needed to take into account highly individual-
ized circumstances.  Judicial discretion facilitates individualized decisionmak-
ing, but undermines uniformity and predictability of results.1
Throughout the first two-thirds of the twentieth century in the United
States, the best-interests-of-the-child test was implemented through maternal
preference rules that produced results that were both uniform, and generally re-
garded as sound.2  The relatively recent elimination of explicit sex-based prefer-
ences and the erosion of the ideology on which it was based left the best-
interests test without concrete mooring.  Today, the test is uniformly dispar-
aged.  Critics charge that the unpredictability of results encourages parents to
engage in strategic behavior, take their chances in litigation, and hire expensive
experts to highlight each other’s shortcomings rather than work together to
make the best of the inevitable.  The test is also condemned because of the room
it allows for those who apply it to express biases based on gender, race, religion,
unconventional behaviors and life choices, and economic circumstances.3
Another criticism of the best-interests test is that it sets an unrealistic goal
for the law.  The standard tells courts to do what is best for a child, as if what is
best can be determined and is within their power to achieve.  In fact, what is best
for children depends upon values and norms upon which reasonable people
sometimes differ.  Even when consensus exists, there are substantial limits on
the ability of courts to predict outcomes for children and to compel individuals
to act in ways most beneficial to children.
Over the last decade, most jurisdictions have attempted to make the best-
interests test more concrete by specifying the criteria courts should consider in
applying it.4  Such criteria can be helpful in clarifying what is relevant in a cus-
1. The trade-offs entailed in discretionary and determinate decision-making custody standards
are reviewed in Marsha Garrison, How do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discre-
tionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 505-27 (1996).
2. On the history of child custody law, see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994); MICHAEL
GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985);
Jacob Goldstein & C. Abraham Fenster, Anglo-American Criteria for Resolving Child Custody Disputes
from the Eighteenth Century to the Present, 19 J. FAM. HIST. 35 (1994).
3. The classic critiques of the best-interests-of-the-child test include Gary Crippen, Stumbling
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minne-
sota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499-500 (1990);
Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Mar-
tha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision-
making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Mary Anne Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TULANE L. REV. 1365, 1181 (1986); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226
(Summer 1975); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
4. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150(c) (1995).  Other examples are listed in the Reporter’s Note to §
2.08, Comment (a).
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tody case, but an all-inclusive itemization of factors adds little determinacy un-
less the rule specifies priorities among them.
An alternative for achieving greater determinacy is an approach that builds
in a preference in favor of, or against, a particular form of custody.  For example,
some states express a presumption that joint custody is in a child’s best inter-
ests;5 other states have a presumption in favor of the primary custodian.6  Such
presumptions add determinacy to the decisionmaking process, but they are
based necessarily on factual and normative assumptions about families and
children that (1) are not accurate across the board, and (2) run counter to the
commitment this society avows toward family diversity.
There is consensus that the law should seek to promote the child’s best in-
terests.  The problem is in determining what those interests are.  The best solu-
tion would be to find predictability in the concrete, individual patterns of spe-
cific families.
b. Finality v. flexibility.  Another tension in custodial rule-making is created
by the desire for both finality of results and flexibility in the face of changing cir-
cumstances.  Finality forces parents to accept and live with the results of judicial
decisionmaking, leading potentially to greater stability for the child.  Yet flexi-
bility is necessary to be responsive to children’s needs and parental circum-
stances as they change over time.  In the two-parent, intact family, finality and
flexibility typically are achieved through on ongoing process of consensus, ne-
gotiation and compromise.  When parents no longer live together in a single
family unit, more structured mechanisms are often necessary.
Officially, current law favors finality, treating a custody decision as a fixed
event at which the court, often based on agreement by the parents, determines
each parent’s “rights” to the child.  When parents do not agree, a great deal of
time, attention and resources are often put into this decision because so much is
at stake. Once a decision is reached, it is expected to be final; relitigation is con-
sidered a failure of adjudication and often is limited by a strict modification
standard.7
In contrast to the time and resources spent on the initial custody determi-
nation, little attention is given to anticipating future changes and how to re-
spond to them.  Even though changes may be expected to occur, at the time of
the custody determination they are treated not as part of the inevitably unpre-
dictable evolution of events for which advance provision should be made, but as
contingent risks to be allocated at the time of divorce.  When the time comes,
however, courts are often reluctant to enforce a dysfunctional custody order,
notwithstanding the legal barriers to its modification.  The result is that there is
neither planning for change nor any real finality.
The law also requires little in the way of steps to minimize the impact on
children of family dissolution.  Because the focus of the law at divorce is on
solving the immediate issue of custody, opportunities are missed to undertake
5. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5) (Supp. 1996).  Other examples are listed in the Re-
porter’s Note to § 2.08, Comment (a).
6. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169(3) (1990). Other examples are listed in the Reporter’s Note to §
2.08, Comment (a).
7. See Reporter’s Note to § 2.16, Comment (a).
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measures that will meet the child’s ongoing need for stability.  For example, in
contested cases experts tend to be deployed to strengthen one parent’s case
against the other, rather than to soften conflict and help the family work to-
gether for the benefit of the child.  Few jurisdictions offer services that will in-
form the parents about the risks of divorce to children and what steps they
might take to reduce those risks.
The best legal approaches to conflict over children at divorce would as-
sume the likelihood of future changes and disagreements, and provide for them.
Rules should require planning for the child’s future needs, anticipate disrup-
tions, and provide a process for defusing and resolving conflict.
c. Judicial supervision v. private ordering.  Generally speaking, responsibility
for children is allocated on a de-centralized basis, to a child’s parents.  That re-
sponsibility is broad and near-absolute.8  The degree of confidence placed in
parents is not based on the certainty that all parents will do best for their chil-
dren; some children would undoubtedly be better off if they had been assigned
to someone other than their parents, or if their parents were more heavily su-
pervised.  It is assumed, however, that children on the whole will be better off,
because: (1) parents are the adults most likely to love their children; (2) love in-
spires parents to act responsibly toward their children, and (3) parental auton-
omy not only makes parents able to care for their children but more committed
to doing so.  Society, in turn, benefits from the diverse social fabric that is cre-
ated by the de-centralized manner in which their care is provided.9
At divorce, societal deference to parents is considered more problematic.
Although a high percentage of custody arrangements are settled by agreement
of the parents,10 under most states’ laws a court must review an agreement to
determine whether it is in the child’s best interests.  The practice of court review
reflects various concerns about parents who are going through divorce, includ-
ing a fear they may compromise their child’s interests in favor of their own.11
Despite the appearance of review, however, independent judicial inquiry is dif-
ficult because of the inaccessibility of facts that might dictate a different result.12
The result is the worst of both worlds: parents enter the divorce process with
their autonomy to make arrangements for their children officially abridged, and
yet arrangements that might truly be detrimental to children are unlikely to be
identified.
8. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: the Need for Legal Alter-
natives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 883-85 (1984).
9. On the full range of reasons for giving broad and exclusive autonomy to parents, see gener-
ally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); see also Carl
E. Schneider, On the Duties and Rights of Parents, 81 VA. L. REV. 2477, 2485-86 (1995).
10. A study of 933 families with minor children from two California counties, only four percent
required a custody hearing.  See ELEANOR  E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 138 (1992).
11. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 193 (1962) (“the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds
parental judgement with emotion and prejudice”).
12. See Marygold S. Melli, Howard S. Erlanger & Elizabeth Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation:
An Exploratory Investigation in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1145 (1988)
(reporting study showing that only one case of 349 offered settlement was rejected by a court).
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d. Biological v. de facto parenthood.  As noted above, a child’s legal parents
are given comprehensive authority to make decisions for their children, in part
to reinforce their maximum commitment to the parenting enterprise.  In prac-
tice, however, children are often cared for by adults other than parents.  These
adults include some stepparents, grandparents, and parental partners who
function as co-parents.  Giving rights to de facto parents may serve to weaken
the commitment society has to legal parents, on which the ideology of responsi-
ble parenting is based; yet disregarding their connection to a child at the time of
family dissolution ignores child-parent relationships that may be fundamental
to the child’s sense of stability.
Traditionally, parenthood is an exclusive, all-or-nothing status.  A child can
have only one mother and only one father; others have no rights, regardless of
their functional roles.  Only when a parent has been shown to be unfit or to have
abandoned the child may a parent’s rights be taken away.  Yet states have
carved out an exception for one group of non-parents—grandparents—who
may be given rights sometimes without regard to their prior contact with the
child.  The distance between these two sets of principles is difficult to reconcile
from a child-centered perspective.
The law’s challenge is to identify an approach applicable to all cases that
allows continued contacts by de facto parents whose participation in the child’s
life is critically important to the child’s welfare and recognizes the importance
that some families place on extended family, and yet is consistent with the
autonomy of parents that is essential to their meaningful exercise of responsibil-
ity.
e. Protection v. privacy.  The final tension concerns the conflict between the
state’s interest in protecting individuals from harm and the freedom of families
to have their privacy undisturbed.  There is increasing awareness of the preva-
lence and danger of domestic abuse both to the physical security of individuals
and to domestic tranquility.13  At the same time, there is a traditional resistance
to interference in the family, rooted in ideologies of family privacy which are
supported in constitutional jurisprudence.14  The law’s difficult task to provide
protection for individuals who need it, within an institution valued primarily
for the privacy from law that it provides.
II. An Overview of the Principles of Chapter 2
Chapter 2 addresses the issues identified above through a set of principles
designed to: (1) focus greater attention during family breakdown on planning
for the child’s needs; (2) locate responsibility for the child in parents, and in
13. See Reporter’s Notes to § 2.11.
14. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right of the individual “to marry, establish
a home and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (summarizing prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions estab-
lishing “the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The entire fabric of the Constitution and the pur-
poses that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and
to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically
protected [in the Constitution].”).
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courts only as the last resort; (3)  provide more determinate criteria for resolving
disputes over children that will promote continuity and minimize reliance on
stereotypes; (4) preserve the diversity in parenting arrangements within fami-
lies; (5)  encourage parents to anticipate future problems and disputes and to
establish means for resolving them short of relitigation in court; (6) allow con-
tinued participation in the child’s life, in certain limited circumstances, by indi-
viduals who are not parents under state law but who have functioned as par-
ents; and (7) provide appropriate protection for victims of domestic abuse after a
family separation.
a. The parenting plan.   The cornerstone of Chapter 2 is the parenting plan,
which is an individualized and customized set of custodial and decisionmaking
arrangements for a child whose parents do not live together.  Parents seeking
court-ordered responsibility for or access to a child must file a parenting plan,
and they are encouraged to file a joint plan.  Joint plans must be approved by
the court, with limited exceptions.  See b, below.  When the parents do not agree
on a joint plan, the court must formulate one, applying the criteria set forth in
the Chapter.
As part of the parenting plan process, Chapter 2 obligates courts to have a
screening process for identifying cases in which there is credible information
that child abuse or domestic abuse has occurred.  This requirement helps to en-
sure that parents who are victims of domestic abuse understand the process, in-
cluding their rights, and know about resources that may exist to address the
abuse.  The requirement also identifies cases in which there is special concern
about coercion and manipulation of the victim and about the safety of the child,
so that the court may satisfy its obligation to ensure that parental agreements are
knowing and voluntary and that they are not harmful to the child, and to order
protective measures when necessary to protect the child or a parent.  See b, be-
low.
A parenting plan is not simply a recital of who “wins” custody and who
has to settle for visitation.  The assumption of a parenting plan is that each par-
ent ordinarily will play an important ongoing role in the child’s life.  A parent-
ing plan must set forth the child’s custodial arrangements in some detail, speci-
fying the time each parent is to have responsibility for the child and a schedule,
or a method for determining a schedule.  A parenting plan must also designate
who is to make significant decisions with respect to the child’s education, health
care, and other important matters.  This does not mean that parents are bound at
divorce to permanent, detailed arrangements for the child’s care and control.
The parenting plan must also contain provisions that respond to anticipated
changes and can resolve future disputes as to matters that may not have been
anticipated.  See Comment (e), below.
As parenting plans move parents toward richer and fuller plans for the
child, the limitations of traditional “custody” and “visitation” terminology be-
come apparent.  These traditional terms represent, and help to perpetuate, an
adversarial, win-lose paradigm of divorce.  One alternative is to assume that
parents will share “joint custody,” but this substitutes one assumed ideal form
of custody for another.  Once planning for the child at divorce is viewed as a
more dynamic and complex process, terms that imply one form of custody over
another are inadequate.  Chapter 2 uses “custodial responsibility” to encompass
ALI CHAPTER - FMT_2.DOC 10/01/01  11:54 AM
INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 7
all forms of custody and visitation.  The more inclusive terminology expresses
the ordinary expectation that both parents have meaningful responsibilities for
their child at divorce; it leaves open the question of what those responsibilities
will be.  Likewise, the term “decisionmaking responsibility” reframes the tradi-
tional concept of “legal custody” to better connote a wide range of possible ways
decisionmaking authority for a child can be divided, rather than a fixed tem-
plate imposed by the state.  The changes in terminology cannot be expected, by
themselves, to revolutionize how custody allocations are viewed, but they may
contribute to a broader reconceptualization of the question from who will pos-
sess and control children to what adjustments in family roles will be most ap-
propriate for the child.  It affirms that the options are not limited to one or two
prescribed models but, rather, are spread out along a continuum.  And it helps
to move beyond the terms of public policy debates that posit a “best” way of di-
viding up responsibility for children based on the experience of divorced fami-
lies in the aggregate, to a legal framework focusing on the diverse circumstances
and possibilities of each individual family.
b. Preference for voluntary agreements.  Chapter 2 assumes that parental
agreement is, generally speaking, good for children, and that it is difficult for
courts to accomplish meaningful review that is likely to improve measurably
those agreements.  Thus, if parents have agreed on each parent’s future respon-
sibility for their child, Chapter 2 requires the court to accept the agreement, un-
less the court makes specific findings that the agreement is not knowing or vol-
untary, or provides for an arrangement that would be harmful to the child.  The
court ordinarily may accept an agreement without an evidentiary hearing on
these matters, but if there is credible information that child abuse or domestic
abuse has occurred, review is mandatory.  A screening process is mandated to
aid the court in identifying cases to which the review requirement applies.  See §
2.05(3); see also § 2.07(2) (mandatory screening for domestic abuse before media-
tion).
To facilitate agreement and to help the parents focus their negotiations on
the child’s interests, Chapter 2 provides that the court may order parents to at-
tend parenting classes, as well as information sessions about mediation or other
forms of dispute resolution.  § 2.07(1).  Chapter 2 does not allow courts to re-
quire parents to engage in face-to-face mediation or other procedures or classes
involving face-to-face conduct.  § 2.07(3).  The benefits of face-to-face mediation
have been demonstrated primarily in the context of voluntary procedures; the
Chapter assumes that mediation that is not voluntary creates too great an op-
portunity for the dominant parent to coerce the other into an agreement.
c. Structured decisionmaking.  Chapter 2 achieves greater predictability
through structured, yet individualized, decisionmaking principles.  The princi-
pal rule for allocating custodial responsibility when parents do not otherwise
agree is that custodial time between parents approximate the share of caretaking
each parent performed for the child before the parents separated.15  § 2.08(1)  By
15. Elizabeth S. Scott first suggested this concept, which she called the “approximation stan-
dard.”  See Elizabeth C. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preferences, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615
(1992).
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focusing on how the child was cared for previously, the past caretaking rule an-
chors the determination of the child’s best interests not in generalizations about
what post-divorce arrangements work best for children, but in the individual
history of each family.  How caretaking was divided in the past provides a rela-
tively concrete point of reference which is likely to reflect various qualitative
factors that are otherwise very hard to measure, including the strength of the
emotional ties between the child and each parent, relative parental competen-
cies, and the willingness of each parent to put the child’s interests first.  At the
same time, it reduces the need for predictions about the future, and thus the ex-
penses and uncertainty produced by expert witnesses and psychological studies.
It is also consistent with Chapter 2’s emphasis on parental agreements, in that
when parents do not agree, past divisions of responsibility may be the most reli-
able proxy for the shares of responsibility they would agree upon if they were
focused on their child.
Operationally, the approximation rule means that allocations of custodial
responsibility, when not otherwise agreed to by the parents, should reflect the
roles each parent assumed prior to their separation.  This does not mean that
caretaking arrangements are expected to remain the same after the divorce.
What it means is that a parent who has been the primary caretaker of the child
should remain so, and that parents who had co-equal roles before their separa-
tion should also retain those roles afterwards, if possible. The options are not
limited to any particular standard arrangement, but cover the entire spectrum of
possibilities.  The Principles of Chapter 2 resist the tendency to identify some
particular arrangement that works best in the greatest number of cases.  They
assume, instead, that if the parents do not agree about post-separation arrange-
ments for their child, the arrangements they previously followed are the best
guide for the future.
A number of Principles qualify the past caretaking rule.  First, unless cir-
cumstances exist warranting access limitations under § 2.11, each parent should
be allocated an amount of custodial responsibility that will enable the parent to
maintain a relationship with the child, even if this level of responsibility is not
supported by the parent’s past level of involvement in the child’s care.  In the
case of a parent who has contributed in other ways to the child’s welfare, such
as by providing financial support, the amount of responsibility to be allocated
should not go below a certain presumptive amount of time, as established in a
uniform rule of statewide application.  § 2.08(1)(a).
Second, the court should accommodate the preferences of an older child
who has firm and reasonable preferences.  The Principles do not specify the age
at which a child’s preferences should be accommodated, but recommend that
each jurisdiction adopt a uniform rule of statewide application.  This exception
for the child’s preferences assumes that an older child is more mature than a
younger child and may have a perspective that provides better information
about the child’s interests than the history of past caretaking roles provides.  It
also assumes that forcing older children to adjust to arrangements to which they
are keenly opposed is often unrealistic and counter-productive.  § 2.08(1)(b).
Third, the court should attempt to keep siblings together if it determines
that doing so is necessary to their welfare. § 2.08(1)(c).
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Fourth, the court should depart from an arrangement that approximates
past shares of caretaking responsibility to take account of a gross disparity in the
quality of the emotional attachments between the child and each parent, or in
the ability or availability of each parent.  This qualification applies only when,
notwithstanding past caretaking roles, a disparity in the quality of the parents’
emotional bonds with the child or in the ability or availability of the parents is
so severe that it would harm the child and thus clearly demands a different re-
sult than the past caretaking standard alone would produce.  § 2.08(1)(d).
Fifth, prior agreements between the parents should be taken into account if
the court determines that doing so would be appropriate in the circumstances,
including the expectations of the parties and the extent to which the circum-
stances match what the parties anticipated.  This qualification applies when the
parents had an understanding about how caretaking responsibility would be di-
vided that would be frustrated if the past caretaking standard is applied.  It
would not be appropriate to apply this limitation when to do so would be con-
trary to the child’s welfare.  § 2.08(1)(e).
Sixth, courts should take account of logistical and relevant factors that
make an otherwise appropriate equal allocation of custodial time impractical or
harmful to the child’s stability.  Among the factors to be considered are the dis-
tance between the parents’ residences, the cost and difficulty of transporting the
child, the parents’ and child’s daily schedules, and the ability of the parents to
cooperate in the arrangements.  § 2.08(1)(f).  While such factors are generally
applicable only to determining the manner in which custodial time is allocated
and not how much is allocated to each parent, see § 2.08(4), when significant
practical obstacles make it necessary, they may also affect each parent’s share of
custodial time.
Finally, a catch-all exception requires departure from the past caretaking
rule to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child.  § 2.08(1)(h).
These Principles do not eliminate the focus on the best interests of the child,
but rather refine it.  In some cases, however, the Principles will not provide the
intended determinacy.  For example, when the past caretaking patterns are too
complex or unstable to provide a guide to decision-making, courts must fall
back on the less satisfactory, unguided best-interests-of-the-child test as a neces-
sary, second-best alternative. § 2.08(3).
The Chapter also provides greater structure for resolving questions about
decisionmaking responsibility for children at divorce.  For example, the Princi-
ples establish a presumption in favor of joint decisionmaking responsibility if
both parents have been exercising a reasonable share of parenting functions.  §
2.09(2).
d. Limitations in cases involving domestic abuse.  Chapter 2 takes into ac-
count, in a number of different ways, the risks to the child or parent who has
been the victim of abuse.  As noted above, the court is required to have a process
to screening for child and domestic abuse, and court review of parental agree-
ments submitted in such cases is mandatory.  §§ 2.05(3); 2.06(2).  The Chapter
also prohibits courts from requiring parents to participate in face-to-face meet-
ings or to engage in mandatory mediation.  § 2.07(3).
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The existence of domestic abuse requires special measures in a parenting
plan to protect the child or adult victim.  If necessary, the court must limit access
to a child by an individual who has committed acts of domestic abuse.  Limita-
tions are also required when other risk factors exist, such as a parent’s drug or
alcohol abuse, or interference with the other parent’s lawful access to the child.
§ 2.11.  Substantial allegations of domestic abuse also require, in most instances,
a court-ordered investigation or the appointment of a guardian ad litem or at-
torney for the child.  § 2.13(4).
e. Resolution of future disputes.  Chapter 2 requires that parenting plans
provide for the resolution of future disputes.  § 2.10.  In so doing, the Chapter
treats future change and disagreement as something to be anticipated and
planned for, rather than as extraordinary and unexpected.  Chapter 2 assumes
that alternatives to judicial re-litigation can provide a faster, less expensive, and
less adversarial means for responding to issues that later arise, even though not
all outcomes from alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are necessarily fi-
nal.
With regard to modifications of the parenting plan itself, Chapter 2 differ-
entiates changes intended to reinforce parental agreement or continuity in care-
taking arrangements, to which a liberal modification standard applies, from
changes more likely to be threatening to a child’s continuity, which are subject
to stricter modification rules.  In the first category are modifications determined
to be in the child’s best interests that (1) are agreed to by the parents themselves,
(2) reflect the actual parenting arrangements that have evolved since adoption of
the plan, (3) are minor adjustments, or (4) accommodate an older child’s reason-
able and firm preferences.  § 2.16.  The stricter standards required for all other
modification requests are intended to discourage interruption of the child’s ex-
isting caretaking arrangements. § 2.15.
An especially difficult issue in modification is the proposed relocation of a
parent.  The parent seeking to move may have the stronger relationship to the
child and a significant personal stake in the move, such as an important career
opportunity or remarriage to a spouse or domestic partner who lives (or moves)
elsewhere.  The other parent, however, may have a relationship with the child
that will be significantly compromised by the move.  There is often not a good
solution to this conflict.  This Chapter approaches the dilemma within its gen-
eral framework that emphasizes the responsibility each parent has been exer-
cising for the child up to that point.  It allows a parent who has been exercising a
significant majority of custodial responsibility to relocate with the child, for a le-
gitimate purpose, in good faith, and to a location reasonable in light of that pur-
pose, with appropriate adjustments to the parenting plan to maintain the child’s
relationship with the other parent.  A relocation that does not meet these criteria
justifies reconsideration of the basic custodial framework under the fall-back,
best-interests-of-the-child test.  § 2.17.
f. Prohibitions against discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sex-
ual orientation, sexual conduct, and economic circumstances of a parent.   Chapter 2
prohibits consideration of race, ethnicity, sex, and sexual orientation.  It also
limits consideration of religion and sexual conduct to circumstances in which
the child would otherwise be harmed, and it allows consideration of the parents’
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financial resources only to the extent necessary to consider whether the other-
wise appropriate custodial arrangements would be feasible.  § 2.12(a), (b), (c), &
(f).
These non-discrimination provisions conform to the emerging law, which
recognizes that the prohibited factors usually reflect prejudice rather than a ra-
tional assessment of the child’s welfare.  Because much bias is unintentional and
subtle, however, it cannot be expected that non-discrimination provisions will
be entirely effective in ending over-reliance on stereotypes.  To an important
extent, it is the more determinate standards of the Chapter rather than the non-
discrimination provisions themselves that will curtail stereotyped custody deci-
sions.
The most controversial of the Chapter’s prohibited factors is sexual orien-
tation.  Some courts assume that the open homosexuality of a parent is detri-
mental to the child’s interests.  This treatment reflects a moral judgment, not a
scientific one, and even as a moral matter, is subject to considerable societal de-
bate. Attempting to avoid over-generalizations on both sides of the debate,
Chapter 2 requires that sexual orientation should not be a consideration and that
homosexual conduct, like heterosexual, extra-marital conduct, should be disre-
garded unless shown to be harmful to an individual child. § 2.12(1)(d) & (e).
g. Extension of principles to parents by estoppel and de facto parents.  Chapter 2
covers not only disputes between legal parents who do not live together but
also, in some circumstances, individuals who have functioned as parents.  The
Chapter extends the same treatment that it affords to legal parents to four cate-
gories of individuals whom it labels “parents by estoppel.” § 2.03(1)(b).  One
category includes an individual upon whom a child support obligation is im-
posed, even if he or she is not the child’s legal parent.  Another category in-
cludes a man who lived with the child for at least two years and had a reason-
able good faith belief that he was the child’s biological father.  Still another
category of parent by estoppel extends to an individual who lived with the child
since the child’s birth under a co-parenting agreement with the legal parent or
parents.  Finally, an individual who lived with the child for at least two years
pursuant to an appropriate agreement with the legal parent or parents may be a
parent by estoppel.
Other individuals, such as a stepparent or the non-marital partner of the le-
gal parent, may function as a parent and thereby receive recognition as a de
facto parent, under a strict set of criteria designed to test the individual’s level of
commitment and involvement in the child’s life.  § 2.03(1)(c).  De facto parent
status is extended only to an adult who lived with the child and who regularly
performed at least half of the caretaking functions with respect to the child, with
the consent of at least one of the child’s parents and without expectation of fi-
nancial compensation.
Recognition as a parent does not necessarily entail an allocation of custo-
dial or decisionmaking responsibility, only that consideration will be given un-
der the allocation rules set forth in the Chapter.  In applying these rules, a legal
parent and a parent by estoppel are favored somewhat over a de facto parent.
For example, a de facto parent ordinarily cannot receive primary custody re-
sponsibility if a fit legal parent is able and willing to take such responsibility.  §
2.18(1)(a).  A de facto parent, in turn, is favored over other non-parents.  Except
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for grandparents and other close relatives, a person who is neither a legal par-
ent, a parent by estoppel or a de facto parent cannot be allocated custodial or de-
cisionmaking responsibility, unless the alternative would be harmful to the
child. § 2.18(2). Even a grandparent or close relative cannot be allocated respon-
sibility unless the individual has developed a significant relationship with the
child, one of the child’s parents consents, and the objecting parent has not been
performing a reasonable share of parenting functions. § 2.18(2)(a).  Exception is
also made for a biological parent of the child who is not the child’s legal parent
but who had an agreement with a legal parent under which the individual re-
tained some parental rights or responsibilities. § 2.18(2)(b).
III.  Recognizing the Limits of Law
Chapter 2 recognizes the limited role the law can effectively play in re-
solving disputes over the care and control of children.  It assumes that the law
cannot prevent embittered or adversarial adults from waging battle over chil-
dren, predict with any certainty the future behaviors of adults or future re-
sponses by children, or guarantee that children will obtain the love and nurture
that they most need.
Too often reform efforts focus on the narrow minority of high conflict cases
whose results are likely to be poor, no matter what the law is.16  Judged by the
outcomes in these cases, no law will seem sound.  Acknowledging the limits of
law, this Chapter seeks to manage the small percentage of cases in which serious
conflict exists, while strengthening the incentives of most parents to serve their
children well without undue interference by the law.
Chapter Three
I. Introduction
The Anglo-American history of child support encompasses both public and
private law.  Child support obligations were first imposed by the Elizabethan
poor law. They ran not to children but to the local parish, for they were de-
signed to save the parish the expense of supporting indigent children.  At com-
mon law, parents had no privately enforceable obligation to support their chil-
dren.  Commentators frequently observed that parents had a moral but not a
legal responsibility to their children, and hence there was no private remedy for
nonsupport, at least not at law.  In the United States, remnants of this principle
persisted well into the twentieth century.17
During the twentieth century, all states enacted statutes requiring parents
to provide child support, generally in a “just and reasonable” amount.  Receiv-
ing little guidance from those vague statutes, trial courts frequently applied a
rubric that referred to the child’s needs and the nonresidential parent’s eco-
16. The Maccoby & Mnookin study determined that about 15 percent of cases involved intense
conflict between the parents.  See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 10, at 140.
17. See Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1953) (liability of parent for medical services pro-
vided to minor child) and cases cited therein. See generally ROBERT MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG,
CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 261-270 (4th ed. 2000).
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nomic ability to help satisfy those needs.  This approach to child support awards
has often been characterized as “need-based,” or “discretionary.” In practice, the
residential parent generally submitted a household budget in excess of house-
hold income, and the nonresidential parent did likewise.  The child support or-
der effectively required that the nonresidential parent pay some portion of the
unmet budget expenses of the child.  Child support awards were unpredictable
and highly variable in factually indistinguishable cases.  Additionally, child
support awards were widely believed to be grossly inadequate.
In the third quarter of the twentieth century Congress persistently ex-
pressed concern about the adequacy of child support awards and the burdens
that inadequate awards cast on federal and state government, particularly on the
categorical public assistance program formerly called Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) and later restyled as Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF).18  In 1984, as a condition for state receipt of federal AFDC
funds, Congress required states to adopt non-binding guidelines for establishing
child support obligations.  In 1988, Congress additionally required that the
guidelines19 be given presumptive effect, and that any different result be justified
in writing or on the record.20  All states now calculate the basic child support ob-
ligation as a percentage of parent earnings.  Congress has not mandated any
particular percentages, and there is wide variation.  States also differ in their
treatment of child expenditure not included within the formula, such as day care
expenditure required by the residential parent’s employment.  American child
support guidelines generally base child support obligations on estimates of
marginal child expenditure in two-parent families. Chapter 3 characterizes these
guidelines as first-generation Marginal Expenditure guidelines.
The anticipated benefits of formulaic awards, as compared to earlier dis-
cretionary awards, were predictability, uniformity of awards in like circum-
stances, and greater adequacy and “correctness” of child support transfers.
Most observers consider the guidelines a step forward in providing predictable
and uniform awards.  However, typical guidelines have only modestly in-
creased the dollar amount of child support awards.21  Moreover, the mere notion
of a presumptively applicable child support guideline does not prescribe the
content of the guideline, that is, does not provide the substance of the child sup-
port obligation.  Although in retrospect this may seem self-evident, formulaic
18. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.
19. Although “formula” is often descriptively more apt, the term “child support guideline” is
frequently employed in federal law and the legal literature. “Child support guideline” is sometimes
also used to distinguish the practice, in some states, of expressing child support obligations in tabu-
lar form, rather than directly applying the underlying child support formula to each individual case.
Chapter 3 uses “formula” and “guideline” interchangeably.  “Guidelines,” in the plural, is also used
to signify the entire body of child support rules, including the formula.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 667.
21. Examining child support awards made before and after the introduction of child support
guidelines in three representative states, one study reported “. . .a modest post-guideline increase of
15 percent” and concluded that these “findings appear to be consistent with those reached in the few
other empirical studies of child support guidelines conducted to date.”  Jessica Pearson, Nancy Tho-
ennes, & Patricia Tjaden, Legislating Adequacy: The Impact of Child Support Guidelines, 23 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 569, 585 (1989).
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guidelines were initially welcomed as scientific answers to old questions never
adequately addressed by child support doctrine.  It was commonly believed that
a formula would produce a “correct answer” to the question: What is the right,
or just, amount of child support?  On the contrary, instead of answering this
question, child support guidelines simply pose it anew in the generalized con-
text of a uniform guideline rather than in the individualized context of a discre-
tionary award.  Additionally, the factors that underlay inadequate or unjust dis-
cretionary child support awards could not be expected to vanish in the face of
formulaic guidelines; those factors might instead be expected to influence rule-
makers who construct the guidelines.
Chapter 3 sets out a method for establishing the substantive content of
child support rules. Chapter 3 is primarily addressed to the rulemaker who con-
structs or reviews22 the state child support formula and the associated child sup-
port rules.  In order to illustrate the content and consequences of alternative
rules, Chapter 3 uses available data, including estimates of marginal child ex-
penditure and household equivalence scales.  However, the significance of
Chapter 3 lies not in the numbers chosen for illustrative purposes, but rather in
the method followed for establishing child support obligations.  As the data im-
prove and change, the numbers may vary.  But the methodology should remain
constant.23
Chapter 3 is followed by a Glossary and an Appendix.  The Glossary is or-
ganized substantively, rather than alphabetically, and is designed to serve as an
introduction to the theory and landscape of contemporary American child sup-
port law.  It explains the concept of marginal child expenditure; surveys a range
of competing child support formulas, including those currently used by Ameri-
can jurisdictions; and sets out two tables for determining basic adequacy and
comparing the standards of living of the child’s residential household and the
support obligor, adjusting both tables to take into account direct child expendi-
ture by the obligor, as well by the residential parent.  Readers unfamiliar with
the technical literature of child support may profitably begin with the Glossary,
which is reprinted at the end of Chapter 3.  The Glossary is followed by an Ap-
pendix containing portions of a prior draft of Chapter 3, which proposed a first-
generation Marginal Expenditure formula enhanced by meliorative provisions.
The commentary of this earlier draft contains, inter alia, extensive discussion of
the concept of marginal child expenditure and its appropriate use in the devel-
opment of child support obligations.  The prior draft can be read as an explana-
tion and a critique of the first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula.  It
shows the limitations of the first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula and
demonstrates how difficult they are to overcome without fundamentally alter-
ing the formula.  It may also be read as a rulemaker’s guide to the second-best,
22. Federal law requires each state to review its guidelines “at least once every 4 years to ensure
that their application results in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts.”  42
U.S.C. § 667(a).
23. Chapter 3 necessarily uses concrete numerical explanations and illustrations. Numbers are
an unavoidable aspect of understanding child support and constructing just child support rules.
However, the reader needs no more than rudimentary arithmetic and patience to work with this
material.
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that is, how to revise an existing first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula
to make the most of a seriously flawed instrument, should that be required.
II. The Methodology of Chapter 3
Chapter 3 begins with a balancing process generally familiar to legal audi-
ences.  Balancing is typically used to resolve legal disputes when diverse claim-
ants seek to assert legitimate but conflicting interests.  However, balancing has
not previously been systematically applied in the development of child support
rules and formulas.  Chapter 3 posits that the establishment of a just child sup-
port obligation requires the compromise and harmonization of competing val-
ues and interests.24  Chapter 3 initially identifies the interests of all the parties,
including the child, the residential parent, the nonresidential parent, and the
state.  It also identifies the social and cultural values implicated in the formula-
tion and execution of child support rules.  After exploring a range of interests
that each party might assert, Chapter 3 establishes the cognizable interests of each
of the parties (those interests that are taken into account in establishing the op-
erative objectives of Chapter 3) and also specifies the social and cultural values
that should be reflected or expressed in the child support rules.
In Chapter 3, the role of compromise and harmonization is three-fold.
First, the interests of all parties are taken into account in defining the cognizable
interests of each party, that is, those interests that the Chapter recognizes, sub-
ject to compromise and harmonization.  Next, in defining the § 3.04 objectives of
child support, the cognizable interests of each party are compromised and har-
monized with the competing cognizable interests of all other parties.  Finally, in
responding to the specific economic circumstances of the parties, the child sup-
port formula and rules again balance and harmonize the interests of the parties
in a manner designed to realize § 3.04 objectives in the particular case before the
court.
Besides yielding a set of operative goals and principled child support
guidelines, the process of balancing interests has a another important virtue.  In
the highly charged and often polarized arena of child support, balancing tends
to be consensus-building, for it identifies and takes into account the interests of
all parties.  No single interest is fully vindicated, but no interest is ignored or
slighted either.  Identifying and accounting for all interests is a useful antidote to
the polarization that results when the interests of one party, whether the child,
the state, the residential parent, or the support obligor, are treated as preeminent
or specially privileged.
24. Child support law has been characterized, on the one hand, by precepts that exalt the child’s
interests and, on the other, by often inadequate awards that may leave children in poverty while
their nonresidential parent enjoys a comfortable standard of living.  This is not to say that there are
not other operative objectives; the results bespeak them.  But they generally operate sub silentio, and
the gap between the principles and operative reality has resulted in normless decisionmaking and
rulemaking.  Child support doctrine and legal scholarship have failed to recognize explicitly that the
interests of the parties are conflicting and competing, and that a just law of child support must iden-
tify and balance those competing interests.
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The formula and the auxiliary rules proposed in Chapter 3 are designed to
realize § 3.04 objectives.25 Commonly, state child support guidelines are pre-
ceded by a list of objectives.  Not uncommonly, the objectives are inconsistent
and thus incapable of realization.  Even when the objectives are coherent and
thus theoretically capable of realization, the guidelines that follow are usually
incapable of realizing those objectives.  The extent to which they do so is meas-
ured throughout the Chapter in the Comment and in representative illustra-
tions.26
Chapter 3 illustrations show both male and female residential parents.
However, when it is not possible to avoid using a personal pronoun or adjective
in speaking about parents generally, “she” and “her” have been used for resi-
dential parents, and “he” and “his” have been used for nonresidential parents.
This has been done simply for conciseness and clarity; it expresses no gender
preference in the allocation of residential responsibility.  The results of each Il-
lustration are quantitatively evaluated in terms of comparative economic out-
comes and economic adequacy for all parties.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics
household equivalence scale is applied generally to compare economic out-
comes.  A measure of basic adequacy derived from federal poverty threshold
figures is additionally applied to low-income households.  (For full discussion of
these measures, see Glossary.)  Each illustration also compares the results under
the formula and rules proposed by Chapter 3 with the results under a typical
first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula and associated rules.  Qualitative
achievement of the goals of the Chapter is measured by the extent to which the
child support rules express identified social and cultural values and provide de-
sired behavioral incentives. The operation of the formula and auxiliary rules is
additionally demonstrated in a series of step-by-step work sheets of the sort
typically used by states to calculate child support obligations.  The work sheets,
which are appended to the sections they illustrate, may also be used to construct
a computer program.
25. Section 3.04 objectives are not simply aspirational or hortatory.  They are intended to be op-
erative goals.  They are concrete and determinate, and their achievement is measurable.
26. The Chapter 3 formula sets obligations for one, two, and three or more children.  However,
the illustrations are limited to one and two children, for they constitute the large majority of children
subject to child support orders.
In their representative California sample, Maccoby and Mnookin found that “[n]early half of the
separating couples had only one child, and most of the rest had only two.” ELEANOR E. MACCOBY
AND ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 59 (1992).
Specifically, their data showed:





Five or more      0.4__
100.0%
(N = 1,124)
Id. at 61. With respect to number of children, Maccoby and Mnookin observed that their California
sample was quite similar to a national sample of divorced mothers. Id. at 62.
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III. Section 3.04: the Establishment of Legal Principles upon Which to Base
Child Support Obligations
With two noteworthy exceptions, child support guidelines now extant in
the United States are based on the principle that a nonresidential parent should
contribute to the support of a child as the parent would if he were sharing a
home with the child and the child’s residential parent. These guidelines deter-
mine a parent’s support obligation for a child who resides in another household
according to estimates of marginal child expenditure, expressed as a percentage
of total family expenditure, in two-parent families.  These guidelines may be
understood to address the question: What is the just amount of child support
payable by a nonresidential parent?  Unlike the earlier need-based discretionary
rubric, these guidelines are neither intended nor designed to register and reflect
the need of the child in the residential household.  They do not, in any meaning-
ful manner, consider the resources independently available to the residential
household.27  Rather, they generally establish uniform percentages payable at
given levels of obligor income.  Chapter 3 characterizes these guidelines as first-
generation Marginal Expenditure guidelines, or formulas.
First-generation Marginal Expenditure guidelines are capable of producing
just results when the child’s parents have substantially equal incomes before the
payment of child support; indeed, in various ways these guidelines implicitly
assume substantial equality of income.  However, they generally do not produce
satisfactory results when the child’s parents have substantially unequal incomes.
This shortcoming is apparent when the residential parent has substantially
lower or higher income: in the first case, child support payments are inadequate;
in the second, they are excessive and unjustifiably burden the support obligor.
An earlier draft of this Chapter succumbed to the weight of current law and
propounded a first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula, which it aug-
mented with several meliorative provisions designed to remedy some of the
most obvious shortcomings of first-generation Marginal Expenditure guidelines.
This mildly reformist approach appears as an Appendix to this chapter.  It is in-
cluded for the assistance of jurisdictions reconsidering their guidelines; it serves
both to critique first-generation Marginal Expenditure guidelines and to guide
jurisdictions choosing to retain and reform a first-generation Marginal Expen-
diture guideline.
The Institute ultimately concluded that a first-generation Marginal Expen-
diture formula, even when augmented by meliorative provisions, was too often
incapable of accomplishing the goals expressed in § 3.04.  Moreover, the melio-
rative provisions added undue complexity to the routine administration of child
support law.  To more fully and efficiently accomplish § 3.04 goals, Chapter 3
27. A majority of the first-generation guidelines, the so-called “Income Shares” guidelines,
nominally consider the combined income of both parents for the purpose of establishing the per-
centage of income payable by the nonresidential parent.  However, the purpose and effect of such
consideration is not to assess the resources independently available to the child in the residential
household, but simply to execute the principle that the percentage of income actually (by the non-
residential parent) and constructively (by the residential parent) payable as child support should be
determined by and applied against the total income of both parents.  For further explanation of this
point, see Glossary, note 8.
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required a child support formula that would take into account the absolute and
relative incomes of the child’s parents.
Chapter 3 ultimately drew inspiration from the Massachusetts child sup-
port formula,28 which has also been adopted, in a modified form, by the District
of Columbia.29  The child support formula propounded by Chapter 3 effectively
adopts the first-generation concept of marginal child expenditure, or a close
proxy, as a baseline measure.  It accepts it, all other things being equal, as a just
measure of a nonresidential parent’s child support obligation.  But when all
other things are not equal, as they usually are not, the second-generation for-
mula proposed by Chapter 3 makes appropriate adjustments.
The Chapter 3 formula combines the conceptual virtues of the old need-
based discretionary rubric with the conceptual and practical virtues of the first-
generation Marginal Expenditure formulas.  Like a first-generation Marginal
Expenditure formula, the Chapter 3 formula can be efficiently administered in a
mass system of child support.  Yet the Chapter 3 formula, like the need-based
discretionary rubric, is also sensitive to the relative and absolute needs of the
parents and their children.  The Chapter 3 formula requires no more information
than that employed by the first-generation Marginal Expenditure guideline used
in a majority of states, the so-called Income Shares formula.  Yet, unlike first-
generation Marginal Expenditure guidelines, the Chapter 3 formula processes
that information in a manner that takes into account the economic circumstances
of the residential household as well as those of the nonresidential parent.  It
registers absolute need for both parents and factors the relative economic cir-
cumstances of the parents, adjusting the child support obligation accordingly,
both upward and downward.
IV. The Various Sections of Chapter 3
a. The formula.  The essence of the Chapter 3 formula, also called the ALI
formula, is presented in two provisions: Sections 3.05 and 3.15.  Section 3.05 pre-
scribes the content of the ALI child support formula and the appropriate treat-
ment of child expenditure not included within the formula.  Section 3.15 is an
income imputation provision designed to capture income actually or construc-
tively available to the residential household.  These two provisions are a pack-
age.  They are not meant to be combined with the provisions of a first-
generation Marginal Expenditure formula.
b. The remaining provisions of the Chapter.  Unless specifically indicated oth-
erwise, all the remaining provisions of the Chapter apply to both the ALI for-
mula and a first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula.  Although the re-
maining provisions apply equally to both formulas, their application may
produce different results depending on whether the provisions are applied with
28. Massachusetts Rules of Court, Child Support Guidelines.  Although the Massachusetts for-
mula has not been explained or rationalized as the ALI formula has in Chapter 3, nevertheless the
basic elements used and refined in the ALI formula are contained in the Massachusetts child support
formula. For further discussion of the Massachusetts formula, see § 3.05, Reporter’s Note to Com-
ment b, and § 3.06, Reporter’s Note to Comment c.
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1.
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a Marginal Expenditure or ALI formula.  In such cases, the superiority of the
ALI formula is again evident.  See particularly § 3.08, Determining the Child
Support Obligations of Dual Residential Parents, where the difficult problems
posed by the application of a first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula in
dual residence (joint physical custody) cases largely disappear with application
of the ALI formula.
c. The Appendix.  The Appendix includes a first-generation Marginal Ex-
penditure formula supplemented with equitable provisions.  Section 3.05A pre-
scribes the content of the Marginal Expenditure child support formula and the
appropriate treatment of types of child expenditure not included within the
formula.  Sections 3.052A, 3.053A, and 3.07A (2)(e) are meliorative provisions
designed to remedy some of the most serious shortcomings of first-generation
Marginal Expenditure formulas.  Section 3.052A provides a supplementary child
support award when a child’s need for care limits the earnings of the residential
parent.  Section 3.053A provides a supplementary child support award when the
residential household, despite the best efforts of the residential parent, is unable
to achieve a minimum decent standard of living. Section 3.07A (2)(e) affords
hardship relief to nonresidential parents whose income is less than that of the
residential parent.  The four provisions are a package.  They are not meant to be
combined with ALI formula provisions.30  The Appendix also contains small
portions of other provisions of the Chapter that should or may be varied to ac-
commodate a first-generation Marginal Expenditure formula.
Chapters Four and Five
I. The Background of Existing Law
a. Division of property.  At one time there was a sharp division between
most American states, which followed traditional common-law principles in the
allocation of property at divorce, and the eight states that followed community
property principles. The common law treated property owned by the spouses
during their marriage as the individual property of one of them unless, as to a
particular piece of property, they had acted to create joint ownership. The title in
which property was held was critical. The effect was to vest ownership in the
spouse who earned the money with which the property was purchased, al-
though that owner could make a gift to the other spouse by shifting property to
joint title, or sole title in the other spouse’s name. At divorce each spouse was
allocated his or her property. The result in most cases was to allocate the bulk of
the property to the husband. Alimony was therefore often the only financial
remedy available to meet claims the divorced wife might have on her own be-
30. This is because the ALI formula proposed by Section 3.05 does the work of all four Marginal
Expenditure provisions (§§ 3.05A, 3.052A, 3.053A, and 3.07A (2)(e)).  The ALI formula itself accounts
for earnings constraints the residential parent may experience and for difficulty the residential
household may have in attaining a minimum decent standard of living. The ALI formula also ad-
justs, in both directions, for relative income inequality between the parents.
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half, as contrasted with claims of child support she might make on behalf of her
children.
Community property law begins with the contrary presumption: all earn-
ings from spousal labor during the marriage are the property of the marital
“community” in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest. Property
acquired with spousal earnings is therefore also owned equally by the spouses,
regardless of whether purchased with funds earned by the husband, the wife, or
both, unless the parties change the character of the property by agreement or
gift. In California and two other community property states, all community
property is divided at divorce into spousal shares equal in value, although not
necessarily identical in kind. Alimony (renamed as “spousal support” or
“maintenance” in most jurisdictions) may also be allowed, as determined on a
case-by-case basis.
This sharp dichotomy between common law and community property tra-
ditions no longer prevails in the United States. All the common-law states now
allow the divorce court to distribute the spouse’s property between them on a
basis other than common-law principles of ownership, under a doctrine known
generally as “equitable distribution.” Five of the eight community property
states also instruct their divorce courts to divide the community property be-
tween the spouses “equitably” (rather than “equally”). Equitable distribution is
therefore the dominant rule today, followed everywhere but in the three “equal
division” community property states.31
The consensus, however, is not so great as first appears. In community
property states, the concept of joint ownership is pervasive, applicable not only
at dissolution but also at death and during the intact marriage.32 The common-
law states, in contrast, generally retain their traditional separate ownership
principles in all matters other than the system of equitable distribution they ap-
ply at divorce. These different starting points in the basic underlying concepts of
ownership may yield differences in the application of equitable distribution
rules that are similar in form. The two most critical features of any law of equi-
table distribution are its rules for identifying which spousal-owned property is
within the pool available to the divorce court to allocate on equitable grounds,
and its default or presumptive allocation rule. The trend in equitable division
states has favored a presumption, whether formal or in practice, that an equita-
ble division of property is an equal division, but not all states follow this pat-
tern, and its strength varies among those that do. Such differences in the default
allocation rule are sometimes related to differences in the definition of property
available for allocation. Strong presumptions of equal division are more com-
mon among states that exclude from the allocable pool inherited property, or
property owned by the spouses individually before their marriage, as compared
to states that allow the divorce court to allocate all property owned by the
spouses, however or whenever acquired. More generally, inclusive or open-
ended rules defining the property available for allocation are associated with
31. These three are California, Louisiana, and New Mexico.
32. For example, the will of a spouse in a community property state applies only to that
spouse’s half-share of the community property. The surviving spouse’s ownership of the other half
is not dependent upon the will and cannot be defeated by it.
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more discretionary and open-ended rules of allocation. California is a leading
example at the other end of the spectrum; it requires equal division in all cases,
but has detailed and comprehensive rules distinguishing the equally-divided
community property from each spouse’s “separate property,” which the court
cannot reallocate.
Looking behind these differences nonetheless reveals some common sub-
stantive themes. For example, even in those states that do not require or strongly
presume equal division, property acquired with spousal labor is often divided
equally at dissolution. At the same time, even in those states which in principle
allow the court to allocate all property owned by the spouses, property inherited
by one spouse during the marriage is treated differently from property acquired
through spousal labor. Important distinctions among the states thus emerge
primarily at the next level of detail: when is a case not “ordinary,” so that an
equal division presumption should not apply? When, if ever, should the court
be allowed to divide property that one of the spouses inherited or owned before
the marriage?
Generalization becomes more difficult at this finer level of detail for two
reasons. First, the rules of many states leave so much to trial court discretion
that statutes and reported decisions provide limited guidance to how the law
actually operates in practice. Second, for reasons developed further below, there
was an effort in the past two decades to persuade courts to include, within the
rubric of property division, claims on post-marital earnings that could tradition-
ally have been made only under the rubric of alimony. Some of these claims
have been rejected by most courts, but others have been embraced in varying
degrees. For example, nearly all courts have rejected attempts to treat degrees or
professional licenses as property, while the treatment of professional goodwill
has been considerably more varied.33 The significance of these resulting varia-
tions in marital property law cannot be understood without examining the
treatment of related alimony claims, which traditionally were the only basis for
claims on post-marital earnings.
b. Alimony.  Alimony was originally a remedy of the English ecclesiastical
courts developed at a time when complete divorce was available only by special
legislative action, and gender roles in marriage were rigid and unquestioned.
The husband had a legal and customary duty to support his wife. This duty
continued after divorce because there was no divorce in the modern sense, but
only legal separation. When judicial divorce became available in the 18th and
19th century, alimony remained a remedy even though its initial justification—
the duty of the husband to support his wife—no longer applied. One
explanation was that the duty to support one’s wife could not be extinguished
by the husband’s own misconduct. Following that rationale, some jurisdictions
allowed alimony claims only by “innocent” wives divorcing “guilty” husbands.
Other jurisdictions, focusing on women’s financial dependency, in theory al-
33. Property claims on both degrees and goodwill are effectively claims on post-dissolution
earnings if the “asset” in question is measured by estimating them. New York is the only state that
accepts this treatment of degrees and licenses.
ALI CHAPTER - FMT_2.DOC 10/01/01  11:54 AM
22 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 8:1 2001
lowed claims by guilty wives as well.34 This view was eventually adopted by the
English ecclesiastical courts from their concern that the wife might otherwise
“be turned out destitute on the streets or led into temptation,” the assumption
being that women were limited to domestic skills and could not support them-
selves by employment.35 The traditional explanation for alimony was weakened
considerably once absolute divorce was allowed, and was undermined com-
pletely by modern reforms removing fault from divorce and rejecting gender
roles. Yet the financial dependency of wives continued in most marriages. On a
practical level a doctrine such as alimony was believed necessary even though
the law had no theory to explain it.
Unease over the continuing validity of the traditional rationale for alimony
affected decisions early in the modern regime of no-fault divorce. These deci-
sions granted only limited-duration alimony to women who had been home-
makers in long-term marriages, and expressed the view that alimony’s principal
purpose was to provide short-term transitional assistance to such women. The
inability to articulate any basis for an indefinite continuation of the husband’s
support obligation, and the conviction that where possible divorce should effect
a “clean break” between the marital partners, combined to push the courts in
this direction. The result was buttressed by the expectation that the homemaker
would develop marketable skills sufficient to afford her an acceptable living
standard, at least when combined with her share in the equitable distribution of
their accumulated property, an entitlement which was then relatively new in
many common-law states.
But these expectations were often frustrated, and this vision of alimony
does not describe the law that one finds today in most appellate opinions. At
least in long-term marriages one instead finds a widespread view that marital
dissolution should not dissolve all financial ties between the former spouses if
the result would be a significant disparity in the spouses’ post-dissolution finan-
cial standing. A similar intuition encourages awards in marriages of shorter du-
ration as well, where there are children of the marriage who are still young and
will be primarily in the care of one spouse.
But this apparent consensus exists only in very general terms, and has pro-
duced no dominant theory to explain the alimony award. The prevailing statu-
tory formulation allows the court to grant alimony (now usually called “spousal
support” or “maintenance”) to the spouse who is in need. Neither the statutes
nor the cases, however, explain why a needy person’s former spouse should be
liable for his or her support rather than the needy person’s parents, children, or
society as a whole. The result is that the meaning of “need”—the most funda-
mental issue created by such statutes—is hopelessly confused. Some opinions
find an alimony claimant in “need” only if unable to provide for her basic neces-
sities; others find need if the claimant is unable to support himself at a moderate
middle-class level; and still others find need when the claimant is unable to
34. A well-known commentator of the era argued that “a guilty wife may starve as quickly as
an innocent one,” from which he concluded that the husband has a lifetime obligation to keep his
wife from need until the obligation was assumed by another. Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Back-
ground of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 199 (1939).
35. J. EEKALAAR & M. MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE 9, 14 (1986).
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sustain the living standard enjoyed during the marriage even if it was lavish.
There can be no principled basis for choosing among these definitions of need
without an explanation for imposing the obligation to meet it. In fact, “need” is
often used in the law as a conclusory term whose only meaning is that a court
has found the spouse entitled to an award of alimony.
It is therefore not surprising that research studies find that trial court deci-
sions on alimony vary widely, even within the same jurisdiction. Some deci-
sional variation would be expected in even a perfect system, because trial courts
must have discretion in these matters to deal appropriately with factual varia-
tions that no statute can comprehensively anticipate. But it seems clear that the
variation arises at least in part because trial courts apply different principles as
often as they face different facts. As a consequence, decisions are very difficult to
predict. This unpredictability affects the negotiations that settle the great major-
ity of cases.36
c. The relationship between alimony awards and property allocations.  Income
flows and capital assets can be substituted for one another, and can be valued on
a common scale. For this reason, an enhanced share of marital property may in
principle always substitute for a fixed-term alimony award. This was the prem-
ise sometimes relied upon early in the no-fault reform era by those who hoped
that equitable distribution reforms, by recognizing the wife’s property claims,
would end reliance upon alimony. Those hopes were frustrated in practice. Few
divorcing couples have capital assets sufficiently large to provide an adequate
substitute for any but the most modest of alimony awards. Yet alimony also re-
mained an unsatisfactory remedy. The dramatic reforms in marital property
law, and in the grounds for divorce, left the law of alimony largely unaffected.
Alimony awards were still unpredictable, unreliable, and often unenforceable. It
was thus natural for advocates to look for alternatives in the newly reformed
property law. Alimony claims based on the former spouse’s greater earnings
could be replaced by claims that such earnings were the product of a thing
called “earning capacity” that was marital property in which both spouses had
an ownership interest. That characterization would give the claimant a marital
property entitlement to share in the portion of the other spouse’s post-
dissolution earnings attributable to this jointly owned earning capacity. Such a
property entitlement promised a far more reliable strategy than the appeal to
judicial discretion at the heart of the alimony claim which it replaced.
36. As a general matter settlement is more likely when the parties have similar expectations of
the likely outcome of litigation, than when their expectations differ significantly. There is evidence
that clear rules encourage settlement, suggesting that the highly discretionary rules traditionally
employed in divorce make parties less likely to settle, perhaps because the difficulty of predicting
the result of litigation makes it more likely the parties’ lawyers will have different predictions. Grif-
fiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do in Divorce Cases?, 20 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 135, 161 n.24
(1986). An alternative hypothesis observes that highly discretionary rules of adjudication also make
the parties less confident of their predictions. Their uncertainty increases the bargaining advantage
in the negotiations of the party who is more able, financially or emotionally, to bear the risk of an
unfavorable outcome. This consequence of discretionary rules is thought unfortunate by writers who
have considered them. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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Judicial receptivity to property claims on “earning capacity” depended
largely on the extent to which those claims could be framed in familiar terms.
Courts generally rejected claims that professional degrees or licenses are “prop-
erty” with a value measured by the earnings increment that the holders of such
credentials typically realize. On the other hand, most courts allow property
claims on professional goodwill, and many have accepted measures of that
goodwill that effectively include the obligor’s earning capacity.
While in some cases the treatment of earning capacity as property would
lead to an equitable result, in other cases it would not. One source of this varia-
tion is the usual rule that marital property does not include property acquired
before marriage. Marital property rules would not therefore reach earning ca-
pacity brought into the marriage. One spouse’s post-dissolution income may
thus be treated as marital property while the other’s is not, depending upon
when the capacity to earn that income had been acquired. This timing question
may or may not be related to the equitable considerations that appropriately
bear on the law’s treatment of such post-dissolution income. See § 4.07, Com-
ment a. Alimony awards, in contrast, may be based on the parties’ current in-
come without regard to this timing question.
There are additional reasons as well why alimony is a better vehicle than
property allocations for adjusting the former spouse’s relative post-dissolution
living standards. An alimony award, ordinarily paid periodically, is subject to
modification with changes in the circumstances of the obligee or obligor. A
property award, in contrast, is a fixed judgment debt. A “property” award de-
termined by capitalizing some portion of the obligor’s expected future income
thus becomes a fixed obligation which cannot be changed if the earnings fore-
cast proves inaccurate. It may therefore be a poor vehicle for achieving equitable
objectives. But property claims on future earnings will be brought if the only al-
ternative is an alimony remedy which is unreliable or uncertain.
II. Lessons from This History
a. The importance of establishing a coherent justification for alimony.  The ab-
sence of any systematic theory of alimony in modern divorce law presents diffi-
culties that extend to the law of marital property. The law of alimony needs a
justification that can support a law operating more consistently, more reliably,
and more predictably. Part I(b) of this essay observed that need, the most com-
mon criterion for an alimony award under existing law, is employed largely as a
conclusory term. Not only do courts use varying definitions of need, but they
sometimes grant alimony awards in cases where no need exists under any
commonly employed standard. Sometimes alimony is denied despite the pres-
ence of obvious need. The solution does not lie in refining our understanding of
need, but in recognizing that alimony has been used as a residual category to
provide remedies in a wide variety of cases that do not share any consistent
pattern that can be captured in a sensible definition of need. A unifying concept
must be sought in other terms. The approach of the Principles is to refocus the
alimony inquiry from need to loss, a shift that some of the cases have now begun
to adopt.
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A spouse found in need is usually a spouse on whom the marital dissolu-
tion imposes a loss that seems unfairly disproportionate. That is, the sense that
one spouse has an obligation to meet the other’s post-dissolution needs arises
from the recognition that the need results at least in part from an unfair distri-
bution of the financial losses arising from the marital failure. The payment’s true
justification is as a remedy for an unfair loss allocation, not as relief of need, and
need is not therefore an eligibility requirement for the award. The spouse who
incurs a disproportionate financial loss from the dissolution will often seem in
need, but even in those cases the degree of need will vary. That is why no single
standard of need appropriately decides all alimony cases. Chapter 5 therefore
characterizes the remedy as compensation for loss rather than relief of need, and
employs the term compensatory payment (instead of alimony or spousal support)
to emphasize this conceptual change.
Grounding compensatory awards on a principle of loss yields a conceptual
reformulation that helps explain generally prevailing practices. The categories of
compensable loss recognized in the draft bear a close relationship to the kinds of
fact patterns that most often support alimony claims in existing law. At the same
time, the shift to loss as the primary explanatory concept allows development of
rules of adjudication that are more predictable in application than are rules
grounded upon a single but ill-defined goal of relieving need. Perhaps equally
important, reconceptualizing the award’s purpose as the equitable allocation of
a joint loss changes it from a plea for help to a claim of entitlement, thereby
making the award’s availability more certain. One result is to reduce the pres-
sure to expand the relief available through the division of property to reach
claims for which that remedy is ill-suited.
b. Recognizing the relationship between property allocation and compensatory
payments (alimony).  An equitable distribution rule must say something about
the facts that bear on assessments of equity. Even a rule that presumptively
divides marital property equally must offer guidance as to the circumstances
under which the presumption is rebutted. Existing statutes typically provide a
list of factors for the trial court to consider. That list typically overlaps with
other lists of factors that bear on whether alimony should be ordered. The over-
lap arises because  “need” is the most common rationale both for awarding ali-
mony and also for allowing one spouse an enhanced share of the marital prop-
erty. As explained above, the Principles redefine the question from need into
whether one of the spouses has incurred a compensable loss. But whether
“need” or “loss” is the central concept, there is no reason the term should mean
different things in these two contexts. The assessment of whether a spouse has
incurred a compensable loss can thus be made just once. If a compensable loss
has occurred, the choice of remedy (property or compensatory payments) is a
separate question, appropriately decided by rules that rely more on practical
considerations and less on basic principle.
A loss that is well-defined and close-ended, such as the cost of an educa-
tional program, may be remedied with a fixed sum provided from an enhanced
share of the property allocation. A loss that is open-ended and variable, such as
the loss of the marital living standard, will instead usually require modifiable
periodic payments, which is the form of award traditionally associated with
alimony, and recognized in these Principles as compensatory payments. While
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these general observations are helpful, the circumstances of some parties will
suggest departures from these conventional patterns. For some couples it may
be better to settle, for a lump sum and with finality, a claim that would in other
cases be better handled by periodic payments of modifiable amount or uncertain
duration. The potential size of the compensable loss relative to the value of the
parties’ marital property may affect this assessment. The Principles therefore
give courts considerable discretion to determine the most appropriate form for
any award in light of practical considerations. Most often the parties themselves
will readily reach agreement on these matters of implementation, especially if
they negotiate under the influence of rules such as those contained in the Princi-
ples, that establish with some clarity whether, and in what amount, a compensa-
ble loss will be recognized. Property division and alimony are always consid-
ered together by attorneys negotiating a settlement and by trial judges
adjudicating contested cases. Each element has an economic value and they can
be traded off against one another.
A court’s determination of whether a compensable loss has been incurred
by either spouse is made under rules set forth in Chapter 5 (Compensatory
Spousal Payments). Having found a spouse entitled to compensatory payments,
the court may then determine whether that entitlement is best satisfied through
an award of periodic payments, an enhanced share of the marital property, or a
blend of the two. The contrary pattern of the existing law, in which property
claims and for alimony claims are formally considered separately, is probably an
historical fortuity: the two remedies developed separately because they devel-
oped at different times.37
c. The value of statewide rules establishing presumptive results.  With divorce
rates at their current levels, divorce proceedings affect a large proportion of the
population. It appears that an individual American is more likely to be a party
to a state court domestic relations proceeding than to any other kind of state
court civil litigation.38 In many divorces the parties’ assets and incomes are not
great, and it will not be sensible or even possible to devote significant legal re-
sources to the divorce proceedings. Expeditious settlement with a minimum of
legal process is the preferred result. Rebuttable presumptions that decide the
majority of litigated cases facilitate this goal by making the results of potential
litigation more predictable. It has the second effect of requiring the development
of a consistent statewide policy on the matter addressed by the presumption.
Current law often avoids such policy choices, in practice if not in theory, by reli-
37. A different analysis would be necessary if the law allocated an enhanced share of the mari-
tal property to a spouse who had made a disproportionate contribution to its acquisition, because
that “contribution” consideration would not be reflected in the alimony or “compensable loss” de-
termination. However, the traditional community property rule, increasingly followed in the com-
mon-law marital property states, does not give an enhanced share of the marital property to the
spouse who earned the funds from which it was bought. The Principles also adopt this approach. See
§ 4.09, Comment c.
38. An admittedly partial count found about five million domestic relations cases filed in state
courts in 1999.  NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1999-2000—A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 42 (Brian J. Ostrom et al.
eds. 2001). In comparison, there were about 7.1 million other civil cases of all kinds filed in 1999 in
state courts of general jurisdiction.  Id. at 16.
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ance on the exercise of trial court discretion. But that approach devolves policy
to the predispositions of individual judges. Statewide rules provide consistency
across parties in the policies applied to their dissolutions. The presumptions es-
tablished under such rules must nonetheless be rebuttable, to allow trial courts
to respond to the unusual case presenting factual variations no governing stat-
ute could anticipate.
The approach of rebuttable presumptions is taken throughout the Princi-
ples. In applying it to Property Division and Compensatory Payments, the Prin-
ciples extend reforms that in the past decade were successfully applied to the law
of child support and that in many states already apply to the division of marital
property. While the use of presumptions in determining alimony is currently
less common, they are used in local rules adopted by some domestic relations
courts. For more on the use of statewide rules establishing presumptive results,
see § 1.01.
III. An Organizational Overview of Chapters Four and Five
a. Chapter 4.  Chapter 4 addresses the allocation of spousal property at dis-
solution. It adopts the majority view and distinguishes marital from separate
property. See § 4.03, Comment a. It follows prevailing law in recognizing as
marital property many important intangible assets, such as goodwill (§ 4.07) and
pensions (§ 4.08), while excluding earning capacity (§ 4.07). It recognizes the
presumption that marital property is divided equally between the parties at dis-
solution, § 4.09, as well as the usual rule that separate property is assigned to its
spousal owner, § 4.11.39 At the same time it vindicates the most persuasive ra-
tionale for a unitary property system, the claims of the long-term spouse, with a
rule that over the course of a long marriage recharacterizes separate property as
marital property for the purpose of dividing property at divorce. See § 4.12.
b. Chapter 5. The scope and objectives of Chapter 5 are set forth in Topic 1.
Section 5.03 provides an overview by listing all the compensable losses recog-
nized in the Chapter, and identifying for each the subsequent section that treats
it in detail. The Comment to § 5.03 includes Illustrations that show how these
sections would apply to common situations. The Comment also demonstrates
how later sections of Chapter 5, which address each compensable loss in detail,
contain provisions that ensure that multiple awards will not yield double-
counting, and that the entire design, taken as a whole, should produce a reason-
able result. These later sections are set out in Topics 2 and 3. These Topics sepa-
rate the compensable losses between those that give rise to a claim measured by
the post-dissolution disparity in spousal incomes (Topic 2), and those for fixed
amounts (Topic 3).
Topic 2 addresses the loss of the marital living standard experienced by the
person whose income after dissolution is less than his or her former spouse’s. It
recognizes this loss as compensable in two situations primarily: when the mar-
riage exceeds a duration threshold (§ 5.04), and when the less-well-off spouse
gave up opportunities to develop his or her earning capacity in order to serve as
39. The only exception arises when a judgment against separate assets is employed to reim-
burse one spouse for the other’s improper or fraudulent disposition of the marital property.
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the primary caretaker of the marital children (§ 5.05).40 The amount of the claim
is presumptively proportional to the spousal income disparity and, generally
speaking, to the duration of either the marriage (§ 5.04) or the childcare period
(§ 5.05). At any given marital duration the spouse who has cared for marital
children, by virtue of the combined effects of both sections, will have a larger
claim than the spouse who has not. However, even a spouse in a childless mar-
riage may be entitled to a large claim if the marital duration is sufficiently long
and the income disparity sufficiently great. Topic 2 awards are framed as peri-
odic payments the duration of which is set under § 5.06, and which may be
modified as provided under §§ 5.07, 5.08, and 5.09. But in appropriate cases the
court may make offsetting adjustments in the amount and duration of the
award, and may substitute an enhanced share of the marital property for all or
part of the Compensatory Payment (§ 5.10), thus establishing a basis for an une-
qual division of the marital property. Topic 3 addresses claims for fixed amounts
that are not based on the spouses’ post-dissolution income disparity. An exam-
ple is the claim a spouse may have for restitution of the costs that spouse in-
curred to finance the other spouse’s education (§ 5.12). Such claims are available
primarily in shorter marriages, and may often be satisfied through an enhanced
share of the marital property (§ 5.14).
An important objective of Chapter 5 is to replace current alimony law with
principles that are “consistent and predictable in application” (§ 5.02). This is ac-
complished primarily through rules that set forth circumstances under which a
presumption arises that a spouse is entitled to a particular compensatory award.
Other rules establish presumptive amounts for these awards. This approach
emulates reforms of the past decade, prodded by federal requirements in the
law of child support. Child support awards were once left nearly entirely to trial
judge discretion, but are now typically governed by detailed tables that set forth
presumptive award levels that apply unless the trial court makes specified
findings that justify another amount. An analogous approach is taken in this
Chapter.
The presumptions employed in Chapter 5 are typically rebuttable, and
awards may also be given in cases in which no presumptive entitlement arises.
In many cases the required presumption necessarily addresses a level of detail
whose precise content is left each jurisdiction’s policy-making body (see Part
II(c) of this Topic). Similar language is used throughout both Chapters in de-
scribing the findings required to rebut the presumption. Ideally, rebuttable pre-
sumptions will achieve substantial consistency and predictability, while pre-
serving the ability of trial courts to deal appropriately with the special cases that
no statute can fully anticipate.
40. Other comparable situations which are also recognized in Topic 2 include claimants whose
earning capacity loss arises from the care of children who are not the children of both spouses (see §
5.05, Comment b), or from the care of certain other persons, § 5.11.
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Chapter Six
During the final quarter of the twentieth century all western countries ex-
perienced extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital cohabitation.41  All re-
sponded with legal regulation, much of which substantially differs from Ameri-
can law.42  In addition to providing legal contrast, a comparative perspective
reveals the extent to which the American family (whether marital or nonmarital)
serves vital economic functions that in other countries are more often assumed
by society at large.  A comparative perspective illuminates the relative impor-
tance of American private law in assuring the welfare of children and fairness to
adults at family dissolution.43
In view of the scope of these Principles, Chapter 6 is limited to the following
question: What are the economic rights and responsibilities of the parties to each
other at the termination of their nonmarital cohabitation?44Although the three
trends are distinct, they are also interrelated.  For example, § 6.03 takes into ac-
count domestic partnership registration and declaration as some evidence that
the parties are domestic partners for purposes of Chapter 6.  Chapter 6 does not
create any rights against the government or third parties.45
Chapter 6 begins with the premise that if both parties desire, they may join
together and explicitly contract for the terms of their relationship.  Thus the role
of Chapter 6 is to provide an appropriate set of default rules, that is, the rules
that govern when the parties have not otherwise provided.  Accordingly,
41. See § 6.03, Reporter’s Note to Comment a.
42. See § 6.03, Reporter’s Note to Comment b.
43. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 10.
44. A survey of recent developments in the American treatment of nonmarital cohabitation
points up what Chapter 6 does and, equally importantly, what Chapter 6 does not do. There have
been several distinct trends.
Some jurisdictions have created a new legal status that falls short of marriage, but entails some of
the public rights and benefits of marriage.  This status is often called “domestic partnership.”  Al-
though largely intended for same-sex partners, who are not legally entitled to marry each other, in
some instances the opportunity has also been extended to opposite-sex couples.  This trend is em-
bodied in state and municipal registration statutes, which allow couples to register and which define
the incidents of registration.  The first comprehensive domestic partnership legislation was enacted
by Denmark in 1989. In the United States, domestic partnership legislation has been relatively mod-
est, except in Vermont and Hawaii, where broad-sweeping legislation was required by, or respon-
sive to, equal protection litigation. See § 6.03, Reporter’s Note to Comment g.
A second trend, which has considerable strength in the United States, is the extension to non-
marital cohabitants of private rights and benefits historically enjoyed only by married persons.  This
has been most noteworthy in the employer-employee relationship, where many employers have ex-
tended family health and pension benefits to the domestic partners of their employees. For this pur-
pose, employers generally require some sort of declaration that the parties live together and assume
mutual responsibility for each other.  Data on Fortune 500 companies, colleges and universities, and
state and local government are collected at www.hrc.org.
A third trend is legal regulation of the rights and obligations that one nonmarital partner may
have against the other at the dissolution of their relationship by inter vivos separation or death.  The
inter vivos aspect of this third area is the topic of Chapter 6.  (In view of the scope of these Principles,
they treat only dissolution by inter vivos separation.)
45. Thus, Chapter 6 should not be understood to revive the doctrine of common law marriage
in jurisdictions that have abolished it. See § 3.01, Comment a.
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Chapter 6 provides equitable rules that apply at the termination of qualifying
domestic relationships unless one of the parties proves an inconsistent agree-
ment.  Chapter 6 could alternatively have required that a nonmarital claimant
affirmatively prove an agreement specifying the claims available at permanent
separation.  Chapter 6 declined to do so and instead chose the former course for
many reasons.46  Those reasons can be organized in two categories. The first re-
lates to the intentions of the parties.  The second is normative.
Chapter 6 takes the view that the parties’ failure to marry should not be
understood to signify that the parties agreed that they would have no economic
obligations to each other.  As the incidence of cohabitation has dramatically in-
creased and cohabitation has become socially acceptable at all levels of society, it
has become increasingly implausible to attribute special significance to the par-
ties’ failure to marry.47  Domestic partners fail to marry for many reasons.
Among others, some have been unhappy in prior marriages and therefore wish
to avoid the form of marriage, even as they enjoy its substance with a domestic
partner.  Some begin a casual relationship that develops into a durable union, by
which time a formal marriage ceremony may seem awkward or even unneces-
sary, for many Americans entertain the widespread, albeit erroneous, belief that
the mere passage of time transforms cohabitation into common law marriage.48
Failure to marry may reflect group mores. Some ethnic and social groups have a
substantially lower incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of
informal domestic relationships than do others.  Failure to marry may also re-
flect strong social or economic inequality between the partners, which allows the
stronger partner to resist the weaker partner’s preference for marriage.  Finally
there are domestic partners who are not allowed to marry each other under state
law because they are of the same sex, although they are otherwise eligible to
marry and would marry one another if the law allowed them to do so.  In all of
these cases, the absence of formal marriage may have little or no bearing on the
character of the parties’ domestic relationship and on the equitable considera-
tions that underlie claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution of a mar-
riage.
Normatively, Chapter 6 takes the view that family law should be concerned
about relationships that may be indistinguishable from marriage49 except for the
legal formality of marriage.  The more frequent such relationships become, the
more the law should be concerned.  Chapter 6 assumes as its foundation Chap-
ters 4 and 5, which define and rationalize the economic claims that one spouse
has upon another at the termination of a marriage.  The equitable concerns that
46. For fuller discussion, see the comment to §§ 6.02 and 6.03.
47. Jan Trost, the Swedish sociologist, first observed this when he did empirical work in Swe-
den, which has long had the highest cohabitation rate in the world.  Trost concluded that the more
people cohabit, the less it means. JAN TROST, UNMARRIED COHABITATION 185-87 (1979).
48. In the United States, this belief is expressed in the popular myth that cohabitants become
common law spouses after 7 years of cohabitation.
49. Of course many cohabiting relationships do not endure for a significant period time and, of
those that do, many culminate in the parties’ marriage.  See § 6.03, cmt. a.  Chapter 6 has no applica-
tion in either case. It applies only when cohabitation does endure for a significant period of time.
When cohabitation culminates in marriage, Chapter 6 has no application because a prior period of
unmarried cohabitation is taken into account in the remedies available at the dissolution of marriage.
See § 4.03(6) and § 5.04(6).
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are expressed there apply equally to marriage-like cohabitation.  Chapters 4 and
5 do not rely upon a conception of marriage as a contract whose terms require
the equitable remedies contained in those chapters. They instead see those
remedies and obligations as arising over time from the parties’ conduct in shar-
ing their lives.
With some notable exceptions, for the last 25 years American law has ap-
plied the rubric of contract, rather than family law, to the rights and obligations
of nonmarital cohabitants. This rubric has generally proven unsatisfactory.
Some courts reach harsh and undesirable results by applying contract law
strictly, while other courts, to avoid harsh results, play havoc with contract law,
distending it beyond recognition.  Additionally, the rubric of contract tends to
be difficult and time-consuming to administer.  American contractual treatment
of nonmarital cohabitation is unusual in that no other country approaches co-
habitation solely as a matter of contract law.  Other countries primarily ask the
question: Does this nonmarital family look like a marital family?  If so, they ap-
ply some or all of their family law to the dissolution of the nonmarital family.  In
other words, other countries look to the character of the relationship as it devel-
oped over time, and not just to the statements the parties may have made, or not
made, to one another at its inception.50 Chapter 6 adopts this approach.  In its
operative provisions, Chapter 6 draws inspiration from Canada, and also from
Australia and New Zealand. Domestically, Chapter 6 looks to the case law of
Washington and Oregon.51
The operative provisions of Chapter 6 are designed to distinguish relation-
ships that are marriage-like from those that are not.  They are designed to be
readily administrable, but also to allow for individualized treatment, that is, to
dispose easily of run-of-the-mill cases, but also to permit persons to show that
they should not be covered by the rules.  The provisions are also designed to
give due weight to the economic interests of children born in nonmarital rela-
tionships. Chapter 6 generally defines domestic partners as “two persons of the
same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of
time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.”  However, few
cases will require significant factual inquiry because Chapter 6 uses out an ab-
solute rule and a presumption to identify most relationships that would satisfy
this definition.
When parties have lived together in a common household for a specified
uniform period of time with a child of both of them, they are domestic partners.
These Principles do not specify any particular period of time.  That decision is
50. In other western countries, both less and more is at stake.  If cohabitation goes unrecognized
by the legal system, their more highly developed welfare states will avoid more of the social welfare
harms that would otherwise accrue at family dissolution.  On the other hand, they have more of a
public purse interest in establishing inter se obligations, for the state operates as the guarantor of last
resort.  In the United States, the vital interest is less the public purse, which is frequently held harm-
less in any event due to paucity of public welfare provision, but rather the public interest in insuring
the well-being of all family members, particularly children.  To the extent that the United States does
not have a well-developed welfare state, it should be more concerned about establishing inter se
rights at family dissolution, for the family serves basic social welfare functions that are elsewhere
undertaken by the state.
51. See § 6.03, Reporter’s Note to Comment b.
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left to the enacting state. When parties are not the co-parents of a child, but have
shared a common household for a specified period of time, they are presumed
to be domestic partners.  Again, these Principles do not specify a period, but the
period adopted by a jurisdiction should be longer when the parties do not have
a child together.  For example, if two years were used when the parties have a
child together, three years would be appropriate when they do not.  The pre-
sumption requires that the parties share a common household, which in most
cases is one that is occupied exclusively by the parties and their relatives.  The
purpose of this requirement is to make the presumption unavailable to persons
who merely share a group residence, such as college students.  When the pre-
sumption arises, it may be rebutted by a showing that the parties did not in fact
share life together as a couple, as that term is defined in the guidelines for de-
termining whether parties shared life together as a couple. If neither the abso-
lute rule nor the rebuttable presumption applies, the claimant bears the burden
of showing that: (i) for a significant period of time (ii) the parties shared a pri-
mary residence and (iii) a life together as a couple within the meaning of the
guidelines.  Such cases are likely to be rare.
Once the parties are determined to be domestic partners, they are generally
subject to the compensatory payments and property distribution chapters of
these Principles, unless they have made an inconsistent agreement setting differ-
ent terms.  Only relatively long-term cohabitation can give rise to compensatory
payment claims, for they have a minimum vesting period.  Thus, domestic part-
nership status alone will ordinarily be insufficient to generate compensatory
payment claims.  Similarly, in most relationships, the amount of marital prop-
erty is proportionate to the duration of the marriage.  Thus, the duration of co-
habitation is likely to be the main determinant of cohabitation claims.  It is the
long-term cohabitation cases that are the most troubling under existing Ameri-
can law, and they are the ones most likely to be effectively reached by Chapter 6,
in conjunction with Chapters 4 and 5.52
Chapter Seven
Chapter Seven addresses the agreements between parties concerning the
consequences of the dissolution of their relationship. Topics One, Two and
Three of Chapter Seven set forth common principles governing premarital
agreements, agreements made during marriage, and analogous agreements
between persons who are domestic partners within the meaning of Chapter 6.
Topic Four sets out principles governing separation agreements, which are
agreements made by parties who have already decided to dissolve their rela-
tionship.
The recommendations and analysis adopted in this chapter with respect to
agreements concerning the consequences of divorce do not assume acceptance
of the recommendations contained in the remaining Chapters of these Principles.
This chapter’s recommendations stand on their own and could appropriately be
followed by jurisdictions with rules concerning property allocation, compensa-
52. See supra note 9.
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tory payments or alimony, child support, or child custody, that do not conform
to the Principles.
I. Premarital and marital agreements.
A. Background
At one time, the law did not enforce agreements between prospective or
current spouses that “contemplated divorce,” as contrasted with agreements
that applied only if the parties’ marriage ended by death. This bar followed
from the rule of fault divorce which then prevailed, which disallowed divorce
by mutual consent. The spouses’ agreement concerning the terms of divorce
could be seen as in conflict with this policy. The nationwide abandonment of
traditional fault divorce by the 1970’s eliminated this barrier to premarital
agreements. Most courts, however, did not move to a system in which such
agreements were enforced on the same basis as other contracts. Lingering con-
cerns over premarital agreements remained, expressed by rules that gave such
agreements heightened procedural and substantive scrutiny. The intuition was
that premarital agreements raised issues of public policy, fairness, and bargain-
ing integrity that distinguished them from ordinary commercial contracts. But
while most courts still decline to enforce premarital agreements on precisely the
same basis as commercial contracts, no clear consensus emerged on the appro-
priate rules to apply, much less on the rationale that might be offered to explain
them. These questions are the principal topic of this Chapter. They are not an-
swered by the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which neither grapples with
nor resolves these concerns, leaving the question of enforceability largely up to
courts in their construction of the Act’s undefined requirement that agreements
must be “voluntary” to be enforceable.
In addition to more general concerns about premarital agreements, the
nearly universal rule is that with respect to matters of child custody and child
support, no agreement of the parties can bind the court. This chapter is therefore
largely about the claims between divorcing spouses concerning that financial
consequences of the relationship’s dissolution. Agreements concerning custodial
arrangements are treated in Chapter 2 (see § 7.07 of Chapter 7), which allows
them some weight. Agreements that adversely affect a child’s support are on the
basis entirely unenforceable. See § 7.06.
B. General approach
This chapter necessarily recognizes the benefits to allowing parties to make
agreements about the consequences of family dissolution. Two benefits deserve
specific mention. First, contractual autonomy encourages parties about to enter
into family relationships to think realistically about that relationship, anticipate
contingencies, and plan for them. In some cases, the process of planning for
contingencies will help parties to make better decisions about the relationships
they form, including the decision whether or not to marry. Agreements also give
parties greater certainty about the future, and about the consequences of their
actions.
ALI CHAPTER - FMT_2.DOC 10/01/01  11:54 AM
34 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 8:1 2001
Second, contractual autonomy allows parties to form relationships that do
not fit the patterns contemplated in the otherwise applicable law. For example,
two previously married older persons contemplating marriage may wish to en-
sure that in the event of divorce (or death), their property will go to their own
children rather than to the spouse. Freedom to make an enforceable agreement
along these lines not only facilitates the marriage of this couple, but may also
improve the quality of the marriage, providing assurance to their respective
children, for example, that the new marriage will not interfere with their own
expectations, and providing each spouse the security of control over their own
individual assets. Even without special circumstances, young adults entering
first marriages may be able to negotiate the terms of a possible, future dissolu-
tion that is more in keeping with their own mutual aspirations and values than
the consequences of marital dissolution provided for by law.
While Chapter Seven thus recognizes the virtues of private agreements, it
must also recognize that formal contracts can never be the exclusive source of
the rights and obligations that arise between persons who live in a family rela-
tionship. Legal duties arise from relationships alone, without contract, in many
fields, including torts and employment law, and they do so in family relation-
ships as well. The legal obligations of parents to their children do not depend
upon contract. Intimate partners who forge a life together over many years also
acquire obligations to one another than do not depend upon their having been
set forth in an agreement that meets the legal tests of an enforceable contract.
Relational duties that do not arise from agreement cannot always be shed by
agreement. Duties toward children are the most obvious example, but the prin-
ciple also has application to duties between spouses. Chapter Seven therefore
provides for the enforcement of agreements within the limits of constraints
arising from the family context that supplement the rules of contract applicable
to commercial arrangements.
These constraints are of two kinds. The first are procedural requirements,
which are addressed primarily by Section 7.04. Their purpose is to provide
added assurance of the integrity and reality of the spouses’ consent to an agree-
ment that alters the mutual obligations which the law would otherwise impose
upon them. It therefore requires the person seeking to enforce a premarital
agreement to show that the other parties’ consent to it was both informed, and
not given under duress. The section facilitates a party’s ability to make this
showing by establishing a rebuttable presumption that it has been made when
the agreement is executed at least 30 days before the wedding, both parties had
a reasonable opportunity to consult independent counsel, and (if either party
did not in fact have counsel) the agreement contains plain language explaining
how it alters rights otherwise arising at dissolution. There is also a separate dis-
closure requirement. One effect of this section is to give meaning to the other-
wise vague requirement of “voluntariness” that pervades much caselaw in this
area.
The second set of constraints implement a particular kind of fairness con-
cern that applies with special force in the family context. Ordinary contract law
also responds to fairness concerns under the doctrine of unconscionability. That
doctrine considers the agreement’s terms as of the time of execution. It seems
likely that a party consenting to an unfavorable and extremely one-sided agree-
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ment has done so in consequence of problematic bargaining tactics, and the
doctrine of unconscionability is therefore responsive to both substantive and
procedural norms. This standard contract doctrine may have important applica-
tion to agreements that spouses conclude during the marriage. See § 7.01, Com-
ment e. Premarital agreements, with potential long-term application, raise a dif-
ferent kind of fairness concern, however, which is not addressed by the
unconscionability doctrine. A premarital agreement which at the time of execu-
tion is fair on its face, and is entered into by parties whose consent is truly mu-
tual, may have a very different significance in the parties’ lives when enforce-
ment is sought fifteen years later, after they have borne and nurtured children.
The law’s usual assumption that contracting parties are capable judges of their
own self-interest is put in doubt when the judgment is so distant in time and cir-
cumstance from the consequences it had to assess. This capability problem is ex-
acerbated by another uncommon feature of premarital agreements: its principal
terms speak exclusively to a marital dissolution which the parties do not expect
to occur, and so the agreement has no expected application. Finally, agreements
are static, but relationships are not. The agreement may have contemplated a
relationship very different than the one that the parties in fact later lived. As
couples share a life together for many years they develop mutual interdepend-
encies and obligations, and one may question whether an agreement entered
into years before these obligations develop can effectively disavow them.
These special fairness concerns are addressed primarily by Section 7.05,
which establishes circumstances under which a court should ask whether en-
forcement of an agreement would work “a substantial injustice.” That inquiry is
made when, since the time of execution, the parties have had children (when
they did not before). It is also made, whether the parties had children or not, if
enforcement is ought more than a fixed period of years since the agreement’s
execution. While the length of that period is not set by this section, ten years is
suggested as reasonable by the commentary. Section 7.05 also allows such a
fairness inquiry in the limited number of cases that might arise in which neither
of these two objective triggers is present, if nonetheless “there has been a change
in circumstances that has a substantial impact on the parties or their children,
but when they executed the agreement the parties probably did not anticipate
either the change, or its impact.”  If the person resisting an agreement’s en-
forcement cannot show any of these three triggers, then the court should not in-
quire into the fairness of the agreement’s enforcement. Thus, parties to a pre-
marital agreement who divorce five or eight years after its execution, without
having had children, and in circumstances that are not dramatically different
than those they likely contemplated, cannot avoid the agreement under this sec-
tion. Because half of all divorces occur by the seventh year of marriage, this sec-
tion may have no application in most cases. This result is intentional, for the
section’s purpose is to permit a substantial injustice inquiry in a subset of cases
in which there is special reason to test the parties’ capacity to assess their self-
interest, without casting doubt generally on the enforceability of premarital
agreements. Section 7.05 also provides specific guidance concerning the deter-
mination of whether enforcement of an agreement would work a substantial
injustice.
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II. Agreements between domestic partners
Chapter Six of the Principles recognizes certain unmarried couples as “do-
mestic partners” to whom most of the provisions of these Principles apply. Per-
sons who would be recognized as domestic partners under Chapter 6 may wish
to enter into an agreement avoiding or altering the application of these rules to
them. In this regard they are in a position no different than that of married per-
sons entering an analogous agreement. Chapter Seven therefore provides that as
a general matter it applies equally to such agreements by persons who are do-
mestic partners within the meaning of Chapter Six.  Of course, if a jurisdiction
does not follow Chapter Six’s recommendations with respect to domestic part-
ners, it will have no occasion to apply Chapter Seven in that context.
III. Separation Agreements
Separation agreements are contracts made by parties at the dissolution of
their relationship. The law has traditionally treated separation agreements dif-
ferently from premarital and marital agreements. These Principles adhere to that
tradition, because separation agreements differ significantly from premarital
and marital agreements. The Principles also follow the traditional distinction
between terms of a separation agreement that concern the parties’ economic
rights and obligations to each other, and terms that directly affect the interests of
a child. The enforceability of terms that directly affect a child is regulated by
Chapter 2 (child custody)53 or Chapter 3 (child support).54 The separation agree-
ment sections of Chapter 755 are addressed to the enforceability of agreement
terms concerning property disposition and compensatory payments. The sepa-
ration agreement sections of Chapter 7 treat (i) the enforceability of a separation
agreement and its particular terms (§ 7.09); (ii) incorporation of the terms of a
separation agreements in a decree of dissolution (§ 7.10); (iii) setting aside the
terms of a judgment incorporating an unenforceable agreement (§ 7.11); and
subsequent modification of the incorporated or unincorporated terms of a sepa-
ration agreement (§ 7.12).
Separation agreements resolving the terms of dissolution are favored, both
under existing law and these Principles. Agreements between parties dissolving
a family relationship are desirable because the parties have accrued rights and
obligations that must be ascertained and settled, if not by the parties then by a
court. In negotiating a separation agreement in the shadow of state default rules
that set the standard for fairness, the parties can often settle their affairs more
efficiently and more to their satisfaction than a court can. The greater favor
shown to separation agreements than to premarital agreements may also reflect
the different negotiating context. The parties to a premarital agreement are con-
tracting about a speculative future event, dissolution, in a setting dominated by
a quite different and immediate event, marriage. In contrast, at dissolution the
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able to comprehend the circumstances in which the agreement will be enforced
and thus to grasp the significance of the terms of the agreement. Given the de-
mise of their relationship, the parties may generally be expected to bargain at
arm’s length. Although parties making agreements before or during marriage
may assume that the other party is acting for their common good, parties bar-
gaining about the terms of an impending dissolution are more likely to appreci-
ate that each party has individual interests to advance and safeguard.
Thus the law should enforce separation agreements unless the rules of
contract, viewed in the context of family dissolution, have been violated, or the
terms of the agreement would frustrate some important policy of the law of
family dissolution. Under either circumstance, the law should decline to enforce
the parties’ agreement. Unlike premarital agreements, which may be understood
as a term of, or even as a precondition to, the parties’ marriage, and thus to give
rise to reliance and expectation interests, a separation agreement comes to the
court as a freshly made settlement of accrued rights and obligations. Reliance
and expectation interests may arise as a separation agreement ages and forms
part of the parties’ dissolution decree and post-dissolution experience, but time
limitations for the reopening of judgments afford adequate protection for those
reliance and expectation interests. Additionally, the law’s unwillingness to en-
force oppressive separation agreements should serve to discourage overreaching
and unfair bargaining practices.
The Principles impose few formal requirements for the enforceability of
separation agreements. Recognizing that parties may not settle until the hour of
trial, separation agreements may either be in writing or stipulated by the parties
before the court. The party seeking enforcement need only show the prima facie
existence of an agreement, that is, a signed writing or a stipulation. The party
resisting enforcement bears the burden of showing that the agreement should
not be enforced.
Usually, the material terms of the parties’ separation agreement are, pursu-
ant to the agreement, incorporated by the court as the terms of the dissolution
decree, with little or no judicial oversight of the negotiation or substance of
those terms. In most cases, the agreement or decree will appear before the court
again only for enforcement56 or subsequent modification, due to changed cir-
cumstances,57 of its otherwise uncontested terms. In relatively few cases, how-
ever, a party may challenge the terms of the separation agreement by resisting
enforcement of the agreement58 or incorporation of its terms in the decree of dis-
solution,59 or by moving to set aside an incorporated term of the decree.60 Judicial
economy is better served by limiting court oversight to those relatively few cases
in which a term of an agreement is ultimately contested than by requiring courts
to examine all separation agreements, including those that are unproblematic or
may never be contested. In any event, these Principles acknowledge the reality
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all separation agreements. Therefore these Principles do not require judicial ap-
proval of agreements regulating property disposition or compensatory pay-
ments,61 and instead require judicial inquiry only when one party objects to the
terms of an agreement.
A party may successfully resist enforcement or incorporation of the terms
of an agreement that does not satisfy the ordinary requirements of an enforce-
able contract. Enforcement or incorporation of terms concerning property dispo-
sition or compensatory payment may also be denied if, prior to accepting the
agreement, a party did not have full and fair opportunity to be informed of the
existence and value of the parties’ separate and marital property, each party’s
current earnings and prospects for future earnings, and the significance of the
terms of the agreement. Finally, enforcement of the property distribution and
compensatory payment terms may be denied if they substantially limit or aug-
ment property rights or compensatory payments otherwise due under state law,
and enforcement of those terms would substantially impair the economic well-
being of a party who has (i) primary or dual residential responsibility for chil-
dren or (ii) substantially fewer economic resources than the other party. The
“economic well-being of a party” contemplates mere adequacy of economic re-
sources and freedom from economic privation. Thus this ground for resisting
enforcement is unavailable when the moving party is well-off or comfortable
under the agreement, or despite the agreement. This ground is not intended
generally to limit the parties’ power to deviate from statutory norms of property
distribution or compensatory payments. Nor is it intended to disallow bargain-
ing tactics that some may find unsavory. Its sole purpose is to safeguard inter-
ests of great concern to the law of family dissolution. When a residential par-
ent’s economic well-being is substantially impaired by the contractual
relinquishment of legal rights, the interests of the children with whom that par-
ent resides are equally compromised. When the economic well-being of a spouse
with substantially fewer resources than the other spouse is similarly impaired,
the public policy purposes underlying the law of property distribution and
compensatory payments may be completely frustrated. Under such circum-
stances, contractual relinquishment of substantial economic rights may suggest a
process defect, such as lack of informed consent or duress, in the negotiation of
the agreement. However, this ground does not require proof of such defect.
Rather than require the court to undertake a factual inquiry into the parties’ ne-
gotiations, the Principles allow the court, in an appropriate case, to base its de-
termination on the more readily available and apparent terms of the agreement
and the economic circumstances of the parties. Subject to time limitations on the
reopening of judgments, a party may similarly set aside those portions of a dis-
solution decree incorporating unenforceable contract terms.
61. Compare Model Marriage and Divorce Act § 306, which requires the court to examine the
economic circumstances of the parties and determine whether the agreement is “not unconscionable
as to disposition of property or maintenance, and not unsatisfactory as to support” before the court
may incorporate the terms of the parties’ agreement in the decree of dissolution.
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Topic 2
Whether Marital Misconduct Should Be Considered in Property
Allocations and Awards of Compensatory Payments
I. Introduction
American law is sharply divided on the question of whether “marital mis-
conduct” should be considered in allocating marital property or awarding ali-
mony. Prior to 1968, consideration of such misconduct, or “fault,” was almost
universally allowed. The two decades that followed saw considerable change in
the law. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), initially approved in
1970, provides unambiguously that both allocation of marital property and de-
terminations of spousal maintenance be made “without regard to marital mis-
conduct.” Published surveys typically report that approximately half the states
now share the Uniform Act’s position. The Principles do as well. As the division
amongst the states illustrates, however, the question is not without difficulty.
Nonetheless, the position taken by the Principles on this question follows from
both the goal of improving the consistency and predictability of dissolution law,
and the core tenet that the dissolution law provides compensation for only the
financial losses arising from the dissolution of marriage. Moreover, the rationale
for excluding fault from the dissolution law has been strengthened since adop-
tion of the UMDA by changes in the tort law, which in most states now recog-
nizes claims between former spouses that might once have been excluded by
blanket rules of spousal immunity. In consequence the debate over fault in dis-
solution must be reframed; the question now is not whether the law should pro-
vide a remedy for certain forms of spousal misconduct, but whether that remedy
should be provided in the tort law or in the law of marital dissolution. This
Topic addresses these questions in some detail, thus providing a foundation
upon which the appropriate sections of Chapters 4 and 5 rely.
II. Summary of Existing Law
Two categories—fault and no-fault—are inadequate to describe the major
variations in state policy. The tables that follow place states in one of five cate-
gories. Some preliminary comments are necessary to explain these classifica-
tions.
There are two senses in which marital misconduct affects property disposi-
tion and alimony orders in even the most thoroughly no-fault jurisdictions. One
might call them the two “financial cost” exceptions to the no-fault principle.
First, it appears that all states allow divorce courts to adjust the allocation of
marital property to compensate one spouse for the other’s financial misconduct,
often referred to as the waste or dissipation of marital assets. There are of course
variations in the nature of the financial misconduct made subject to this princi-
ple. The Principles also accept this general principle, however, and Section 4.10
treats the question in detail. Second, because under existing law relative need is
the dominant factor in alimony orders, and in most states an important factor in
property allocations, misconduct affects both alimony and property allocations
to the extent it enlarges either spouse’s need. Courts in no-fault states have ob-
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served that domestic violence which leaves one spouse with increased medical
costs or a reduced earning capacity may for this reason enlarge the victim’s fi-
nancial claims under no-fault principles.62 Because Chapter 5 of the Principles
also emphasizes disparities in post-dissolution living standards as primary basis
for compensatory payment awards, it also can respond to such facts without ex-
plicit consideration of the misconduct that has altered the disparity.63
Categorization of state law is also complicated by the variation among the
fault states in their definition of the relevant misconduct and the financial issues
to which it applies. Some leave the matter almost entirely to trial court discre-
tion, while others specify explicitly particular forms of misconduct that may be
considered. A middle group attempts to contain the trial court’s exercise of dis-
cretion through rules that limit the kind of conduct that may be considered, but
only in general terms. It is particularly difficult to characterize the law of this
last group because of the hortatory nature of governing authority. Perhaps the
problem is even greater. Experienced practitioners in some of these states have
suggested that trial courts do not always honor the “official” limitations on con-
sideration of fault. On the other hand, some from fault states with broad rules
suggest that their courts are rarely willing to consider evidence of misconduct
even though they may do so under local law. It is difficult to make use of such
anecdotal reports of discrepancies between the formal law governing fault and a
jurisdiction’s actual practice.64 In any event, this discussion is necessarily limited
to describing the law insofar as it can be discerned from the governing statutes
and published cases.
The classifications of state law employed here are based upon a compre-
hensive survey prepared for the Council of the Institute in 1996. It adopts the
following conventions.65
1. Pure no-fault (20 states)
These states exclude consideration of marital misconduct entirely, subject
to the two universal “financial cost” exceptions. Many employ the language of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in their statutes, stating clearly that both
property allocations and spousal maintenance adjudications are made “without
regard to marital misconduct.” This is the language adopted in Chapter 5.
62. E.g., Burt v. Burt, 386 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. App. 1986) (“The statutory prohibition against
considering marital misconduct does not foreclose a judge from considering the financial needs re-
sulting from a chronic health problem that in turn was caused by physical abuse during the mar-
riage.”). See also Marriage of Foran, 834 P.2d 1081 (Wash. App. 1992).
63. The system will respond appropriately without regard to whether the victim of the spousal
violence was the financially dependent spouse or the primary wage earner. In either case adjust-
ments in the financial calculations that arise from the altered costs or earning capacity will favor the
victim of the violence. This is true of both Chapter 5 of the Principles and of traditional alimony
awards authorized in existing law.
64. There is some systematically collected data on this point. In England, where the governing
statute permitted the courts to take “conduct” into account in property allocations and alimony or-
ders, interviews with the “registrars” charged with administering the law found that they rejected
suggestions to consider marital misconduct “almost with one voice”. Apparently the only instances
they could think of which might call for application of this rule were “financial misconduct” of the
sort which American no-fault states routinely consider.  JOHN EEKELAAR, REGULATING DIVORCE 87
(1991).
65. For a list of the states in each category and supporting authorities, see Reporter’s Note a.
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2. Pure no-fault property, almost pure no-fault alimony (5 states)
The states in this category all adopt a pure no-fault position with regard to
property, but may allow some very limited consideration of misconduct with
respect to alimony. In one state in this group, it appears that the state supreme
court is gradually retreating from a 1973 decision allowing consideration of fault
with respect to alimony, and in 1995 came within one vote of excluding it alto-
gether.66 In the second there is case law that allows consideration of misconduct
in alimony adjudications but few reported decisions that actually do so.67 In the
third a 1990 amendment deleted the requirement that alimony claimants be free
from fault, establishing instead need and ability to pay as the primary basis for
the awards; it is not yet clear whether any consideration of fault survives this
amendment.68 In the fourth there are a handful of 20-year-old cases from inter-
mediate appellate courts considering fault in fixing alimony awards. While these
have never been formally overruled, more recent practice seems identical to
states in Category 1.69 In the fifth very recent legislation allows but does not re-
quire courts to consider fault in alimony adjudications. While established case
law in that state strongly suggests that its courts will not embrace this invita-
tion,70 there is not yet an authoritative interpretation of the new provision. 
3. Almost pure no-fault (3 states)
These states seem very much like those in Category 1, but the slight possi-
bility of considering fault that exists under their law applies to both alimony and
property allocation. Two of the three could easily be placed in Category 1.  In
one, the governing state supreme court decision establishes a no-fault rule with
language that is nearly absolute, and in fact there have been no reported deci-
sions in that state allowing consideration of misconduct since that case was de-
cided.71 In the second, there is a single decision of the state supreme court that
allowed an exception (to the state’s otherwise complete no-fault approach) in a
case of murder.72 The third state in this group has an apparently unique rule that
in practice excludes fault from consideration except in cases of serious violent
assault.73
66. The state is Kentucky. See Reporter’s Note a.2.b.
67. The state is Ohio. See Reporter’s Note a.2.d.
68. The state is Idaho. See Reporter’s Note a.2.a.
69. The state is New Jersey. See Reporter’s Note a.2.c.
70. The state is Utah. The state’s no-fault tradition can be seen in Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1988), in which the Utah Supreme Court allocated to a tort claim rather than to the divorce
action the nonfinancial losses suffered by a spouse who was disabled by the other spouse’s attempt
to murder her. For further information on Utah law, see Reporter’s Note a.2.e.
71. The state is Kansas. See Reporter’s Note a.3.b.
72. In Stover v. Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750 (Ark. 1985), the Arkansas Supreme Court allowed an une-
qual division of marital property where the wife was convicted of conspiring to kill the husband, the
court concluding that the no-fault rule was not meant “to preclude a chancellor from considering
such bizarre facts as those in this case.” Id. at 752. The court cautioned, however, that “the extent of
our holding” is to allow consideration “of the fact that one spouse has been convicted of conspiring
to kill the other.” Id. Subsequently, the same court held in Burns v. Burns, 847 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Ark.
1993), that “fault is not a factor in deciding whether to award alimony unless it relates to need or the
ability to pay.” For treatment of interspousal murder in Category 1 states, see Reporter’s Note c.
73. The state is New York. Its rule as stated is to allow consideration of only “egregious mis-
conduct.” Because New York reports many of its trial court decisions it is easier there than in some
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4. No-fault property, fault in alimony (7 states)
These states have a pure no-fault position with regard to marital property
allocations, but give their trial courts considerable discretion to consider fault in
alimony awards.
5. Full-fault (15 states)
These are true fault states. They give their courts discretion to consider the
parties’ marital misconduct in both alimony adjudications and property alloca-
tions. In some, authoritative appellate opinions have on occasion attempted to
describe the range of misconduct that trial courts should consider, or suggest re-
straint in the weight to be accorded misconduct. These states are nonetheless
classified as “full-fault” because their appellate opinions also embrace the im-
portance of trial judge discretion, and the pattern of reported cases suggests that
the hortatory language in the more cautious fault opinions has little impact on
the decisions in others.74
Many surveys would classify the 28 states in Categories 1, 2, and 3 as
no-fault jurisdictions. A more careful count that distinguishes property and ali-
mony yields a more complex picture. On the allocation of property at least 32
states have a pure no-fault system.75 Every American jurisdiction that bars con-
sideration of fault in alimony awards also bars it in property allocations. On the
other hand, at least seven states (Category 4) permit consideration of fault in
alimony awards even though they bar it in the allocation of property.76 It thus
appears that 25 states (32-7) are properly described as no-fault in alimony as
well, although there is some question concerning the proper classification of the
five states in Category 2, in which the governing rule cannot be definitely estab-
lished by examination of the reported decisions. The conclusion, however, is
that the states are divided evenly—approximately, if not precisely—on whether
fault can be considered in alimony, and that among those that allow fault there
is some variation in practice. One can also observe that these alignments have in
recent years been relatively stable. Essentially all the American states moved to
laws that allowed divorce on no-fault grounds in the 1970s and early 1980s, and
as they did so they made choices about whether to apply the no-fault principle
to property and alimony as well. Few have revisited those choices.77
states to see how its rule is applied in practice, and the pattern seems fairly clear. Minor batteries, for
example, are not considered, even when they cause injury. See Reporter’s Note a.3.c.
74. There is one state in this group, Rhode Island, which may in fact largely be a no-fault state
in practice, but that could not be determined with certainty.
75. The 32 states in Categories 1, 2, and 4 follow a pure no-fault approach to property alloca-
tions. Two of the three states in Category 3, Kansas and Arkansas, probably do as well.
76. Recent authority suggests than an eleventh, South Carolina, should possibly be added to
this group, although it is placed above with the full-fault states in Category 5. See Reporter’s Note
a.5.l.
77. Kansas did not adopt an unequivocal no-fault position on alimony and property until its
1990 decision in Sommers; Michigan did not adopt an unequivocal fault position until its decision in
Sparks in 1992. Nevada and New Jersey appear to have gradually solidified their no-fault inclina-
tions over the past two decades. Utah may be reconsidering its traditional no-fault position with re-
gard to alimony, while the Idaho legislature recently deleted fault language from its alimony statute.
There has been little new law on the matter in other states. See Reporter’s Notes.
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The dominant position of no-fault rules in property allocation, as compared
to the even division in alimony, appears to reflect a difference in the underlying
rationale for each of them, at least in many states. As common-law states moved
from the traditional title system to the modern system of equitable distribution
of marital property, some also internalized the community property view that
the spouses jointly own property acquired during marriage through the labor of
either of them. Under this view spousal claims on the property at divorce are le-
gal rather than equitable: The court is not transferring assets from the true
owner to his or her spouse, in recognition of the claimant’s compelling equitable
claims, but is rather dividing the property between its two joint owners, an exer-
cise in which the marital misconduct of the parties seems largely irrelevant.78
Complete transformation to a joint ownership view would also imply applica-
tion of community property principles to the management of assets during mar-
riage, and to their distribution after a spouse’s death. Because the common-law
states have not generally gone that far,79 those that take a joint ownership view
at divorce seem somewhat schizophrenic (since they do not take that view dur-
ing marriage or at death). It is nonetheless the law of many common-law states,
and their adoption of the joint ownership at dissolution has apparently encour-
aged a no-fault approach to its allocation. There seems to be overlap between the
15 states that allow consideration of fault in the allocation of property at divorce
and those common-law states that have been most resistant generally to moving
from the common-law marital property system to the marital property idea of
joint ownership.80
The idea of joint ownership has no presence in the law of alimony, and as
explained in Topic 1, alimony has not experienced any widespread reforms in
basic theory analogous to the marital property movement in common-law states.
Its frequent change of name, from alimony to maintenance or spousal support,
was intended by many reformers to signal the law’s movement away from di-
vorce laws based on fault and gender roles, but the idea of “need” upon which
the reformed support claim was to be based did not always carry enough weight
to complete this transition. Unlike marital property, the alimony claim remained
largely discretionary in entitlement as well as amount. In a system with few
bright lines, or even dim ones, it is not surprising that spousal conduct would
often be included, along with everything else, among the open-ended list of
factors that a court may consider. In that sense fault’s continued presence in the
alimony law of these states reflects, more than anything else, the primitive state
of alimony law generally.
78. If marital property is jointly owned, then ordinary property principles would bar alterations
in the spousal shares for misconduct in the marital relationship. Murder is a dramatic example. See
Reporter’s Note c.
79. The exception is Wisconsin, which has adopted community property rules during marriage
and at death.
80. The 15 states that allow consideration of fault in allocating property are predominantly in
the northeast and south, which were generally the last bastions of the traditional common-law title
system for allocating property at divorce. Fault is irrelevant in the allocation of community property
in all the community states but Texas, whose system is heavily idiosyncratic in other ways as well.
(Texas was, until this year, the only American jurisdiction to have no provision for alimony, and
even its recently enacted statute adopts only a very limited remedy.) See Reporter’s Notes a and
a.5.m.
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Chapter 5 of the Principles establishes a firmer footing for claims tradition-
ally considered under the alimony rubric, and in particular claims at the disso-
lution of a long marriage by the spouse whose employment opportunities were
burdened by having fulfilled most of the couple’s responsibilities for the routine
care of their children. The Chapter establishes a presumption of entitlement to
compensatory payments for such spouses in an amount proportional to both the
length of the marriage and the disparity in spousal incomes. If the soundness of
that basic system is accepted, the question then is whether the entitlement it rec-
ognizes should be affected by assessments of misconduct. Marital misconduct,
as defined in states which continue to consider it, would typically have no logi-
cal connection to the factual foundation upon which Chapter 5’s presumptions
of entitlement are based. That is, the misconduct would itself cast no doubt on
the existence and size of the financial loss recognized by the presumption, or on
the basis for presuming joint responsibility for it, given the duration of the mar-
riage and the period of foregone employment opportunity. Reliance upon mis-
conduct to enlarge or reduce the entitlement must therefore be based upon the
vindication of other interests that require a concurrent financial award that is, in
effect, added to, or offset against, the award based upon the compensatory
payment rationale. An examination of the policy question must therefore begin
by identifying these other interests to determine whether they should in fact be
considered in the dissolution action.
III. The Possible Functions of Fault
A justifying rationale for considering marital misconduct at dissolution
must identify some important interests not recognized by a no-fault system and
must show how the finding of misconduct can, at least in principle, explain
some particular dollar adjustment of the award. Any such justifying rationale
must at bottom be based on either punishment of the misconduct or compensa-
tion for the harm it has caused. The obvious model for such a system is the tort
law. A tort model would understand marital misconduct as relevant primarily
because of the harm it imposes on the other spouse, and would measure its dol-
lar consequence by the extent of that harm. Tort law also permits punitive dam-
ages in certain circumstances.
a. A fault rule as an agent of morality: rewarding virtue and punishing sin
1. General difficulties with punitive awards
Punishing the wrongdoer has been a persistent but troubled theme in the
law of fault states. Punishment is more usually the function of the criminal law.
The use of tort law for this purpose, through punitive damage awards, is often
controversial, particularly if the plaintiff has suffered relatively little harm. The
punitive use of matrimonial law is yet more problematic. It is thus not surpris-
ing that even in fault states, punitive awards are ordinarily condemned—when
they are recognized as such. On the other hand, many fault states apply rules
that cannot be explained as anything but punitive. The clearest example is the
rule that inflexibly bars alimony awards to every adulterous spouse, without re-
ALI CHAPTER - FMT_2.DOC 10/01/01  11:54 AM
INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 45
gard to any other facts of the case.81 The case law’s oft-stated rejection of puni-
tive awards82 seems preferable to these silent impositions of them.
A rule allowing punitive awards must either set clear behavioral stan-
dards—as with the rules barring alimony awards to an adulterous spouse—or
must rely upon trial judge discretion. The inflexibility of the first approach vir-
tually ensures some indefensible results. The vagueness of the second approach
does as well, because the moral standards by which blameworthy conduct will
be identified and punished will vary from judge to judge, as each judge neces-
sarily relies on his or her own vision of appropriate behavior in intimate rela-
tionships. The discretion seems inherently limitless if no finding of economic
harm to the claimant is required to justify the award or its amount. In that case
the effect is to empower each judge to employ the matrimonial law to punish
conduct that society is unwilling to reach explicitly, as in the criminal law.83
2. Punishing the spouse who “caused” the dissolution
Some courts appeal to a rationale that seems at first to avoid the punitive
nature of a fault award by casting it as compensation for the financial costs of
splitting one household in two, costs that necessarily arise in most dissolutions.
These courts argue that a fault-based award is justified because it allocates more
of those costs to the spouse whose conduct caused them, by causing the dissolu-
tion.84 Framing the rule this way thus casts it as compensation rather than pun-
ishment even though no losses are identified beyond the financial consequences
present in nearly every dissolution.
81. The potential recipient’s adultery is a complete bar to alimony, without regard to any other
facts of the case, in Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia. In Virginia it is a
complete bar unless the court finds that its denial “would constitute a manifest injustice based upon
the respective degrees of fault during the marriage and the relative economic circumstances of the
parties.” In Mississippi it is generally a bar, but not after a long marriage if the adulterous spouse
would otherwise be “destitute,” in which case a reduced award may be allowed. The Mississippi
rule was applied to limit the alimony that would otherwise have been allowed the wife in the dis-
solution of a 25-year marriage, even though the husband in that case also committed adultery.
Adultery is an “appropriate consideration” in many other fault states; decisions sustaining its con-
sideration without any apparent important limitation on the trial court’s discretion include Alabama
(trial court reversed for failing to consider husband’s adultery in allocating marital property); Con-
necticut; Kentucky (wife’s adultery may reduce alimony award, but husband’s adultery cannot be
the basis for increasing it); Louisiana; South Dakota (husband’s adultery may also be considered);
Maryland (trial court reversed for refusing to hear testimony of wife’s adultery); New Hampshire;
North Dakota (trial court properly allocated 83% of property to husband after 19-year marriage,
where wife guilty of adultery); Tennessee; Texas; and Vermont. See the Reporter’s Notes.
82. This sentiment is expressed even in full-fault states, Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 762
(Tex. 1980) (court should use fault to make “a just and right division” of the community property,
not to “punish” the guilty spouse); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo. 1980) (court should not use
its discretion to reward one party and punish the other).
83. One reason for reluctance to apply the criminal law is the absence of a sufficient consensus
concerning appropriate marital conduct. Another is the concern that evaluation of marital miscon-
duct requires too nuanced an understanding of the marital relationship. The uncertainties fueled by
these two concerns exacerbate another—-that in practice these evaluations will not be gender-
neutral. This is certainly true even today in many states that attach far more consequence to a wife’s
adultery than a husband’s. See supra note 29. These concerns apply just as forcefully in the dissolu-
tion context.
84. For an example of this approach, see Reporter’s Note b.2.
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Closer examination suggests, however, that this principle, while appealing
in the abstract, necessarily relies on sleight of hand in application. The problem
is the principle’s reliance on being able to establish which spouse “caused” the
dissolution. Inquiring into the cause of marital dissolution is different from in-
quiring into the cause of chicken pox, or of a plumbing failure. In those contexts
the word “cause” has an objective meaning; it is a prior event (such as infection,
or rust) without which the later event would not have occurred. In the context of
marital failure, however, the word “cause” has no such meaning, and its use
simply masks a moral inquiry with a word pretending a more objective assess-
ment. Some individuals tolerate their spouse’s drunkenness or adultery and re-
main in their marriage. Others may seek divorce if their spouse grows fat, or
spends long hours at the office. Is the divorce “caused” by one spouse’s offen-
sive conduct, or by the other’s unreasonable intolerance? In deciding that ques-
tion the court is assessing the parties’ relative moral failings, not the relationship
between independent and dependent variables. And the complexity of marital
relations of course confounds the inquiry. The fading of affective ties makes
spouses less tolerant of one another. So of course the decisionmaker inquiring
into “cause” should ask about the reason for the loss of affection in order, for ex-
ample, to determine whether it is the complainant’s apparently unreasonable
intolerance that is the cause of the marital failure, rather than conduct of the
other spouse that prompted the complainant’s loss of affection (and which in
turn encouraged the intolerance). Perhaps courts in fault states sometimes en-
gage in such tracing, although surely many do not. But in any event such courts
are not inquiring into the conduct that caused the dissolution, but into the mis-
conduct that can be assigned the blame for it. Was the marital breakdown in
Marriage One caused by one spouse’s adultery or the other’s emotional insensi-
tivity? In Marriage Two, by the first’s adultery or the second’s failure to keep fit?
The court’s answer tells us which conduct it finds more blameworthy, not which
functioned as the cause of the other.
This analysis does not itself suggest, of course, that it is wrong to assign the
costs of dissolution to the spouse whose conduct was more blameworthy. It only
reveals that the objective language of causation has concealed that this is what
the court is in fact doing. Once that is revealed, however, a problem is uncov-
ered: by dressing up its conclusion in the neutral language of causation, the
court can assign such blame without identifying the standards under which it
does so. Much mischief can result from allowing courts to assign liability to
nontortious conduct by application of unarticulated—and effectively unreview-
able—standards of blameworthiness.85 Nor is such sleight of hand necessary to
allow the law to respond to serious misconduct. Offensive conduct in marriage
that violates the norms of tort or criminal law will normally be actionable
whether or not it is the “cause” of the actor’s marital dissolution.86
85. For example, a spouse may be held at fault for the breakup of the marriage because she pre-
fers to live in a more urban setting than is available in the forum state preferred by her husband.
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1984).
86. To be actionable in tort, conduct need only have caused some loss or harm, even mental
distress. The financial costs that arise from the dissolution could, however, be an element of the tort
damages in such a case, if they were found to have been caused by the tortious conduct. See infra
Part IV.
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In sum, courts that purport to allocate the unavoidable costs of dissolution
by assessing the cause of the marital failure are in fact rewarding virtue and
punishing sin. They are not compensating one spouse for a harm “caused” by
the other. If the behavior they punish is tortious, it ought to give rise to damages
on those grounds. If not, the language of “cause” serves only to conceal, perhaps
from the court itself, that the judgment’s true function is to punish behavior that
may not be blameworthy under familiar and accepted standards of tort law.
The Principles are allied with a substantial majority of modern American
decisions in rejecting punishment as a proper basis for adjusting property or
alimony awards at divorce. They adhere to that view whether the purpose of
punishment is made overt, or is concealed under the rubric of causation.
b. Fault law as a source of compensation for harms caused by wrongful conduct.
Compensation is a more palatable rationale than punishment for fault-based
adjustments in alimony awards, and promises a more certain basis for fixing the
amount of the adjustment, which would presumably reflect the loss imposed on
the claimant by the other spouse’s misconduct. But just what kind of loss would
the fault-based rule provide compensation for? No-fault principles already rec-
ognize financial losses traceable to spousal misconduct, under the two mecha-
nisms identified in Part II. The first, exemplified in Chapter 4 by § 4.10, allows
the allocation of marital property to reflect misconduct that had a direct impact
on the amount of property available at divorce. The second, inherent in both
Chapter 5 and any modern no-fault rule, arises from the centrality of earning
capacity in setting the alimony or compensatory payment award: The impact of
one spouse’s misconduct on the other’s earning capacity is thus necessarily re-
flected in the award. What additional losses would a fault system recognize, be-
yond these losses of property and earning capacity? The answer is nonfinancial
losses.
A proposal to add a compensation-based fault rule to the Principles could
therefore be understood as revisiting Chapter Five’s determination that the law
of marital dissolution should provide compensation only for nonfinancial losses.
(See § 5.02, Comment b.) Recognizing this does not imply that the existing law in
fault states currently provides such compensation, for its standards of recovery
and for measuring damages are simply too vague to identify that purpose,
which is in any event sometimes even disavowed.87 Any proposal to consider
marital misconduct at dissolution must do better. The first step is a more explicit
87. Courts in full-fault states do sometimes describe their consideration of fault as serving this
compensation function. E.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 444 A.2d 234, 235-36 (Conn. 1982) (in consider-
ing the “gravity” of the wife’s adultery as it applies to the allocation of property, the court may con-
sider the “humiliation and mental anguish” that it imposed on the husband). And it seems clear that
in exercising the wide discretion typically allowed them in full-fault jurisdictions, trial judges often
think of themselves as awarding damages in the guise of alimony or property allocations. Whether
those damages are compensatory or punitive in nature is typically difficult to ascertain, however,
because of the fault law’s disinclination to acknowledge either purpose overtly. For a telling illustra-
tion, see Martone v. Martone, 611 A.2d 896 (Conn. App. 1992).  There, the trial judge initially referred
to an award of $15,000 to wife as “damages” for husband’s conduct in “brutally causing the breakup
of this marriage,” but subsequently recharacterized it as alimony.  Id. at 899.  The award was af-
firmed on appeal, the court reasoning fault was a valid factor in awarding alimony and the trial
court’s “later characterization” of its award should control.  Id. at 901.
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identification of purpose. There are in principle two possibilities, each of which
has a tort analog. They are:
1. Compensation for emotional losses arising from the other spouse’s mis-
conduct. (Analogous to tort claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.)
2. Compensation for the pain and suffering arising from the other’s mis-
conduct. (Analogous to general damages in battery or assault actions.)
In short, a fault rule would serve compensation functions that may already
be served by the tort law. Such duplication is inadvisable. There is no reason to
reinvent compensation principles under the rubric of fault adjudications, nor to
incorporate tort principles into divorce adjudications. A jurisdiction that wants
concurrent consideration of tort claims and dissolution remedies may permit
their joinder. Whether it should do so requires consideration of procedural is-
sues beyond the scope of the Principles.88 What the Principles must consider,
however, is whether the existing tort law is adequate to provide spouses com-
pensation for nonfinancial losses arising from one another’s misconduct. If there
are large groups of worthy claims for which tort law cannot in fact provide an
effective remedy, then the Principles must consider offering one. Part IV reviews
the relevant tort law in some detail, for the limited purpose of deciding whether
it is adequate to this task.
In comparing the virtues of recognizing certain interspousal claims for mis-
conduct in tort or in dissolution, it might seem natural to assume that their in-
corporation into dissolution law would have the advantage of facilitating such
claims by lowering the procedural or transactional hurdles that confront them.
But whether a fault-regarding dissolution law would actually have this effect, as
compared to a rule allowing the joinder of the dissolution and tort actions, is
hardly clear. Even more importantly, however, one cannot in fact assume that
sound policy favors the encouragement of such claims. Daily life is full of acts
that meet the formal elements of battery, or of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, but which are not pursued to judgment by their victims. Both inside
and outside the family, people do not sue over every shove, punch, or outra-
geously mean and hurtful act. Their reticence is usually regarded as a good
thing, not as a problem to be solved.
Because the judicial system administers the state’s monopoly on dissolving
marital status, those wishing to end their marriage must file a lawsuit. But nei-
ther policymakers nor legal commentators have sought generally to encourage
more tort suits by allowing those otherwise disinclined to sue to add their pos-
sible claims to forms that the state requires them to file for other reasons. Inter-
spousal tort claims present no reason for a different view. To the contrary, the
encouragement of spousal claims for misconduct could easily, if unintentionally,
tap the anger and bitterness often present at divorce, so that the additional suits
resulting from such a policy would be disproportionately of the sort that should
not be brought. In addition, some misconduct claims might be made for tactical
88. The procedural problems involved in joinder are complicated by the fact that dissolution
actions are ordinarily heard by a judge, while tort claims may be heard before a jury.
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advantage in the divorce settlement negotiations. In short, a conclusion that
fault-oriented property or alimony rules encourage more people to charge their
spouses with misconduct, as compared to a system in which misconduct claims
must be brought in tort, may be reason to oppose rather than support such fault
rules. The question is whether the tort law provides an adequate opportunity to
obtain a remedy for worthy claims of misconduct that the victim wants to pur-
sue. If it does, then inviting additional claims in the dissolution action is a prob-
lem, not a solution.
Does tort law provide that adequate opportunity? We now turn to that
question.
IV. Tort Claims for Marital Misconduct
a. Battery. With the general demise of interspousal tort immunity,89 battery
claims between spouses face no special legal obstacles. There are many appellate
decisions dealing with such claims, concerned primarily with their procedural
relationship to the financial claims that arise in dissolution actions.90 There is no
important dissent from the proposition that a battery claim should be available
to the individual who suffers physical injury at the hands of his or her spouse.
Despite the general absence of special legal barriers to interspousal battery
claims, one may fear that some victims of spousal abuse will be psychologically
unable to seek redress, at least before the applicable statute of limitations has
89. For a description and endorsement of the modern trend to abolish interspousal tort immu-
nity, see generally, Fowler Harper, et al., The Law of Torts § 8.10 (2d ed. 1986) and Restatement, Sec-
ond, Torts § 895F (1964) (rejecting inter-spousal immunity). Writing in 1988, Clark reported that in-
terspousal tort immunity has been abolished fully in 36 states, and abolished for intentional torts in
four others. H. Clark, 1 Law of Domestic Relations in the United States 631-36 (1988). Additional
states that have followed the trend after Clark wrote include Florida, Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360
(Fla. 1993); Mississippi, Burns v. Burns, 518 So.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Miss. 1988); and Texas, Price v.
Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987). There are undoubtedly others as well.
90. Coleman v. Coleman, 566 So.2d 482 (Ala. 1990) (barring post-divorce tort action where wife
relied on husband’s fault to obtain relief on same claims in divorce action, decided under state law
allowing consideration of fault); Windauer v. O’Connor, 485 P.2d 1157 (Ariz. 1971) (wife can bring
tort action after divorce against husband who fired bullet at her; res judicata does not apply); Cater
v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173 (Ark. 1993) (prior divorce action created no res judicata bar to wife’s tort
award against husband of compensatory and punitive damages for battery); Waite v. Waite, 618
So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (interspousal battery action allowed); McCoy v. Cook, 419 N.W.2d 44 (Mich.
App. 1988) (wife’s tort action for battery and emotional distress not barred by prior divorce judg-
ment that provided wife an enhanced share of the marital property based on husband’s fault, but
husband may raise prior compensation as an affirmative defense to specific damage claims); Town-
send v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (interspousal battery action allowed); SAV v. KGV,
708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (wife may bring tort claim against husband for giving her herpes); Bren-
nan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1996) (decision whether wife’s separate tort claim, consolidated
with divorce action over wife’s objection, should be heard by a jury is within the trial court’s discre-
tion to decide; dissent argues that all victims of domestic violence are entitled to a jury trial for
marital tort claims); Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 1986) (wife may bring tort
claim against husband for giving her herpes); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988) (discussing
method for allocating claims between divorce action and wife’s concurrent tort suit, where husband
had shot wife); Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988) (Abrahamson, J.) (Because fault is com-
pletely barred as a consideration in property division and alimony, prior divorce decree does not
operate as a res judicata bar on subsequent tort claim for assault, battery, and emotional distress;
joinder of tort and divorce claims permissible, but better avoided).
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run. Whether the law should treat such cases differently, for example by tolling
the statute, is a difficult policy choice. Marriage alone does not present adequate
grounds for tolling, but tolling may well be justified by factual findings in a
particular case. There may be concern as to whether the courts can sort the cases
adequately. In any event, resolution of this problem would not be aided by in-
corporating the battery claim into dissolution law. To the contrary, its consid-
eration under some general and highly discretionary rubric of marital fault
would merely obscure the policy issue presented by old claims, which could still
be pressed. Tort law has a rich body of precedent on these tolling questions to
which it can look in working out a solution.91
In sum, there seems no reason to duplicate the battery law in the Principles.
The Principles need not address the procedural question of whether, or under
what rules, to permit the joinder of battery actions and divorce petitions.
b. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims between spouses for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) present a more complicated pic-
ture than does battery. The IIED action in most states is based upon § 46 of the
Restatement, Second, of Torts, which recognizes a cause of action where the de-
fendant, through “outrageous” conduct, intentionally or recklessly causes the
plaintiff severe emotional distress.92 No physical contact is required; the tort can
be committed through words or other non-touching acts alone. Moreover, the
Restatement formulation does not require the victim to prove any particular
physical consequences arising from the distress (although such consequences
are often alleged).
IIED claims often accompany battery actions, and in that context are typi-
cally permitted. But they are also typically superfluous, because they usually do
not enlarge the damages available once battery is shown.93 Pure emotional dis-
tress claims, in which the plaintiff-spouse alleges no physical attacks, but emo-
tional distress alone, are less often successful. A few cases bar them entirely,94
91. E.g., Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109 (N.J. Sup. App. Div. 1995) (allowing wife to include
claims for battering incidents that would ordinarily be time-barred, where she can show she was a
victim of “battered woman’s syndrome” who was rendered incapable of bringing an earlier action).
92. Professor Givelber, in an excellent article on the subject, describes the tort as “widely recog-
nized.” Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 42 (1982).
Two important earlier articles were critical to The American Law Institute’s recognition of this tort
and, in turn, its broad embrace in decisions around the nation. See Calvert Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1949); William Prosser, Insult and
Outrage, 44 Cal. L. Rev. 40 (1956). In a recent opinion recognizing the tort, the Texas Supreme Court
counted itself as the 47th to follow the Restatement’s lead. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-
22 (Tex. 1993).
93. E.g., Stuart v. Stuart, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988) and Caron v. Caron, 577 A.2d 1178 (Me.
1990), both battery cases in which the plaintiffs also included an IIED claim to which the courts paid
no real attention. An odd exception is Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993), in which state
law imposed a shorter limitation period on battery claims than on emotional distress actions. In that
context, the Maine Supreme Court allowed a distress claim grounded largely on the same incidents
that would have supported the time-barred battery action.
94. Weicker v. Weicker, 237 N.E.2d 876, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1968) (rejects distress
claims for marital misconduct); Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989) (husband claims
emotional distress as well as other torts where wife had covert affair and allowed husband to think,
erroneously, that he was the father of her child; summary judgment for wife sustained because pub-
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while a few others have allowed them.95 Most often, however, the court rejects
the particular claim before it as legally inadequate, on the ground that the de-
fendant’s conduct was not sufficiently “outrageous,” without excluding the pos-
sibility that the hurdle might be overcome by different facts. Claims based on
the defendant’s adultery have often been rejected, as courts conclude that un-
faithfulness in all its variations is inadequate to support recovery under the out-
rageousness standard.96 Apparently closer to the line are claims for what might
be called psychological bullying, on which two leading cases divide. Close ex-
amination of these two cases illuminates the question of whether divorce courts
should consider similar conduct in adjudicating claims for compensatory pay-
ments. It suggests that the gingerly approach taken by most courts to spousal
IIED claims is quite sensible, and that this experience supports leaving these
claims in tort law, rather than incorporating them into the dissolution rules.
Some brief observations about the general law of IIED are necessary, however,
before examining these interspousal cases.
Despite the tort’s four “official” elements—(1) an intentional or reckless act
that is (2) extreme and outrageous, and (3) causes (4) severe emotional distress—
in practice the action boils down to the one element of “outrage.”97 The tort has
never been thought to require actual intent to cause the distress, but only to
commit the act that produced it.98 Where intentional outrageous conduct is
proven, courts seem ready to credit the plaintiff’s claim that it caused severe
distress, and where outrage is not proven the tort fails, even if the defendant
meant to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress and succeeded. Thus the
tort is somewhat misnamed. It seems designed less to protect an interest in
emotional tranquility from intentional invasion, than to condemn and punish
bad behavior.99 To establish liability, everything turns on the standard of “outra-
geous” conduct employed in judging the defendant’s conduct. But at the same
time, plaintiffs often detail their emotional upset in order to maximize the
amount of their recovery. So in that important sense, a showing of distress is
lic policy forbids tort claims based on conduct leading to dissolution). This is consistent with the
most common treatment of related third-party claims. E.g., Speer v. Dealy, 495 N.W.2d 911 (Neb.
1993) (husband’s emotional distress claim against his boss, wife’s lover, thrown out as barred by
heartbalm statute).
95. Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. 1991) (allows wife’s IIED claim against hus-
band who falsely told her he had AIDS); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (subse-
quently confirming Texas’s acceptance of IIED in context of spousal claim); Massey v. Massey, 807
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1991) (sustaining jury verdict for $362,000 based on distress claim for hus-
band’s emotional bullying of wife).
96. There have been numerous twists on the basic argument that the defendant’s adultery
caused the plaintiff emotional distress, but none of them have gotten the plaintiff over the outra-
geousness hurdle. E.g., Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa App. 1987) (wife’s affair with hus-
band’s close friend not outrageous as a matter of law); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604 (N.J. Su-
per. Ch. Div. 1991) (wife concealed affair for years); Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. App.
1993) (wife’s exposure of her mind, body, and spirit to sexual advances of another man not outra-
geous); Alexander v. Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. App. 1991) (in suit by husband against wife’s
lover, fact that wife’s lover was himself married and that lover perjured himself in his own divorce
proceedings by denying the affair not sufficiently outrageous).
97. Givelber, supra note 44, at 46-50.
98. Id. at 46.
99. Id. at 54, 59.
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central in the tort’s application. We can thus see that IIED poses policy problems
quite similar to those involved in recognizing fault at divorce. The key question
is defining the actionable conduct, but it is also important to require the showing
of a loss upon which the “damages” may be based.
On the threshold issue—defining the culpable conduct—the authorities are
remarkably vague. The tort has most often been used to police relations between
actors in a commercial context, enforcing a minimal requirement of decency and
fair procedure as between landlords and tenants, creditors and debtors, and
employers and employees.100 One leading writer concludes that distress claims
involving parties not previously bound by contract “are fewer, the results more
unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent.”101 The existence of a previ-
ously established commercial relationship with a well-understood purpose gives
the court a context for establishing the limits of decency by which to judge the
defendant’s conduct. It is thus apparent why the tort’s application in the marital
context has proven problematic. Regulation of commercial interactions can rely
on established conventions of public behavior as well as the understanding that
the actors enter the relationship with a financial purpose that both bounds and
explains the range of acceptable conduct. But neither a financial purpose nor
conventions of public conduct provides a compass to guide the tort’s application
to private marital behavior. What then is available? This is the problem con-
fronted by Massey and Hakkila, two cases that reach conflicting results in IIED
claims based on psychological bullying. In order to appreciate the issues that
arise in these cases, and that would necessarily arise as well in a dissolution law
that permitted consideration of marital misconduct, one must examine the facts
in some detail—as must the courts themselves, in applying such rules.
In Hakkila,102 the spouses separated in 1985 after 10 years of marriage. When
the husband filed a petition for dissolution, the wife, who had a history of de-
pression, counterclaimed for IIED. It appears the divorce and tort cases were
tried together before a judge, who made factual findings to support his award of
tort damages to the wife.103 Although she apparently made no separate claim for
battery, the trial court supported the IIED verdict in part with a general finding
that the husband had “assaulted and battered” her. The appeals court concluded
that this finding was supported in the record by evidence of “several” incidents.
In 1984, when the wife was pushing her finger at her husband’s chest, he
grabbed her wrist and twisted it severely. In 1981, four years before their sepa-
ration, during another argument, he grabbed her and “threw her face down
across the room, into a pot full of dirt.” In 1978, while the wife was putting gro-
100. Id. at 53.
101. Id. at 63. One well-known exception to this principle allows recovery when cruel practical
jokes are played on those with known weaknesses. See Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897); Re-
statement, Second, Torts § 46, Comment d, Illustration 1.
102. Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. App. 1991).
103. The trial court allowed the wife an alimony award of $1,050 monthly in the divorce action,
and then provided that, as damages on the tort claim, she should receive $5,000 in medical expenses
plus the marital residence, worth $136,000, “free and clear” of her “husband’s one-half community
property interest and existing mortgage.” The apparent intent was that existing mortgages be retired
from her husband’s assets. The effect was thus a judgment for at least $73,000 ($5,000 plus her hus-
band’s $68,000 half-share of the home), and perhaps more if there were existing mortgages on the
home for which the husband assumed sole liability. 812 P.2d at 1329.
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ceries in their camper, he slammed part of the camper shell and trunk lid on her
head and hands. In 1976, “and sometimes thereafter,” the husband used “exces-
sive force” during consensual sex when “attempting to stimulate the wife with
his hands.” The court also found that during another argument, she grabbed his
shirt and popped all its buttons off. When she then stepped outside their home,
he closed and locked the door. Neighbors let her in. He threw his clothes in their
camper and drove off for the night. He returned the following morning, they
made up and made love.
The trial court also found additional instances of “outrageous” acts “so ex-
treme in degree as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency and. . .atrocious
and utterly intolerable.” At a Christmas party the husband screamed an obscen-
ity at the wife in front of others when she suggested, at 11 p.m., that they go
home. There was no other evidence of his public screaming, but the wife did
testify that the husband would scream at her when the couple was alone. At
various times he told her “you’re just plain sick, you’re just stupid, you’re just
insane,” and on several occasions the husband said to the wife that “you prefer
women to men.” He testified that he meant only that she preferred women’s
company, and she did not testify that his remarks had any sexual connotations.
Finally, the trial court found that the husband refused to engage in normal sex-
ual relations with the wife, and the wife testified that he blamed his sexual in-
adequacies on her.104 The appellate court cautiously concluded that while
spousal IIED claims might be valid in other settings, the facts of this case were
inadequate as a matter of law to demonstrate such a tort.105 Hence it reversed the
tort judgment for the wife. Indeed, the court expressed concern that the husband
was subjected to a six-day trial on these claims, and urged trial courts to make
more liberal use of summary judgments if similar IIED cases arise in the future.
In Massey,106 the wife claimed that her husband, a bank president, denied
her any independent access to funds and doled out money to her in small
amounts, belittled her in front of others, had temper tantrums that sometimes
included property destruction and that caused her to experience intense anxiety
and fear, and threatened to tell her children and friends of her extramarital af-
fair, and to take custody of her youngest daughter from her. The wife’s psy-
chologist testified that the wife dealt with the husband by “walking on egg
shells” so as not to trigger his rage. The wife made no claim of personal physical
violence, and the jury ultimately found that the husband “had not assaulted [the
wife] by threat of imminent injury nor acted with malice.” Although the hus-
band portrayed most facts differently than his wife, he conceded that he often
used threats in both his business and his marriage “to get his way.” The hus-
band claimed that the wife was an alcoholic, and that he had been devastated by
her extramarital affair. The parties had been married for 22 years. The distress
claim was tried with the divorce action, and resulted in a jury verdict against the
husband for $362,000 in compensatory damages. There was no punitive damage
104. The trial court also found that the husband had refused to allow the wife to pursue school-
ing and hobbies, but the appeals court held that the record did not support these findings.
105. The court certainly did not suggest that the alleged batteries were appropriate marital con-
duct, but rather found that “there was no evidence that [this] conduct caused severe emotional dis-
tress, as opposed to transient pain or discomfort.” 812 P.2d at 1327.
106. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1991).
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award. (There was also a division of property unfavorable to the husband, but
other than rejecting the husband’s claim that this uneven allocation was based
on fault, the opinion provides no details.)  The appeals court affirmed the
award.
In rejecting the husband’s arguments that as a matter of law his conduct
was not outrageous, the Massey appeals court approved the following instruc-
tion that the trial judge had given the jury:
The bounds of decency vary from legal relationship to legal relationship. The
marital relationship is highly subjective and constituted by mutual understand-
ing and interchanges which are constantly in flux, and any number of which
could be viewed by some segment of society as outrageous. Conduct considered
extreme and outrageous in some relationships may be considered forgivable in
other relationships. In your deliberation on the questions, definitions and in-
structions that follow, you shall consider them only in the context of the marital
relationship of the parties to this case.107
In short, by accepting the proposition that the “bounds of decency vary”
among marital relationships, the court seems drawn to the conclusion that the
same acts could be found “outrageous” in the context of one marriage but not in
another. Put differently, the court approved a jury instruction that seeks to avoid
imposing fixed societal standards of conduct on intimate personal relationships
by asking the jury to apply the couple’s own standards. The instruction tells the
jurors not to focus on what they would find outrageous in their own marriage
nor to search for some community consensus as to what marital behavior is
completely out of bounds. Rather, they should decide whether the complaining
spouse can fairly label the other spouse’s behavior “outrageous” in the context
of their own marriage.
The policy issue here—shall the outrageousness of spousal conduct be
judged by external or internal standards—seems fundamental to fault adjudica-
tions in divorce as well as in spousal IIED claims. The apparent justification for
Massey’s choice is that the imposition of external standards on an intimate rela-
tionship may risk inappropriate, and possibly even unconstitutional, intrusion
on marital privacy. But one can agree that such intrusion should be avoided,
while doubting that a resort to internal standards offers a promising solution.
Presumably the relevant internal standard would be found in the couple’s
common understanding when their marriage began, or as they mutually ad-
justed it at some later time, rather than in the unilateral expressions of one
spouse after the marriage has fallen apart. Consider, then, some of the many dif-
ferent possible interpretations of the Massey facts. Perhaps, as suggested by the
opinion, the husband is an insensitive, domineering bully whose conduct nicely
fits the classic fault-divorce standard of mental cruelty. Or perhaps, considering
that their marriage lasted over 20 years, close scrutiny would show that for two
decades or more their relationship, even if “unhealthy,” functioned to meet both
their needs, and was the best that either was capable of. In that case it would
seem that the couple’s marriage complied with their “mutual understanding” so
that the jury instruction would require a verdict for the defendant-husband.
107. 807 S.W.2d at 400.
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There are of course other possible variations. Perhaps his behavior became more
extreme later in the marriage than it was initially, or perhaps when they first
married both were poorly socialized and incapable of “normal” relationships,
but the wife later matured and wanted something better. Note, too, the hus-
band’s claim that he had been devastated by her extramarital affair. Although
other cases reject IIED claims based upon adultery, the Massey jury instruction
might itself suggest that her adultery provides a context (combined perhaps
with her excessive drinking, if he proved that claim as well) in which his be-
havior should not be found “outrageous”?108 Indeed, if the parties’ “mutual un-
derstanding” at the outset of their marriage defines the standard, one might
wonder whether her adultery might not be more outrageous than his bullying
behavior.
These factual speculations may or may not be true, but the approved in-
struction would seem to require the jury to consider if they are. Yet the opinion
suggests no such close examination of the couple’s marital history.109 That is not
surprising. Indeed, on reflection the difficulties with such an inquiry explain
why it is neither realistic nor desirable to require the court to identify and apply
the marital standards the parties had set for themselves. To do so would require
a great deal of nuanced detective work into the parties’ initial understanding at
a time when they both have every incentive to cast earlier words and actions in
an altogether false light. Moreover, to successfully make the inquiry requires a
deep intrusion into the spouses’ intimate affairs, thereby flying in the face of a
central argument in favor of the internal standard in the first place—that they
will respect the couple’s privacy (by avoiding the imposition of outside stan-
dards on them).
It appears, then, that despite the approved jury instruction, neither the jury,
nor the reviewing judges, sought to test the wife’s claim against the couple’s
“mutual understanding.” Instead, the jurors were permitted to deem the hus-
band’s conduct unacceptable for whatever reasons of their own they might have
had.110  The affirmance probably means that the appeals court, applying its own
108. Under the old fault law a “divorce on the ground of cruelty will not be granted if the ill
treatment has been caused by the misconduct of the plaintiff,” thus barring claims by women whose
conduct was “incompatible with the duty of a wife” or who “justly provoke[d] the indignation of the
husband.”  J. Madden, Handbook of the Law of Persons and Domestic Relations 274 (1931).
“[C]ruelty may exist in systematic abuse, humiliating insults and annoyances, causing mental suf-
fering and consequent ill health,” id. at 271; cases granting divorce on grounds of harsh or humiliat-
ing language or demeanor are collected at 272 n.78. Although today the rule would surely be
phrased differently, it seems inevitable that a similar defense would necessarily be allowed to a
claim of outrageous conduct, since the context of the conduct is necessary to evaluating its outra-
geousness.
109. Note, too, that a rule applying internal standards to marital IIED claims creates liability as
well as avoids it. If at the time of their marriage both Massey spouses were staunch believers in a
religion whose sacred texts viewed adultery as an outrage, the court might be bound to give Mr.
Massey an IIED judgment, even though, as a general matter, courts reject IIED claims based upon
adultery.
110. The dissenting judge was also concerned that the jury, despite the instruction that it should
consider the alleged conduct “within the context of the marital relationship” before it, would in fact
“resort to its own view of propriety.” 867 S.W.2d at 767. This is apparently what the wife’s attorney
invited them to do in his closing argument. According to the dissent in Massey:
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values, agreed with the jury that the husband’s behavior was outrageous despite
the wife’s adultery and drinking. Or perhaps the court’s endorsement of an in-
ternal standard makes it all but impossible for it to overturn the factfinder’s de-
cision, because to do so would have required determining and announcing its
own conclusions concerning these details of the couple’s understanding. The
central problem here is not very different if the factfinder is the trial judge in a
dissolution action. The pretense of reliance upon an internal standard frustrates
review of the external standard that is inevitably, if silently, applied, for that
standard need not (indeed, may not) be articulated. Such a system gives fact-
finders enormous discretion to apply whatever standard of marital behavior
they choose, promising uneven justice and unpredictable outcomes, and thus
inviting any discontented, divorcing spouse to try his or her chance at the lot-
tery. The risk is the same whether the factfinder is a judge in a dissolution action
or a tort action.
This problem is especially troublesome because Massey identified an im-
portant problem, even though it did not solve it. Because marital relationships
do vary, important privacy norms can be violated if the law imposes liability
after the marriage for conduct that was within the bounds of the marriage as the
spouses then understood it. This means that an external standard should only
reach conduct that is highly unlikely to have been part of any couple’s mutual
understanding, or that is sufficiently malevolent to justify overriding these pri-
vacy norms.
The preeminent example of such conduct is battery: in holding spouses li-
able for the physical injuries they intentionally inflict on one another, a court has
no occasion to remind the jury that “bounds of decency vary from marital rela-
tionship to marital relationship.” We normally do not believe that couples
meaningfully agree that one may batter the other in return for, say, providing
financial support; and the social norm against spousal beating is sufficiently
strong that we are prepared to condemn it anyway, notwithstanding any alleged
understanding of the couple to the contrary. We are willing to tell batterers that
they act at their peril.
It is more problematic to say this to Mr. Massey, for it is a different matter
to establish standards that identify when emotional mistreatment is completely
out of bounds. People often remain in marriages that others consider unhealthy,
and not only from coercion or delusion. Different couples arrive at different ac-
commodations in their relationship, and some depart from the social conven-
tions. Intimate relationships often involve complex emotional bargains that
make no sense to third parties with different needs or perceptions. Those who
sufficiently dislike their spouse’s behavior can seek a divorce. In a no-fault sys-
tem with appropriate financial remedies to protect either spouse from shoul-
dering a disproportionate share of the financial burden of dissolution, his or her
choice not to do so for many years makes it difficult to conclude that the marital
In his closing. . .argument to the jury, Gayle’s attorney urged them: Show him. Show him
that you’re sensitive. Show him by your verdict that you mean business. Tell this commu-
nity by your verdict that we, these 12 people, don’t sanction this type of conduct in this
country. We want to speak up for the people similarly situated as Gayle Massey and say,
take notice. We’re not going to sanction this type of conduct and only you people can do
that. You can only do it through your verdict.
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relationship was in fact so uncivilized and one-sided as to justify damages,
whether in tort or as part of the dissolution.
The conclusion that the law cannot provide unhappy spouses with com-
pensation for the emotional losses arising in their failed marriage does not re-
quire blindness to the reality of those losses. No one would deny the reality of
the emotional harm inflicted when one spouse honestly tells the other that he no
longer loves her (or vice-versa), but no one would suggest that the statement
should be actionable. Everyone knows that marriage in an emotional enterprise
with high returns and high risks. One reason the Restatement of Torts denies re-
covery for emotional injury intentionally caused by wrongful conduct that is not
“outrageous” is the disparity between our aspirations and our conduct: few of
us always avoid violating the norms of sensitive social conduct that we endorse.
The gap between societal aspiration and individual ability may be especially
great in marital relations, and the range of wrongful behavior that the law can
sensibly address is correspondingly small. Small is not nonexistent, and there
may be highly unusual cases of conduct causing no physical injury which is
nonetheless so extreme that the cautions just surveyed are overcome. The diffi-
culty is in writing a legal standard that limits recovery to such unusual cases. No
model for that standard can be found in existing fault laws despite many dec-
ades of experience. For tort law the problem is new, and perhaps it can construct
a workable solution by building upon precedent interpreting the outrageous-
ness standard, although success is hardly assured.
Claims for emotional loss are far easier to plead than claims for physical
injury. Most marriages that dissolve may involve emotional loss, and almost
certainly, a far higher percentage of estranged spouses see their former mates as
perpetrators of outrageous, emotionally abusive conduct than see them as per-
petrators of physical battery. The subjective lens of spousal bitterness can easily
transform nasty conduct into outrageous conduct, but is less likely to create rec-
ollections of a physical attack that never actually took place. And uncertainty in
the emotional distress liability standard will make such claims more difficult to
defend against. The claimant’s lawyer may thus see more strategic advantage in
making such claims, and the lawyer for the innocent but accused spouse may
feel unable to assure the client that the risk of significant exposure is low. While
these difficulties are exacerbated if the claim is raised in the dissolution action
itself, they exist even if such claims are only allowed in a separate tort suit. The
tort law may invite dubious claims whose settlement will distort the concurrent
divorce process. The risk is that a rule adopted to respond to the small propor-
tion of cases with valid claims would distort the results in the far larger group of
cases without them. In sum, the difficulties with interspousal claims for emo-
tional losses may caution against their recognition in any forum. Certainly, there
is no reason for the dissolution law to invite the kind of claims with which the
tort law has had such difficulty.
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V. The Alternative of Forfeiture
There is reason to consider a rule that would specify acts that forfeit the
actor’s entitlements under the Principles. A forfeiture rule’s blunt approach
avoids the difficulty of placing a dollar value on misconduct. Such a drastic
penalty would require narrow and explicit definitions of the conduct that would
trigger it, but if implemented such language would avoid the difficulties associ-
ated with a discretionary fault system. Forfeiture is not unprecedented. The
handful of states which bar alimony awards to a spouse who has committed an
act of adultery effectively apply a forfeiture rule. The approach might be more
palatable if it were limited to more serious misconduct. For example, a forfeiture
rule could apply only to the claimant who has attempted to murder his or her
spouse.
Consider first how a forfeiture rule would apply to property allocations. It
would deny the actor his or her presumptive half-share of the marital property.
Compare this result to the one that most jurisdictions reach when one joint ten-
ant murders the other. The dominant rule in common-law states appears to al-
low the murderer to retain his or her half-interest, while barring the murderer’s
accession to the victim’s half-interest.111 A similar principle is applied in com-
munity property states.112 Because the Principles, in accord with the pervasive
trend in marital property law over the past several decades, treat the spouses as
joint owners of the marital property at the time of dissolution,113 analogy to joint
tenancy law and community property law is appropriate. The murder attempt
should not, therefore, forfeit the actor’s own half share of the marital property. If
it did, the attempted murder would yield a more severe penalty than the suc-
cessful one who retains his or her own half share even though barred from suc-
ceeding to the victim’s.
For spousal property not held in joint tenancy, a different but no less trou-
bling incongruity would arise in the common-law states. In most of them the
dissolution law’s concept of joint ownership does not apply at death to property
not held in joint title. The result is that the impact of a forfeiture rule would de-
pend upon the spouses’ relative wealth. Assume, for example, a marriage in
which all property was earned by the husband, who did not place it in joint title.
The probate law assesses no penalty on him for murdering her; he retains his
property. While it might deny his inheritance of her property, under these facts
she has no property for him to inherit in any event. However, if she murders
him, the probate penalty is substantial under the common rule that a murderer
cannot inherit from her victim. Thus, a dissolution rule forfeiting the attempted
murderer’s marital property share would, under facts like these, treat the mur-
111. See Reporter’s Note c.
112. E.g., In re Estates of Ruth Ann Spear, 845 P.2d 491 (Ariz. App. 1992).
113. That is why departures from an equal division are permitted only to satisfy a claim allowed
under Chapter 5 (Compensatory Spousal Payments), or to ensure that one spouse’s share of the
property is not compromised by misconduct of the other spouse that squandered a portion of the
assets during the marriage’s final years (§ 4.10). Allocation of the marital property is not governed
by a vague rule of equity, any more than the allocation of joint tenancy property, if partition be-
comes necessary, is so governed. Rather, a transfer of some portion of either spouse’s half-share to
the other requires establishment of a legal claim that the transfer serves to satisfy.
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derous husband more severely if he failed in his attempt than if he succeeded: if
he fails the forfeiture rule would, at dissolution, allocate all property to her, but
if he succeeded the probate law would leave his property to him. The murder-
ous wife, in contrast, would be treated the same whether she failed or suc-
ceeded: in both cases she would receive nothing.
Different but equally anomalous results arise from application of a forfei-
ture rule to claims for compensatory payments. The most serious problem is that
a forfeiture rule only imposes a penalty on the spouse who would otherwise
have a compensatory payment claim—the financially more vulnerable spouse. It
imposes no penalty on the wealthier spouse, who would have no claim for com-
pensatory payments in any event. The less affluent spouse who is victimized
must depend upon the criminal law and the tort law for punishment and com-
pensation. It seems reasonable to place the same burden on the wealthier
spouse, if that spouse is the victim. This is particularly true because the law of
crime and tort has the advantage of adjusting the legal consequences to respond
to the facts of the case in ways that a forfeiture rule cannot. The penalty assessed
by a forfeiture rule equals the lost compensatory payment, reflecting neither the
degree of the actor’s culpability nor the amount of the victim’s loss. The largest
dollar forfeitures are imposed on those who are, relative to their spouses, the
least wealthy, not on those who are the most blameworthy or who have caused
the most harm.
It is once again important to emphasize that rejection of a forfeiture rule
does not imply that the victim of attempted murder has no recourse against the
person who committed it. It is merely to conclude that the appropriate recourse
is the same whether or not the perpetrator is the victim’s spouse: the remedies
provided by the tort law and the criminal justice system. They are designed to
serve this purpose, while the dissolution law is not.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Approximately half the states follow no-fault principles in awarding ali-
mony; considerably more than half do so in allocating marital property. The rea-
son is that the potentially valid functions of a fault principle are better served by
the tort and criminal law, and attempting to serve them through a fault rule
risks serious distortions in the dissolution action. One possible function of a
fault rule, punishment of bad conduct, is generally disavowed even by fault
states. It is better left to the criminal law, which is designed to serve it, and in
doing so appropriately reaches a much narrower range of marital misconduct
than do the marital-misconduct rules of fault states. The second possible func-
tion, compensation for the nonfinancial losses imposed by the other spouse’s
battery or emotional abuse, is better left to tort law. With the general demise of
interspousal immunity, tort remedies for spousal violence are readily available.
Most courts have been more cautious in recognizing interspousal claims for
emotional abuse unaccompanied by physical violence, but the grounds for their
caution apply equally to consideration of emotional distress claims in a dissolu-
tion action under the rubric of a marital misconduct standard.
Where valid compensation claims arise, whether for physical violence or
emotional abuse, the tort law provides principles to measure and satisfy them,
and to determine when they are too stale to entertain. The property allocation
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and alimony rules of the dissolution law, in contrast, are designed for an entirely
different purpose. In the dissolution of a short marriage, the dominant principle
is to return the spouses to the premarital situations. As the marriage lengthens
the Principles provide increasingly generous remedies to the financially more
vulnerable spouse in recognition of their joint responsibility for the irreversible
personal consequences that arise from investing many years in the relationship.
In a system of no-fault divorce in which either party can end the relationship—
by far the dominant American rule—its duration provides a valid benchmark
for assessing the extent of this joint responsibility. In the context of this regime es-
pecially, it will be the unusual case in which the fairness of the result will be im-
proved by a judicial inquiry into the relative virtue of the parties’ intimate con-
duct. In some the result will become less fair. And the rules that invite such
misconduct claims will surely increase the cost and degrade the process in many
other cases, even those in which the claim is ultimately cast aside.
Surely the law must provide a remedy for cases of harm caused by serious
misconduct even if they are unusual, but those are the cases to which tort law
applies. The alternative of using divorce remedies to provide compensation for
tortious injury through the application of a fault principle provides a doubly un-
satisfactory result: the dissolution remedies still remain inadequate as a tort sub-
stitute, while the introduction of fault impairs their utility in serving their pri-
mary purpose. Fault makes the outcome of litigation less predictable, and gives
parties an incentive to raise claims of misconduct as leverage in the negotiation
process. A limited fault rule under which dissolution remedies are forfeited by
serious violence would be less unpredictable in operation, but has its own diffi-
culties. Because it would provide an incomplete compensation structure, tort
remedies would still be necessary to obtain adequate compensation for many
victims. At the same time it would yield a perverse pattern in those cases to
which it applied, as it apportions penalties whose harshness increases with the
tortfeasor’s relative poverty, rather than with his blameworthiness or the dam-
age he inflicted.
Reliance on the tort system to provide a satisfactory result where one
spouse’s wrongful conduct has injured the other requires attention to rules es-
tablishing the relationship between interspousal tort claims and the financial
remedies available in an action for marital dissolution. While this relationship
has been addressed by many courts,114 it may be that further attention to this
matter is necessary. These questions, however, are largely procedural in nature,
and are not within the scope of this project.
REPORTER’S NOTES
a. Current Law.
The following table lists the states included within each of the categories
described in the main body of the essay.  These classifications are based upon
114. See supra note 36.
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supporting authorities gathered for the comprehensive study of this question
completed in 1996.
Group 1: Complete No-Fault, Property and Alimony (20)







Group 2: Pure No-Fault Property, Almost Pure No-Fault Alimony (5)
Idaho New Jersey Utah
Kentucky Ohio
Group 3: Almost Pure No-Fault, Property and Alimony (3)
Arkansas Kansas New York
Group 4: No-Fault Property, Full-Fault Alimony (7)
Louisiana Tennessee West Virginia
North Carolina South Dakota Virginia
Pennsylvania
Group 5: Full-Fault, Property and Alimony (15)
Alabama Michigan Rhode Island
Connecticut Mississippi South Carolina
Georgia Missouri Texas
Maryland New Hampshire Vermont
Massachusetts North Dakota Wyoming
The following lists provide the authorities relied upon for the preceding
classifications, with the states listed alphabetically, by category.
1. Pure no-fault, property and alimony (20)
a. Alaska. Both property and alimony sections of the governing statute re-
fer to the “conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreason-
able depletion of assets” but also specify that the judgment should be made
“without regard to which of the parties is at fault.” Court has interpreted this
language in property section to mean that only post-separation conduct with a
financial impact can be considered—otherwise strict no-fault. Oberhansley v.
Oberhansley, 798 P.2d 883 (Alaska 1990). No cases on alimony, but since statu-
tory language is identical the same result presumably follows.
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b. Arizona. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal maintenance
are determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
25-318 to -319.
c. California. California courts have no discretion in their allocation of
property. The court “shall. . .divide the community property estate of the parties
equally.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550. Thus, California courts may not consider
marital misconduct, or anything else, for that matter. In addition, California
Family Code § 2335 provides (with exceptions for child custody or child abuse)
that in any “pleading or proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion. . .including depositions and discovery. . .evidence of specific acts of mis-
conduct is improper and inadmissible.” Misconduct is thus also excluded from
consideration in spousal maintenance determinations. See also BLUMBERG’S CAL.
FAM. CODE ANN. (1995) (commentary to § 2250). However, in 1995 the California
legislature adopted 1995 Cal. Stat. 364, adding sections 782.5 and 4324 to the
Family Code. These sections bar any award of spousal support, insurance bene-
fits, or of a share in pension benefits, to a spouse who has been convicted of at-
tempting to murder the other spouse. Entitlement to other forms of community
property are not affected by these provisions.
d. Colorado. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal maintenance
are determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” COLO. REV. STAT. §§
14-10-113 to -114.
e. Delaware. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal maintenance
are determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 1512(c), 1513(a).
f. Florida. By statute, adultery can be considered, but the Florida courts
have held that this single statutory exception to the no-fault rule can be relied
upon only insofar as the adultery caused a depletion of marital assets. See Noah
v. Noah, 491 So.2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 1986) (“counsel for petitioner intimated
that. . .pleadings in marital dissolution cases are regressing to the point where
the fault of the parties is once again playing a prominent role. In response. . .we
repeat our admonition. . . . For a trial court to perform routinely a balancing act
with testimony of alleged marital misconduct of the parties would be a step
backward to the days of threats and insinuations which plagued our courts be-
fore our no-fault system was enacted and would be directly contrary to express
legislative policy.”); Heilman v. Heilman, 610 So.2d 60, 61 (Fla. Dist. App. 1992)
(trial court reversed for denying wife alimony and marital property on basis of
her adultery, which under Noah may be considered only insofar as it depleted
marital assets; husband’s argument that the adultery caused the family emo-
tional devastation that had financial consequences “is not persuasive”). See also
Mosbarger v. Mosbarger and De Castro v. De Castro, infra Reporter’s Note c
(holding that attempted murder is irrelevant).
g. Hawaii. Statute, which governs both alimony and property division,
lists as a factor to consider, “the respective merits of the parties,” but it appears
that the Hawaiian courts have long limited this language to conduct that bore on
the accumulation or dissipation of property. Horst v. Horst, 623 P.2d 1265, 1270-
71 (Haw. App. 1981) (“Fault pertaining to personal conduct of the spouses to-
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ward each other has no bearing on the question as to which spouse has a better
claim to the property sought to be divided in a divorce proceeding. . . . A
spouse’s contribution to, or assistance in the accumulation or preservation of,
the separate property of the other spouse are appropriate considerations. . .”)
(citing Richards v. Richards, 355 P.2d 188 (Haw. 1960)); Lewis v. Lewis, 747 P.2d
698, 700 (Haw. App. 1986) (the statutory phrase “‘relative merits of the parties’ is
pertinent only in connection with division of property. We do not think that it
has any reference to personal conduct of the spouse.”), aff’d in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988). A recent case reaffirming
this interpretation is Markham v. Markham, 909 P.2d 602 (Haw. App. 1996). 
h. Illinois. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal maintenance are
determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para.
5-503 to -504.
i. Indiana. Neither alimony nor property statutes make reference to fault.
The property provision does say that the allocation should be “just and reason-
able” but Indiana courts have made clear that this does not allow consideration
of fault. R.E.G. v. L.M.G., 571 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Ind. App. 1991) (chastises trial
court for giving wife 60% of property based on her claim that husband’s homo-
sexual affairs put her at risk for AIDS, since she didn’t have AIDS and “we will
not tolerate the injection of fault into modern dissolution proceedings.”). The
alimony statute does not even contain the phrase “just and reasonable,” seeming
to eliminate any argument for including fault. It is quite directive as to the rele-
vant considerations (basically, need) and has no open-ended list of factors.
j. Iowa. Statute silent, but after adoption of Iowa’s no-fault divorce law its
supreme court considered the question and concluded that “fault for the mar-
riage breakdown. . .must. . .be rejected as a factor in awarding property settle-
ment or an allowance of alimony. . .” In re Williams’ Marriage, 199 N.W.2d 339,
345 (Iowa 1977).
k. Maine. Statutory list of factors does not mention fault, although it does
mention economic misconduct. The deletion of fault from the statute has been
read as meaning that “marital fault leading to the breakdown of the marriage
(adultery, cruel and abusive treatment, nonsupport, etc.) may not be considered
by the court in dividing property.” Delano v. Delano, 501 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Me.
1985). Because the amendments “eliminated the fault provision from the ali-
mony statute. . .the sole purpose of the statute [is] the provision of financial
support. . .when necessary,” since “[a]limony is intended to fill the needs of the
future, not to compensate for the deeds of the past.” Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d
1204, 1207 (Me. 1985).
l. Minnesota. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal maintenance
are determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” MINN. STAT. §§
518.58(l), .552(b).
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m. Montana. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal maintenance
are determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” MONT. CODE ANN. §§
40-4-202(1), -203(2). See also In re Marriage of Bultman, 740 P.2d 1145, 1146
(Mont. 1987).
n. Nebraska. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 governs both property division and
alimony. Fault and marital conduct are omitted from the factors to be consid-
ered in allocating property and granting alimony, and the section states that the
purpose of alimony “is to provide for the continued maintenance and support of
one party by the other when the relative economic circumstances and the other
criteria enumerated in this section make it appropriate.” In Else v. Else, 367
N.W.2d 701 (Neb. 1985), the court stated that in enacting this section, “the Leg-
islature had ample opportunity to retain misconduct of a spouse. . .as a factor to
be considered. . . . However, misconduct. . .was not retained. . . . Were § 42-365
to be interpreted. . .that misconduct. . .was determinative of spousal support,
such interpretation would reinsert fault as a factor. . .regarding alimony, in
derogation of the clearly indicated legislative intent to the contrary.” Id. at 704.
o. Nevada. Property is divided equally unless the court finds a “compelling
reason” for an unequal division that it “sets forth in writing.” NEV. REV. STAT. §
125.150(1)(b). Even prior to its adoption of this equal division presumption, Ne-
vada decisions appear to mention only economic circumstances in identifying
acceptable rationales for an unequal division. E.g., McNabney v. McNabney, 782
P.2d 1291 (Nev. 1989). In a number of decisions the Nevada Supreme Court
noted that the statute allowed consideration of the “respective merits of the par-
ties,” and observed, without deciding, that such language might permit consid-
eration of fault. Rutar v. Rutar, 827 P.2d 829, 831 n.2 (Nev. 1992) (“we have not,
and do not now express any opinion as to the meaning of the term ‘respective
merits of the parties’”); Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 681 n.6 (Nev. 1988) (noting
that courts interpreting statutes that were otherwise no-fault had taken varying
positions on whether fault could be considered in alimony). There were, in fact,
never any modern Nevada decisions that considered marital misconduct in ali-
mony, so far as our search could find. In any event, an October 1993 amendment
of the statute deleted the references to the parties’ “respective merits,” thus
eliminating the only basis upon which the Nevada courts ever even contem-
plated allowing consideration of fault, and consideration of fauilt is now clearly
excluded. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000).
p. New Mexico. Statute does not include fault among the factors that may
be considered, and reported decisions even addressing the issue of fault at di-
vorce are virtually nonexistent. The clearest language on the question appears in
a worker’s compensation case that involved conflicting claims to benefits by the
decedent’s three wives. In resolving that question the court observed that in
“New Mexico we are not concerned with ‘fault’ of the spouse in determining a
right to support. . . . An award of alimony is not dependent upon the fault of a
spouse.” Lauderdale v. Hyord Conduit Corp., 555 P.2d 700, 705 (N.M. App.
1976). In Brister v. Brister, 594 P.2d 1167, 1171 (N.M. 1979), the court held that in
evaluating husband’s claim to reduce wife’s alimony where she had taken a
“live-in lover,” the only question was economic—whether support from the
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lover reduced her need. The court’s analysis assumes, without explicitly stating,
that fault or misconduct are irrelevant in resolving the issue.
q. Oklahoma. The statutes are silent on the question of fault, stating only
that property should be divided as the court may think “just and reasonable”
and alimony awarded as the court may think “reasonable.” OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 121. However, case law authority establishes that misconduct is not
relevant to either the allocation of property or the granting of alimony except as
the misconduct may have affected the accumulation of assets or the financial
need of the parties. Smith v. Smith, 847 P.2d 827, 830 (Okla. App. 1993) (affirm-
ing trial judge’s refusal to hear the wife’s proffered evidence of the husband’s
repeated affairs during marriage because it had no “relevancy” to property or
alimony, as it did not “dissipate marital assets,” nor did she offer any “link”
between the husband’s “misconduct and her ‘need’ for alimony.”).
r. Oregon. Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.036 provides that in allocating property and
in fixing the amount of spousal support, “the court shall not consider the fault, if
any, of either of the parties in causing grounds for
the. . .dissolution. . .or. . .separation.” See Matter of Marriage of DeVille, 607 P.2d
228 (Or. App. 1980), amended, 615 P.2d 1177 (Or. App. 1980).
s. Washington. Follows UMDA. Property division and spousal mainte-
nance are determined “without regard to marital misconduct.” WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (property), § 26.09.090 (alimony). But court can consider
the effect of physical and emotional abuse on the spouse’s economic circum-
stances in determining her need for alimony. Matter of Marriage of Foran, 834
P.2d 1081 (Wash. App. 1992).
t. Wisconsin. Property provision follows UMDA. Property is allocated
“without regard to marital misconduct.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(3). Alimony
provision silent, but an opinion by Justice Abrahamson holds that “the legisla-
ture did not intend to allow the circuit court to consider marital misconduct a
relevant factor in granting maintenance payments.” Dixon v. Dixon, 319 N.W.2d
846, 853 (Wis. 1982), aff’d, Hefty v. Hefty, 493 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Wis. 1992) (al-
though husband “refers to Dixon as the general rule, Dixon is, in fact, the only
rule in this area of law [and] expressly prohibits a court from considering mari-
tal misconduct when awarding maintenance. . . .”). But see In re Marriage of
Brabec, 510 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. App. 1993) (affirming trial court’s refusal to apply
Dixon where wife convicted of attempting to hire someone to kill husband dur-
ing the pendency of the divorce proceedings).
2. Pure no-fault property, almost pure no-fault alimony (5)
a. Idaho. Relevant statutes include fault as a factor for alimony but not for
property, which is presumptively divided “substantially equally.” The only case
on fault explains that prior to 1990, innocence was an eligibility requirement for
alimony, but that 1990 statutory reforms eliminated this requirement and estab-
lished that need and ability to pay were the “primary” basis for alimony awards.
Marmon v. Marmon, 825 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Idaho App. 1992). The extent to which
consideration of fault survives this amendment remains to be seen.
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b. Kentucky. Follows UMDA in property, Dowell v. Dowell, 490 S.W.2d 478
(Ky. App. 1973), but the maintenance statute is silent. Kentucky courts initially
decided that the legislative intent was to exclude fault from determining eligi-
bility for alimony, but not from determining its amount. Chapman v. Chapman,
498 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. App. 1973). This decision has been both limited and se-
verely criticized by later opinions, Platt v. Platt, 728 S.W.2d 542, 543 (Ky. App.
1987) (Chapman opinion “disfigured the statute” by allowing consideration of
fault; fault may not be considered where wife sought to augment her claim with
evidence of husband’s adultery) and only barely survives in the state supreme
court, Tenner v. Tenner, 21 Fam. L. Rep. 1419, 1995 Ky. LEXIS 80 (Ky. 1995)
(agrees with Platt that obligor’s fault may not be considered, but continues to
allow consideration of the claimant’s fault; three dissenters would overrule
Chapman and exclude fault altogether).
c. New Jersey. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23.1 governs the distribution of prop-
erty. Marital misconduct is not among the factors the statute directs the court to
consider, although the court is empowered to consider “any other factor it
deems relevant.” Soon after New Jersey’s adoption of no-fault divorce, however,
the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a trial court that considered the wife’s
adultery in its allocation of marital property. While recognizing that the statu-
tory factors were intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive. . .we are satis-
fied that the concept of ‘equitable distribution’ requires that fault be excluded as
a consideration . . . . The spouse who . . . gives cause . . .for divorce may not be
responsible for the breakdown of the marriage . . . [but] may merely be reacting
to a situation which is not of his or her making. Marriage is such an intricate re-
lationship that often it is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain upon whom the
real responsibility for the marital breakup rests.
The court also quoted with approval the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act language directing that property allocations be made “without regard to
marital misconduct.” Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478, 482-83 (N.J. 1974). A
1980 lower court decision ignored Chalmers and denied any share of the marital
property to a husband who had tried to have his wife murdered. D’Arc v.
D’Arc, 421 A.2d 602 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1980). New Jersey is one of several
states which retained fault grounds for divorce when it added no-fault grounds
to its statute. Litigants may therefore continue to seek a divorce on fault
grounds. If they do, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-23.1 permits the court to consider the
“proofs made in establishing such ground in determining an amount of ali-
mony,” and a number of decisions during the 1970s denied or reduced alimony
awards to wives found guilty of adultery. See Lynn v. Lynn, 398 A.2d 141 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1979). There appear to be no cases since Lynn, however, that
consider fault in an alimony adjudication. In a 1991 tort action between former
spouses, a trial court noting the fault rule cited these 1970 opinions. Ruprecht v.
Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 608 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1991). Yet more recently an-
other trial court deciding an interspousal tort case observed that “a trial judge is
under the specific direction that the resolution of the financial aspects of the
marriage—whether support or equitable distribution—are to be resolved with-
out regard to fault.” Tweedley v. Tweedley, 649 A.2d 630, 633 (N.J. Super. Ch.
Div. 1994). The impression is that, while older authority permitting considera-
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tion of fault in alimony adjudications has never been overruled, it is now rarely
if ever relied upon, and may no longer be considered authoritative.
d. Ohio. The statute does not mention misconduct in its treatment of either
alimony or property allocation, but does for both allow the court to consider “all
relevant factors.” Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (Ohio 1981). In the
case of property, however, consideration of fault seems very rare. A search in
Lexis for Ohio family law cases that contained the word “property” within eight
words of “misconduct” or “fault” yielded almost no cases of true marital mis-
conduct—they were all financial misconduct. The single exception is a peculiar
case involving whether to require wife to return wedding and engagement rings
given her by husband at the dissolution of a brief marriage. In ordering their
return the trial court relied on evidence of wife’s repeated intimacies with a
former husband. In affirming the order, however, the appellate court cautioned
that it did not “intend for the use of fault in this property hearing to be read as
opening the door to fault issues in all property hearings. We hold only that un-
der the facts and circumstances of this particular case, the use of fault in order-
ing the return of the engagement and wedding rings to husband was not an
abuse of discretion.” Schwartz v. Schwartz, No. C-930592, 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 4578 (Oct. 5, 1994). In alimony the governing authority seems more open
to consideration of fault. Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ohio 1984)
(despite statute’s omission of fault as a factor, it may be considered, but court’s
refusal to hear additional evidence of fault not improper). However, most of the
cases found in a Lexis search (alimony within 10 words of fault or misconduct)
either caution against consideration of fault or sustain a lower court decision
over objections that it failed to consider misconduct evidence. Labor v. Labor,
1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 838 (court must state its reasons for alimony award and
should not give greater weight to fault than to other statutory factors; $100 per
month alimony for wife at fault held insufficient); Lemon v. Lemon, 537 N.E.2d
246, 250 (Ohio App. 1988) (governing statute “does not require a trial court to
consider fault or marital aggression in its division of marital assets or award of
alimony. It appears from that language that the legislature did not intend mari-
tal misconduct to be a definitive factor in the division of marital assets. . . . The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider marital fault or ag-
gression in determining the division of property and alimony award between
the parties.”); Groom v. Groom, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4583 (declines to alter
trial court’s award of alimony to wife admittedly guilty of numerous and blatant
infidelities; weight need not be given to misconduct); Kelecava v. Kelecava, 1990
Ohio App. LEXIS 4213 (similar). But there is clearly some undefined range of
tolerance for trial courts that do consider marital misconduct. E.g., Young v.
Young, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2800 (“without findings and conclusions disclos-
ing that the trial court predicated its award of alimony on consideration of de-
fendant’s marital misconduct, we do not presume it did so. However, to the ex-
tent it may have done so, we do not find consideration of such matter to be error
as it may bear upon plaintiff’s physical and emotional condition, for example, or
otherwise.”).
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e. Utah. Utah has largely been a no-fault state. This is illustrated by the
decision in Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), in which husband shot wife
in the head before unsuccessfully attempting to commit suicide. (Husband was
acquitted of attempted murder in a jury trial.) Wife brought a battery and emo-
tional distress claim against husband which had not yet been tried at the time of
the divorce decree. The issue in Noble was whether the divorce court had im-
properly considered matters that should have been reserved for the tort action.
The Utah Supreme Court drew a careful line, making clear that the divorce court
could consider wife’s “increased living expenses and decreased earning capacity
resulting from the disabilities caused by the shooting” in fashioning the alimony
and property portions of the divorce decree. Id. at 1370. Since such disabilities
could be taken into account “regardless of their cause,” consideration of them
should not be precluded when they result from the other spouse’s tortious acts.
Id. at 1372. The court found that the trial court’s substantial property award was
appropriate in light of these factors and of husband’s inability to pay an alimony
award adequate to meet wife’s needs, and therefore rejected husband’s claim
that the trial court’s real rationale—concededly improper—was “to punish Glen
for the shooting and to compensate Elaine for her injuries.” At the same time the
supreme court allowed the tort action to go forward, presumably because the
wife could there recover for losses not recognized in the divorce action. (The
court was also careful to note, however, that special damages ordinarily allowed
in tort—lost earning capacity and medical expenses—could be duplicative of the
divorce recovery, and should therefore be barred in the tort action.) Id. at 1373.
There are nonetheless threads of fault occasionally appearing in Utah law.
Fault grounds for divorce are available to the spouse who chooses to pursue
them, and at one point the Noble opinion itself says that “because Elaine’s coun-
terclaim for divorce was based on Glen’s cruelty to her, it was proper [for the
trial judge] to consider. . .Glen’s fault in causing [her] injuries,” an odd state-
ment not elaborated upon nor consistent with the remainder of the opinion. Id.
at 1371. Most significantly, a 1995 amendment to Utah law allows, but does not
require, the divorce court to consider “the fault of the parties” in its decision on
alimony. Utah Code § 30-3-5(7)(b). (Subsection (7)(a) contains a list of factors
that must be considered, but this fault provision is set aside in a separate sub-
section as a factor that the court “may consider.”) It remains to be seen whether,
or to what extent, Utah courts accept the invitation to consider fault. The Utah
Supreme Court has previously held that “alimony is not intended as a penalty
against the husband nor a reward to the wife.” English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,
411 (Utah 1977).
3. Almost pure no-fault, property and alimony (3)
a. Arkansas. Under § 9-12-315 marital property is divided equally at di-
vorce unless the court makes finding that one of nine statutory factors requires
an unequal division. Fault is not on that list. The Arkansas Supreme Court
nonetheless allowed an unequal division where the wife was convicted of con-
spiring to kill the husband, concluding that the omission of fault from the list
was not meant by the legislature “to preclude a chancellor from considering
such bizarre facts as those in this case.” Stover v. Stover, 696 S.W.2d 750, 752
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(Ark. 1986). The court cautioned, however, that “the extent of our holding” is to
allow consideration “of the fact that one spouse has been convicted of conspir-
ing to kill the other.” Id. Subsequently, the same court held that “fault is not a
factor in deciding whether to award alimony unless it relates to need or the
ability to pay.” Burns v. Burns, 847 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Ark. 1993).
b. Kansas. In re Marriage of Sommers, 792 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Kan. 1990),
adopts an essentially complete no-fault position, although leaving open the pos-
sibility that fault might be considered in “extremely gross and rare situations.”
Since Sommers, no reported decision in Kansas has allowed consideration of
fault. Sommers itself noted that “It is difficult to conceive of any circumstances
where evidence of marital infidelity would be a proper consideration in the
resolution of the financial aspects of a marriage.” Id. at 1010. The financial im-
pact of conduct can be considered, of course. For example, where “the hus-
band’s mental abuse of the wife [made her] so emotionally impaired that her
earning capacity is affected,” the court can fix the financial awards in light of
that reduced earning capacity. Id.
c. New York. Marital fault is excluded from consideration in equitable dis-
tribution except for “egregious cases that shock the conscience.” O’Brien v.
O’Brien, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 (N.Y. 1985) (except for such extreme cases, mis-
conduct is not a “just and proper” consideration because it is inconsistent with
the equitable distribution premise of economic partnership and entitlement to
fair share of accumulated property, difficult to determine, and “would involve
courts in time consuming procedural maneuvers relating to collateral issues.”).
Most lower court decisions apply the same rule to alimony determinations. Wil-
son v. Wilson, 476 N.Y.S.2d 120, 125 (App. Div. 1984). At least one lower court,
however, has stated that fault was still a “proper consideration” in alimony.
Sarafian v. Sarafian, 528 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (App. Div. 1988). The facts of Sarafian
in fact meet New York’s egregious misconduct standard, however (husband,
then 64, received permission from wife’s parents to marry her at 16 by buying a
house for them; he had, since she was 13, “regularly” taken her from her New
York home to his abandoned chicken farm where he engaged in sexual relations
with her). That standard, as it appears to operate in practice, allows considera-
tion of fault only in cases in which the alleged misconduct amounted to a seri-
ous violent felony. It is well-established in New York that “verbal harassment,
threats and several acts of minor domestic violence” is not egregious miscon-
duct under this rule, Kellerman v. Kellerman, 590 N.Y.S.2d 570, 571 (App. Div.
1992), nor is the husband’s refusal to have children in violation of an explicit
promise, McCann v. McCann, 593 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. 1993) (discussing the rule at
length), nor the combination of the wife’s open adultery, physical abuse
(scratching, biting, and pulling hair of husband), verbal abuse (repeatedly be-
rating him in front of coworkers and friends), and wounding of her husband
with a knife while breaking into his locked briefcase, Stevens v. Stevens, 484
N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 1985), nor necessarily the husband’s verbal and physical
abuse of wife, which may not be sufficiently extreme or outrageous to allow re-
duction in his share of marital property, Orofino v. Orofino, 627 N.Y.S.2d 460
(App. Div. 1995). Attempted murder is egregious misconduct, Brancovenanu v.
Brancovenanu, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86 (App. Div. 1988) and Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472
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N.Y.S.2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1984); as is rape, Thompson v. Thompson, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 5,
1990, at 22 (rape of stepdaughter egregious misconduct in dissolution of mar-
riage between mother and stepfather); and repeated physical abuse in which,
over a 20-year period, the husband slapped defendant’s face weekly; broke her
foot by stamping on it; broke her finger, leaving it permanently deformed;
pushed her, causing a broken arm with a permanent 40 percent loss of use, and
punched her so that she sustained dental damage requiring caps and root canal
work. Debeny v. Debeny, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1991 at 21. Even egregious conduct
has been held irrelevant to the property division, however, where both spouses
were guilty of it. Valenza v. Valenza, 16 Fam. L. Rep. 1155 (N.Y. Sup. 1990) (wife
hired hit men who attempted to beat husband to death after husband had raped
wife at gunpoint; relative fault held irrelevant). New York commentators have
concluded that egregious misconduct requires either attempted murder or the
actual commission of “serious violence.” Russell Marnell, Marital Fault in New
York, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 1994, at 1.
4. No-fault property, full fault in alimony (7)
a. Louisiana. Divides community property equally, without regard to fault
(or anything else). Article 112(A)(1) of the Louisiana Code allows alimony only
to a spouse who is not at fault, which the state supreme court defines as “serious
misconduct” or “cruel treatment or excesses which compel a separation because
the marriage is insupportable.” Allen v. Allen, 648 So.2d 359, 363 (La. 1994).
Lower courts have held that the statutory standard includes adultery, conviction
of a felony, habitual intemperance, cruel treatment or outrages, public defama-
tion, abandonment, attempted murder, and intentional nonsupport. Guillory v.
Guillory, 626 So.2d 826, 829 (La. App. 1993).
b. North Carolina. North Carolina’s traditional rule was unusual in making
misconduct of the obligor a requirement for alimony, in addition to providing
that the adultery of the obligee was a bar, and allowing consideration of fault
generally as a factor in setting the award’s amount. Williams v. Williams, 261
S.E.2d 849 (N.C. 1980). A very recent revision of the governing statute retains
these basic sentiments, but drops the fault of the obligor as an alimony eligibility
requirement. It bars alimony awards to a spouse guilty of “illicit sexual behav-
ior,” or adultery, requires that alimony be awarded where the supporting
spouse is guilty of “illicit sexual behavior,” leaves the matter to the court’s dis-
cretion when both are guilty of illicit sexual behavior, and requires the court to
consider, in fixing any award, “the marital misconduct of either of the spouses,”
which is elsewhere defined as any one of nine separate offenses including “illicit
sexual behavior,” “abandonment,” “excessive use of alcohol or drugs,” “indig-
nities,” and a “malicious turning out-of-doors.” N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.1(A),
-16.3(A)(a), -16.3(A)(1). In contrast, fault has been held relevant in the allocation
of marital property only where it is “related to the economic condition of the
marriage,” such as dissipation. Smith v. Smith, 331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (N.C. 1985);
Smith v. Smith, 438 S.E.2d 457, 458 (N.C. App. 1994); Smith v. Smith, 433 S.E.2d
196, 221 (N.C. App. 1993). This rule has also been applied to parties with other
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names. Shoffner v. Shoffner, 371 S.E.2d 749, 751 (N.C. App. 1988); Spence v.
Jones, 348 S.E.2d 819, 821 (N.C. App. 1986).
c. Pennsylvania. “Marital misconduct may not be considered by the court
in determining an order of equitable distribution.” Perlberger v. Perlberger, 626
A.2d 1186, 1195 (Pa. 1992). One lower court allocated all of the marital estate to
the wife where the husband had been convicted of soliciting someone to murder
her, but this was affirmed on the ground that the husband’s conduct, which also
included questionable business dealings, had dissipated marital assets. Holub v.
Holub, 583 A.2d 1157 (1990), appeal denied, 596 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1991). The “mari-
tal misconduct of either of the parties during marriage” may be considered in
alimony awards under Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(14). It has been held proper
for a court to treat the husband’s affairs during marriage as “misconduct”
within the meaning of this provision, in fashioning an alimony award in favor of
the wife. Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369, 1378 (Pa. Super. 1992). An
Adviser from Pennsylvania tells the Reporter, however, that it is rare for fault to
be considered by trial courts.
d. South Dakota. Statute excludes consideration of fault in property. S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.1 (“Fault shall not be taken into account with regard to
the awarding of property.”). The South Dakota Supreme Court has indicated
that it should be considered in alimony, where there is no statutory bar, Hanks v.
Hanks, 296 N.W.2d 523, 527 (S.D. 1980), and there seems to be very little limita-
tion on its consideration. E.g., Temple v. Temple, 365 N.W.2d 561, 568 (S.D.
1984); Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 508 (S.D. 1991) (husband’s extramarital
affair “appropriate for consideration in an alimony award but not in a property
award”).
e. Tennessee. Statute requires no-fault allocation of property, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-4-121 (court shall “assign the marital property between the parties
without regard to marital fault”) but the alimony statute expressly authorizes
the court to consider “the relative fault of the parties . . . where the court, in its
discretion, deems it appropriate to do so.” TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-5-101-(d)(1)(K). And they do, considering things like adultery. Wilder v.
Wilder, 863 S.W.2d 707, 715 (Tenn. App. 1992).
f. Virginia. Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.1 bars alimony to a spouse guilty of
conduct that would provide the basis of a fault divorce unless “the court deter-
mines from clear and convincing evidence, that a denial of support and mainte-
nance would constitute a manifest injustice, based upon the respective decrees
of fault during the marriage and relative economic circumstances of the parties.”
As if the point were not clear, two sentences later the section reiterates that in
determining whether to award alimony the court “shall consider the circum-
stances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage, specifi-
cally including adultery and any other ground for divorce. . . .” The fault
grounds for divorce cross-referenced by this section are adultery, imprisonment
for more than one year upon conviction of a felony, cruelty, desertion, or having
caused “reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt.” VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91. The
consequences of these provisions is that fault can bar or reduce the amount of
alimony, but can almost never increase it. The obligor’s fault would seem rele-
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vant only as a defense to the claim that the obligee’s fault should bar or reduce a
support order. See Dukelow v. Dukelow, 341 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Va. App. 1986), ex-
plaining that alimony decisions are a “two-step” process in which the court first
determines whether a spouse is barred by fault from claiming alimony, and
then, if “no fault ground [for divorce] exists,” it may go on to consider the rela-
tive needs and abilities of the parties. Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.3(E)(5) includes in
the list of factors that the court should consider in its allocation of marital prop-
erty “the circumstances . . . which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage,
specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of §
20-91. . . .” It is unclear the extent to which fault is thought relevant in property
allocation, however. In Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (Va. App. 1988), the
court, construing this language, says that “circumstances that lead to the disso-
lution of the marriage but have no effect upon marital property, its value, or
otherwise are not relevant [and] need not be considered.” It should be noted that
in rejecting, on this basis, the wife’s claim that the trial court did not give suffi-
cient weight to the husband’s adultery, the court affirmed an award of 65 per-
cent of the marital property to the husband, on the apparent basis that he had
earned most of it as an orthopedic surgeon. Later decisions rely on Aster’s ap-
parent exclusion of traditional fault factors to favor other husbands who might
otherwise suffer an unfavorable allocation of property they had earned. E.g.,
Donnell v. Donnell, 455 S.E.2d 256 (Va. App. 1995) (trial court’s property alloca-
tion favorable to wife reversed where it appears to have been improperly based
on husband’s conviction for sexually molesting parties’ daughters, citing Aster);
Gamer v. Gamer, 429 S.E.2d 618 (Va. App. 1993) (husband’s adultery irrelevant
to property allocation under Aster).
g. West Virginia. Statute requires that property be allocated “without re-
gard to any attribution of fault,” W. Va. Code § 48-2-32, but in alimony the court
is directed, in determining both eligibility and amount, to “consider and com-
pare the fault or misconduct of either or both of the parties and the effect of such
fault or misconduct as a contributing factor to the deterioration of the marital
relationship” and to deny alimony altogether to someone guilty of adultery,
conviction of a felony, or “actual” abandonment. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(I).
5. Full-fault, property and alimony (15)
a. Alabama. Trial court even reversed for not considering husband’s adul-
tery in connection with property division. O’Daniel v. O’Daniel, 515 So.2d 1250
(Ala. 1987).
b. Connecticut. Statutes permit consideration of fault in both property and
alimony. Although in one opinion the state supreme court cautioned that fault
should not be overemphasized, being only one factor to be considered, Sands v.
Sands, 448 A.2d 822 (Conn. 1982), most appellate decisions emphasize the wide
discretion allowed trial courts in property allocations and alimony decisions. See
Reporter’s Note b.
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c. Georgia. Fault is relevant to alimony by statute, Ga. Code Ann. § 19-6-1;
test is quite open-ended except that adultery and desertion are a bar to alimony.
See Davidson v. Davidson, 257 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1979). For property division the
statute is silent, but Peters v. Peters, 283 S.E.2d 454, 455 (Ga. 1981), held that “the
conduct of the parties. . . is relevant and admissible” in equitable distribution.
d. Maryland. Relevant statutes make “the circumstances that contributed
to the estrangement of the parties” relevant in both property, Md. Code Ann. §
8-205(b)(4), and alimony, § 8-106(b)(6). A trial judge was reversed for refusing to
allow testimony concerning the wife’s adultery, since that was relevant to the
award. Ohm v. Ohm, 431 A.2d 1371, 1381 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
e. Massachusetts. Mass. Gen. L. Ann. § 208-34 includes among the factors
applicable to both alimony and property division “the conduct of the parties
during the marriage.” It is difficult to fathom much more of a rule from the re-
ported cases. In Putnam v. Putnam, 389 N.E.2d 777, 778 (Mass. App. 1977), a trial
court was reversed for allocating the marital property one-third to the wife and
two-thirds to the husband, where wife had been involved in an “improper rela-
tionship” with a “teenage neighbor,” in part because it took little evidence on
other issues such as the parties’ noneconomic contributions to the marriage and
their economic contributions to it apart from specific contributions to acquisition
of their house, the major property at issue. Court “caution[s] against the view
that either alimony or a transfer of property may be justified purely on the basis
of the blameworthy conduct of one of the spouses.” But in Loud v. Loud, 436
N.E.2d 164 (Mass. 1982), the court sustained a one-third/two-third distribution
in the wife’s favor that was based in part on the husband’s adulterous affairs. In
Denninger v. Denninger, 612 N.E.2d 262, n.4 (Mass. App. 1993), the court, in re-
versing an allocation of only 15 percent of the marital property to husband, ob-
served merely that the husband’s dietary fetishes “hardly resembled the abusive
conduct given weight” in certain prior cases. In the end, it appears that the pri-
mary rule is that trial judges possess “broad discretion” in their weighing of the
various statutory factors, Dalessio v. Dalessio, 570 N.E.2d 139 (Mass. 1991), and
that treatment of marital misconduct is “an aspect of the exercise of [the trial
judge’s] broad discretion.” Ross v. Ross, 430 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Mass. 1982).
f. Michigan. Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1992), allows consid-
eration of fault in allocating property, although it cautions that it is only one of
several factors, and reverses trial court which gave wife only 25 percent of prop-
erty and no alimony because of her adultery, concluding that the trial court gave
this factor excessive weight and did not give adequate consideration to other
factors. Sparks technically addresses property only, but clearly fault is also rele-
vant in alimony. Thames v. Thames, 477 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Mich. App. 1991). In
applying Sparks there seem to be few guidelines, although the state supreme
court seems cautious about counting claims of misconduct heavily. See McDou-
gal v. McDougal, 545 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1996).
g. Mississippi. Fault can bar or reduce, but apparently not increase, ali-
mony. The wife’s fault should not bar alimony after a long marriage where hus-
band can pay and the wife would otherwise be destitute, but it may be the basis
for reducing the amount of alimony in that case. “[T]hese awards have been
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made not to enable the wife to maintain the lifestyle to which she has been ac-
customed, but to prevent her from destitution.” Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597
So.2d 653, 654 (Miss. 1992) (wife should be allowed such a limited alimony
award at dissolution of 25-year marriage during which she raised three children
and did little work outside the home; note that court finds it nonetheless appro-
priate to limit her award on account of her adultery, where husband also com-
mitted adultery during the marriage). This is thought to be an enlightened ad-
vance from “a long line of older cases [that] unequivocally denied periodic
alimony where the husband was granted a divorce on grounds of the wife’s
adultery.” Id. Mississippi has only recently adopted equitable distribution; fault
could not previously come up. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.
1994) (adopting equitable distribution and setting forth guidelines). While some
of the language of Ferguson suggests that fault could be considered (“contribu-
tion to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships”), it is
ambiguous and the issue was not expressly addressed.
h. Missouri. Unpredictable discretion appears to be the rule. E.g., Barth v.
Barth, 800 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App. 1990) (award to the wife of 55% of the substan-
tial marital property at the termination of the parties’ 11-year marriage could be
justified by the husband’s affair, begun shortly before they broke up; court ob-
serves merely that each case must be decided on its own facts). Some Missouri
cases cite an “undue burden” standard but it appears to add little, as there is no
logical pattern to the cases. E.g., Burtscher v. Burtscher, 563 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Mo.
App. 1978) (“the conduct factor becomes important when the conduct of one
party to the marriage is such that it throws upon the other party marital burdens
beyond the norms to be expected in the marital relationship” but also “it is un-
necessary and probably impossible to lay down any precise guidelines for the
weight to be given to the conduct factor”). In Burtscher, wife complained that the
trial court had erred in not counting the affair she claimed husband had near the
end of their 24-year marriage, but the appeals court found no error, observing
that wife played bingo four nights a week over husband’s objection, which “was
also detrimental.” Compare this to In re Marriage of Gustin, 861 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.
App. 1993) (wife’s chopping through door of marital residence after parties’
separation did not place burdens on the marital relationship) and Divine v. Di-
vine, 752 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. App. 1988) (husband’s failure to communicate with
wife, as well as his physical abuse, telephone harassment, and false accusation of
her, placed undue stress on wife during marriage).
i. New Hampshire. N.H. Stat. Ann. § 458:19 governs alimony, and explicitly
allows the court to consider “the fault of either party as defined in RSA 458:a6-a,
II(l),” which is part of the section governing property division. The cited provi-
sion, thus apparently applicable to both alimony and property division, allows
consideration of fault where it caused the breakdown of the marriage as well as
“substantial physical or mental pain and suffering” or an economic loss. This
limiting language has been construed broadly enough, however, as to rob it of
any important impact. Yergeau v. Yergeau, 569 A.2d 237, 240 (N.H. 1990) (hus-
band’s adultery properly considered in fixing alimony award to wife; statutory
standard met where wife testified not only to her “tears” but also to her “obses-
sive conduct in surveillance of [husband’s] and co-respondent’s comings and
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goings.”). Fault is excluded from consideration in property division if the di-
vorce is granted on no-fault grounds, but where different grounds are alleged by
the parties, the “master must grant the divorce on the ground which was the
‘primary cause of the marital breakdown.’” Boucher v. Boucher, 553 A.2d 313,
315 (N.H. 1988).
j. North Dakota. See Davis v. Davis, 458 N.W.2d 309, 316 (N.D. 1990) (fault
may be considered in property allocation; affirms trial court’s allocation of 83%
of property to husband at end of 19-year marriage, where the unequal allocation
is based upon wife’s adulterous affairs). See also Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d
910 (N.D. 1975) (fault considered in alimony).
k. Rhode Island. Statute permits the court to consider “the conduct of the
parties during the marriage” with respect both to alimony, R.I. Gen. Laws §
15-5-16, and property division, R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-16.1(a). With respect to
alimony, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has cautioned that the “tra-
ditional” concept of alimony that was based on protection of the innocent
spouse has been replaced by a “modern concept” that is “based on need” and
that “the primary focus must be on the economic situation of the parties viewed
in light of the financial exigencies of one spouse and the ability of the other
spouse to meet those needs.” Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 957 (R.I. 1984) (trial
court’s denial of alimony to wife because of her “association with her business
associate” reversed as based on the “traditional view,” unduly emphasized a
single statutory factor, and failed to appreciate that conduct within the meaning
of the statute include good as well as bad). Similar language in Rochefort v.
Rochefort, 494 A.2d 92 (R.I. 1985), where court affirmed trial court’s equal divi-
sion of property over husband’s objection that her misconduct was worse than
his, saying that trial judge properly considered all factors and did not give con-
trolling importance to one factor as husband urged.
l. South Carolina. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(B)(10) includes, among the 10
factors the court “must” consider in awarding alimony, “the marital misconduct
or fault of either or both parties, whether or not used as a basis for a divorce or
separate maintenance decree if the misconduct affects or has affected the eco-
nomic circumstances of the parties, or contributed to the breakup of the mar-
riage.” The court is to weigh the various factors “in such proportion as it finds
appropriate.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-472(2) contains essentially identical lan-
guage permitting consideration of fault in allocating the marital property. How-
ever, a provision contained only in the alimony section bars any alimony award
to “a spouse who commits adultery” before the execution of a separation
agreement or the entry of an order of separate maintenance. S.C. CODE ANN.
20-3-130(A). (A case apparently decided under an earlier version of this section
found that it barred any alimony award to wife, a 51-year-old waitress, against
dentist husband earning $90,000 annually, because she had committed “numer-
ous acts of adultery” after the decree of separate maintenance had been entered.
Morris v. Morris, 367 S.E.2d 24, 25 (S.C. 1988)). Conspiracy to murder one’s
spouse, unlike adultery, is not an absolute bar to an alimony award. Sharpe v.
Sharpe, 416 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. App. 1992) (wife, whose conspiracy to murder hus-
band failed when he learned of the plan, awarded alimony in the form of health
insurance husband required to provide for her; adultery cases distinguished as
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based upon statutory bar). Some recent courts of appeal opinions suggest limit-
ing consideration of fault in the allocation of marital property to “its impact on
the economic circumstances of the parties during the marriage.” Peirson v. Cal-
houn, 417 S.E.2d 604, 606 (S.C. App. 1992).
m. Texas. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.63 directs the court to divide marital
property as it “deems just and right.” In divorces granted on fault grounds, the
divorce court may consider fault in its allocation. Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d
758 (Tex. 1980). Young states that the court should use fault to make “a just and
right division” of the community property, not to “punish” the guilty spouse,
but offers no explanation of the distinction between these, and in the same para-
graph emphasizes the trial court’s “broad discretion” in the matter. E.g., Smith v.
Smith, 836 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. App. 1992) (appeals court “unable to say” that
trial court abused discretion by relying on husband’s adultery to justify unequal
division of property where trial court explained its ruling with comment that
“an unequal division is mandated . . . because of the large disparity in the earn-
ing capacities of the parties, and because of the admitted and unrepentant fault”
of husband). Until mid-1995, Texas did not allow alimony at all, the only state
with such a rule. A newly enacted statute allows it but limits claims to spouses
married at least 10 years, except where the other spouse was recently convicted
of family violence; and in any event the maintenance order may not ordinarily
last more than three years, and in determining its duration and size the court
may consider “the marital misconduct of the spouse seeking maintenance.” 1995
TEX. GEN. LAWS 655, adding Subchapter G to Chapter 3 of the Family Code, §
3.9601 et seq.
n. Vermont. The statute governing allocation of property includes among
the factors to be considered “the respective merits of the parties,” VT. STAT.
ANN. § 751(b)(12). There is no similar provision in the alimony statute, § 752, but
the broad discretion permitted under that section could be construed to include
fault even though it is not expressly mentioned among the list of relevant fac-
tors. The actual practice is difficult to discern from the few reported cases on the
matter, which emphasize, sometimes inconsistently, both the special facts of
each case and the importance of trial court discretion. In Cleverly v. Cleverly, 513
A.2d 612, 613-14 (Vt. 1986), the trial court’s fault finding, upon which it based its
property allocation, was reversed, the supreme court holding that the husband’s
leaving the homestead without warning, and later moving in with a woman he
had visited during the marriage, was not properly considered fault or aban-
donment for the purpose of the property allocation statute. Yet the court also
observed that its ruling “should not be construed as a holding that . . .
post-separation conduct of parties . . . may never be considered” as its “ruling is
based on the facts presented by the record in the case at bar.” In Victor v. Victor,
453 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Vt. 1982), the court rejected the husband’s claim that the
trial court’s one-sided property allocation was implicitly grounded on an un-
warranted finding that he was solely at fault for the marital failure, observing
only that fault is but “one factor among many which ‘may’ be considered” and
that “the disposition of property . . . is a matter of broad discretion for the trial
court.” There are very few later cases on fault. It is difficult to know whether this
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reflects the infrequency with which it is relied upon or the effectively unreview-
able discretion of trial courts who in fact employ it in unreported decisions.
o. Wyoming. The relevant statute provides that in allocating property the
court may consider “the respective merits of the parties.” In Paul v. Paul, 616
P.2d 707, 712 (Wyo. 1980), the court affirmed a trial judge who refused to con-
sider evidence of fault in allocating a relatively large marital property estate in
which there were “adequate assets to comfortably provide for both of the par-
ties,” since “the trial judge has great discretion in dividing the property and he
is not to use the property division to punish one of the parties.” But in the later
case of Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 819 (Wyo. 1984), the court sustained
the denial of alimony to a wife who had been found at fault for the marital dis-
solution, the trial court having concluded that “dissolution of the marriage was
caused primarily by the Defendant’s insistence upon removing herself and her
children to the state of Wisconsin instead of remaining with her husband in
Cody, Wyoming.” It reaffirmed that trial courts could consider fault in both ali-
mony and property division, distinguishing Paul with the observation that it
“stands for the principle that in certain circumstances the court may, in its dis-
cretion, refuse to hear evidence of fault; and that, in any event, such evidence
may not be considered by the court to punish one of the parties, but only to in-
sure that the property division is just and equitable under all of the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case.” It thus appears that whether fault is considered, as well
as the weight to be given it, is largely a matter of trial court discretion.
b. Discretion and Fault
The traditional marital fault rule requires extraordinary reliance on trial
court discretion. Neither the standard of misconduct, nor its dollar conse-
quences, are much bounded by any rule. While in principle the trial court’s deci-
sion can be reviewed for “abuse of discretion,” reversals are rare. Such a system
fits most comfortably in a dissolution law which relies on trial court discretion
for the entire adjudication, not only for the fault aspects. The traditional fault
rule is thus inconsistent with a major theme of the Principles, an effort to im-
prove the consistency and predictability of trial court decisions. Appellate deci-
sions and statutory rules sometimes provide parameters that are supposed to
contain the exercise of discretion in fault adjudications, but for the most part
these have little effect. A brief survey of the approaches taken in full fault states
follows.
1. States which make no real effort to contain discretion.
In many fault states there are appellate decisions that seem to recognize
and accept a rule of largely limitless trial court discretion in judging fault. E.g. ,
Ross v. Ross, 430 N.E.2d 815, 819 (Mass. 1982) (treatment of marital misconduct
is “an aspect of the exercise of [the trial judge’s] broad discretion”); Beede v.
Beede, 440 A.2d 283, 285 (Conn. 1982) (“as has been repeatedly stated by this
court, judicial review of a trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion in domestic
relations cases is limited to [whether] the court could reasonably have con-
cluded as it did”); Sunbury v. Sunbury, 553 A.2d 612, 614 (Conn. 1989) (trial
courts have “wide discretion” and “wide latitude in varying the weight placed
upon each item” in the long and nonexclusive list of relevant criteria for alloca-
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tion of property and fixing of alimony). It would seem almost inevitable that
such discretionary systems would yield at least some questionable decisions.
Consider, for example, Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 654 (Miss. 1992)
(allows the wife only a limited alimony award at dissolution of 25-year mar-
riage, during which she raised three children, because of her adultery, where
husband also committed adultery during the marriage) and Grosskopf v.
Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 819 (Wyo. 1984) (governing rule allows the trial court to
consider the “merits” of the parties, defined as their relative “deservedness” or
“goodness”; trial judge properly denied alimony to the wife where the marital
breakup was caused in part by her preference for living in Wisconsin rather than
Cody, Wyoming).
2. Guiding discretion by a rule allocating the costs of dissolution to the
spouse who caused it.
The text explains why this rule does little in practice to limit or guide dis-
cretion, particularly as part of a system that also emphasizes deference to the
trial court. For example, Connecticut, whose reliance on trial court discretion is
described supra, provides that in allocating property and awarding alimony a
court may consider “the causes of the . . . dissolution of the marriage.” CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-82 and § 46b-81; see also Robinson v. Robinson, 444 A.2d
234 (Conn. 1982). Compare Grimmeisen v. Grimmeisen, 1993 W.L. 268412 (Conn.
Super.) (during 20-year marriage husband had two homosexual affairs and has
been in therapy; wife is obese, spends one-third of year away from husband at
parties’ vacation home, and spends too much money; court concludes the dis-
solution is mostly her fault) with Bachman v. Bachman, 1995 W.L. 9259 (Conn.
Super.) (husband’s cruelty and infidelity, rather than wife’s obesity and spend-
thrift practices, were the cause of the dissolution of parties’ 25-year marriage).
3. Ineffective efforts to contain discretion by other standards.
The problem of creating standards by which to determine the dollar conse-
quences of a fault finding is particularly intractable. Appellate decisions in fault
states sometimes caution that fault is only one factor relevant to the allocation of
property or granting of alimony, and should not be given disproportionate
weight. E.g., Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893 (Mich. 1992). But the meaning of
such cautionary language is at best obscure. For example, in Sparks itself, the
trial court had awarded the husband 75 percent of the marital property after
finding that the wife’s adultery was the principal cause of the marital failure.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the trial court had given the wife’s fault
disproportionate weight in this disposition, but was unable to state any rule by
which judges in later decisions might determine the proportionate weight to ac-
cord such misconduct. Later cases seem no more helpful. See McDougal v.
McDougal, 545 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. 1996), in which the court reaffirms the Sparks
language investing the trial court with considerable discretion, but then reverses
its judgment allowing the wife a large proportion of the property on the basis of
the husband’s fault without doing more than providing a long list of factors.
In a number of fault states appellate courts have attempted to establish
rules that explain when findings of fault may appropriately affect the award, but
such guidelines do not seem to create effective bounds on trial court discretion.
For example, Missouri opinions specify that “the conduct factor becomes im-
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portant . . . when the conduct of one party to the marriage is such that it throws
upon the other party marital burdens beyond the norms to be expected in the
marital relationship.” Burtscher v. Burtscher, 563 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Mo. App.
1978). Even in laying down this rule, the court observed that “it is unnecessary
and probably impossible to lay down any precise guidelines for the weight to be
given to the conduct factor.” So in Burtscher itself the appeals court declined to
reverse the trial court’s conclusion that husband’s adultery was counterbalanced
by wife’s insistence on playing bingo four nights a week over husband’s objec-
tion. Cases vary wildly in the importance they attach to adultery. In Barth v.
Barth, 800 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. App. 1990), the court justified its award to the wife of
55 percent of the substantial marital property by reference to the husband’s af-
fair, begun shortly before the spouses broke up. Did the adultery justify for the
wife a five percent bonus, or some other number because the division would
have been unequal even without the adultery? One can’t tell, nor does the court
feel obliged to explain, observing merely that each case must be decided on its
own facts, a proposition which it supports by citing other cases that reached
very different results in weighing the importance of adultery. Cook v. Cook, 706
S.W.2d 606 (Mo. App. 1986) (repeated adultery justifies 86/14 split); D’Aquila v.
D’Aquila, 715 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. App. 1986) (60/40 split of marital property dis-
proportionate despite adultery); Marriage of Ballay, 924 S.W.2d 572 (Mo. App.
1996) (wife’s adultery justifies reducing her share of the marital property despite
rule allowing consideration of misconduct only where “it places extra burdens
on the non-errant spouse ‘in the partnership endeavor’”; court provides no ex-
planation of why adultery qualifies under this rule); Schwarz v. Schwarz, 631
S.W.2d 694 (Mo. App. 1982) (85/15 split sustained).  These opinions are equally
unhelpful. For example, Schwarz affirms the trial court with only the observation
that it made no error, and that “an extended opinion would have no preceden-
tial value.” 631 S.W.2d at 695. Similar reasoning in other jurisdictions yields
similarly inconsistent results. Compare, e.g., Woodside v. Woodside, 350 S.E.2d
407, 412 (S.C. App. 1986) (husband’s adultery doesn’t affect property allocation
because it did not put on wife burdens “beyond the norms expected in marital
relationship”) with Robinson v. Robinson, 444 A.2d 234 (Conn. 1982) (in appor-
tioning marital property, court may consider the “humiliation and anguish” that
wife’s adultery caused husband).
In New Hampshire the statute permits consideration of misconduct only
where it both caused the breakdown of the marriage as well as “substantial
physical or mental pain and suffering” or an economic loss. This limiting lan-
guage has been construed broadly enough, however, as to rob it of any impor-
tant impact. Yergeau v. Yergeau, 569 A.2d 237, 240 (N.H. 1990) (husband’s
adultery properly considered in fixing alimony award to W; statutory standard
met where wife testified not only to her “tears” but also to her “obsessive con-
duct in surveillance of [husband’s] and co-respondent’s comings and goings.”).
c. No-fault States and Attempted Murder
The ultimate test of a state law excluding all consideration of fault in prop-
erty and alimony adjudications is an alimony claim by a spouse guilty of at-
tempting to murder the potential obligor. While hardly common, such cases
have arisen. In none of the states included in Category 1 has such a case been
ALI CHAPTER - FMT_2.DOC 10/01/01  11:54 AM
80 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 8:1 2001
faced by the state’s highest court. (Arkansas is placed in Category 2 because its
high court declined to apply its no-fault rule to a case of murder. See Note 19 in
the main text.) The results in the intermediate courts of appeal have been mixed.
Courts in two no-fault states—Florida and Illinois—have held that a spouse
cannot be denied alimony or his share of the accumulated property as punish-
ment for attempted murder of the other spouse. In Illinois the holding might be
thought fudged, as the opinion relied upon the financial consequences of the
attempt to justify an unequal award. Marriage of Cihak, 416 N.E.2d 701 (Ill.
App. 1981). Husband murdered wife after the court had dissolved their mar-
riage but prior to its entry of a property division order. Under state law the as-
sets were divided by the divorce court rather than the probate court. It allocated
the parties’ $60,000 of marital property to wife’s estate. In affirming, the appel-
late court emphasized that wife had provided all the family’s support for last
five years of marriage, while husband had dissipated some property, and that
husband had little need for the assets given his 30-year jail term. But “the fact
that [husband] murdered [wife] should not operate to take anything away from
him.” It analogized to an earlier Illinois case on joint tenancy, Bradley v. Fox, 129
N.E.2d 699 (Ill. App. 1955), to conclude that husband should retain his entire
half of the property even though he could not enlarge his half-interest through
the killing.
Florida has had several cases. In Mosbarger v. Mosbarger, 547 So.2d 188 (Fla.
App. 1989), wife shot twice at husband six months after the parties separated,
after seeing him with another woman. She subsequently pled guilty to second
degree murder. The trial court divided their property equally except for hus-
band’s military pension, and awarded her $500/month permanent alimony.
Husband’s military pension paid $819 monthly, and he earned $47,000 annually
as a Honeywell program manager. The appeals court actually increased wife’s
award because of her poor earnings prospects and uninsured psychiatric bills,
and held that the trial court erred when it considered her attempted murder of
husband in apportioning their marital property. “Since adultery, as a statutorily
recognized act of marital misconduct, is only considered when it translates into
a greater financial need of the spouse or a depletion of family resources, we are
not inclined to believe that Mrs. Mosbarger’s criminal conduct, which is not a
statutorily recognized act of marital misconduct, should be treated more se-
verely in this domestic proceeding.” Id. at 191. See also De Castro v. De Castro,
334 So.2d 834 (Fla. App. 1976) (husband required to pay alimony to wife of 26
years even though she shot and wounded him during pendency of dissolution
action; award properly based on need alone). Cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 378 So.2d
1352, 1353 (Fla. App. 1980) (alimony award to wife excessive and improperly
based on husband’s physical abuse of wife during their marriage; alimony
award cannot be employed “as a means of punishing the spouse . . . or . . . as a
substitute for a money judgment in a personal injury case”).
Lower court decisions in two other states have declined to apply their
state’s apparently inflexible no-fault rule to cases involving murder, but their
position was not reviewed by the state’s high court. In Marriage of Brabec, 510
N.W.2d 270 (Wis. App. 1993), the court affirmed a trial court decision denying
wife maintenance because she was convicted of attempting to hire someone to
kill husband during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. It explicitly re-
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fused to apply Dixon, the state supreme court’s no-fault decision (see Wisconsin
entry in Reporter’s Note a). In D’Arc v. D’Arc, 395 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1978), aff’d, 421 A.2d 602 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1980), the trial court consid-
ered husband’s attempted murder of wife without even acknowledging the state
supreme court’s earlier decision in Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478 (N.J. 1974),
which barred consideration of fault. At least one fault state has allowed alimony
to a spouse guilty of attempted murder. In Sharpe v. Sharpe, 416 S.E.2d 215 (S.C.
App. 1992), the court held that conspiracy to murder one’s spouse, unlike adul-
tery, is not an absolute bar to an alimony award, and in fact made an alimony
award to wife, whose conspiracy to murder husband failed when he learned of
the plan. The award consisted of the requirement that husband provide health
insurance to wife, who was seriously ill; the court distinguished the adultery
cases as based upon a statutory bar.
As Cihak, the Illinois case, points out, consistency with the dominant rule
applied to the murder of one joint tenant by the other would suggest denying
the spouse who attempted to murder the other any claim upon the other
spouse’s share of the property, while allowing him his own share. In addition to
the old Illinois case of Bradley v. Fox, upon which Cihak relies, many other courts
have also held that the murder of one joint tenant by another does not deprive
the killer of his half-share of the joint tenancy property, even though it bars the
killer’s succession to the entire estate. Kempaner v. Thompson, 394 So.2d 918
(Ala. 1981) (wife retains her half of joint tenancy property owned with husband,
whom she killed); Duncan v. Vassaur, 550 P.2d 929 (Okla. 1976) (same); Estate of
Shields, 574 P.2d 229 (Kan. App. 1978) (husband retains his half interest in joint
tenancy property owned with wife, whom he killed); Heuser v. Cohen, 655
S.W.2d 9 (Ky. App. 1982) (same).
Topic 3
General Provisions
§ 1.01 Rules of Statewide Application
(1) A rule of statewide application is a rule that implements a Principle
set forth herein and that governs in all cases presented for decision in the ju-
risdiction that has adopted it, with such exceptions as the rule itself may pro-
vide.
(2) A rule of statewide application may be established by legislative, ju-
dicial, or administrative action, in accord with the constitutional provisions
and legal traditions that apply to the subject of the rule in the adopting juris-
diction.
Comment:
a. The function of rules of statewide application. Modern divorce rates mean
that a large proportion of the population will at some point be a party to a mar-
riage dissolution action. In many such cases the parties’ assets and incomes are
not great. A large investment of legal resources to divorce proceedings is not
often sensible, or perhaps even possible. Expeditious settlement with a mini-
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mum of legal process is the preferred result. A rule of statewide application es-
tablishing presumptions that decide most litigated cases facilitates this goal by
making the results of potential litigation more predictable. It also requires the
development of a consistent statewide policy on the matter addressed by the
presumption. Current law often avoids such policy choices, in practice if not in
theory, by reliance on the exercise of trial court discretion. But that approach
devolves policy to the predispositions of individual judges. Statewide rules pro-
vide consistency across parties in the policies applied to their dissolutions. Such
consistency is an important goal of the Principles. See Parts I(b) and II(a) of the
Introductory Essay that forms Topic 1 of this Chapter.
While uniform statewide rules thus serve important goals, the particular
formulation of a rule is not always an appropriate subject for resolution in the
black-letter Principles. Policy choices are necessarily made at more than one level
of generality. In many cases, implementation of a Principle requires policy
choices at a more detailed level than the Principle itself resolves. In such cases
the Principle typically requires the adoption of statewide rules that address the
matter on a more detailed level. For example, §§ 5.04 and 5.05 of Chapter 5 es-
tablish the Principle that the duration and amount of income sharing the law
should require between former spouses is, in the ordinary case, proportional to
the disparity in their incomes, the duration of their marriage, and the duration
of any period during which the obligee provided the majority of parental care
for minor children of the marriage. These sections also require a system of re-
buttable presumptions that implement these Principles by resolving more de-
tailed questions: What precise level of income disparity requires a remedy?
Must the remedy provide complete equalization of living standards at the dis-
solution of lengthy marriages, or may it leave some disparity, and if so, in what
amount? The same approach is used in other sections and other Chapters. E.g., §
4.12.
Because no single resolution of these subsidiary policy choices is compelled
by the analysis supporting the basic Principles, none is asserted by the black let-
ter. The Principles thus require statewide rules but do not specify their precise
content. Such specification is not necessary to satisfy the primary purpose for
the requirement of statewide rules, which is achievement of predictability and
policy consistency in the law’s application. However, the commentary to the
Principles offers guidance on the criteria that should govern the policy choices to
be made and suggests boundaries for the rulemaker. These boundaries ensure
that the policy choices reflected in the rule adopted by a jurisdiction are consis-
tent with the basic Principle that the rule is intended to implement.
b. Exceptions to statewide rules. A statewide rule required by these Principles
will ordinarily create a presumption that will control the result in a particular
case in the absence of written findings establishing that the presumed result
would constitute “a substantial injustice.” (For the meaning of the requirement
of written findings, see § 1.02.) Clearly, the presumptions established under the
required statewide rules must be rebuttable, to allow the trial court or other de-
cisionmaker to respond to the unusual case presenting factual variations no
governing statute could anticipate. The approach of rebuttable presumptions
taken in these Chapters borrows from the reforms that in the past decade were
successfully applied to the law of child support, and that in many states already
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apply to the division of marital property. While presumptions for determining
alimony are currently less common, they are used by local rules in some domes-
tic relations courts.
c. Adoption of statewide rules. The method by which each jurisdiction
adopts a statewide rule depends upon the constitutional principles, legal tradi-
tions, and governing statutes that bear on the subject matter of the rule in that
jurisdiction. In some cases the adoption of a rule consistent with these Principles
will require legislative action, while in other cases the required rule might be
adopted by administrative action or by judicial decision in the adjudication of a
particular case. In some cases the highest court of the state may have rulemaking
authority, separate from its authority to adjudicate individual cases, that extends
to the topic of the statewide rule. The appropriate procedure will thus vary with
both the particular jurisdiction and the particular rule, and is beyond the scope
of these Principles. Even where a statewide rule has not yet been adopted, trial
courts may find that the Principles provide useful guidance in the adjudication of
particular cases. A trial court’s authority to rely on these Principles in deciding
cases will necessarily depend upon the governing law in the jurisdiction.
REPORTER’S NOTES
Comment b. Federal law requires the states to employ a system of setting
child support awards that relies upon guidelines establishing rebuttable pre-
sumptions, and thus such a system is in effect in every state. 42 U.S.C. § 667. The
child support guidelines provide a model for the operation of the rebuttable
presumptions established in Chapters 4 and 5.
Comment c. It is common for child support guidelines to be promulgated by
the highest court of the state under rulemaking authority expressly granted it for
this purpose by state law. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-320.
§ 1.02 Written Findings Required to Explain Exceptions
(1) When a statewide rule allows the decisionmaker in a particular case to
render a judgment that departs from the result the rule would ordinarily re-
quire, the decisionmaker should set forth the basis for the departure in writ-
ten findings sufficient to establish the grounds for departure required under
the governing Principle or statewide rule.
(2) The requirement of written findings is met by any method that makes
the findings accessible to someone who consults the physical record in the
case.
Comment:
a. The reason for the requirement of written findings. Many provisions of the
Principles require rules of statewide application that specify a result once par-
ticular facts in the case have been found, unless written findings establish the
justification necessary under the rule for departure from it. Fidelity to the poli-
cies set forth in the governing law is encouraged by requiring the decisionmaker
to articulate findings that explain why those policies require a result that is dif-
ferent from the one the rule itself would ordinarily impose. The additional re-
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quirement that the findings be written facilitates appeals grounded on those
policies. Appellate courts of course ordinarily defer to the trial court’s factual
findings, and appeal on grounds of factual error ordinarily requires incurring
the cost of a transcript of the trial court proceedings. In contrast, only the find-
ings themselves are required for appellate review of whether they are, as a mat-
ter of law, adequate to justify an exception to the general rule. Not only is
meaningful appellate review more likely in that case, it is also essential to the
creation of the body of precedent necessary for the system of rebuttable pre-
sumptions to produce consistent and predictable results. Finally, any effort to
study and evaluate the operation of a system of rebuttable presumptions is fea-
sible only if the physical record of cases in which the decisionmaker found a
governing presumption rebutted contains the findings upon which the rebuttal
was based. Such studies are necessary to determine whether the applicable rule
is consistent and predictable in application, or whether amendment of the rule
or its application is in order.
b. Method for compliance with the requirement of written findings. The most
straightforward method for complying with the requirement of written findings
is an opinion or memorandum decision issued by the decisionmaker, ordinarily
a judge in a judicial proceeding. That is not, however, the exclusive method for
compliance. In some jurisdictions trial judges may dictate findings to a court re-
porter whose transcript of them is then included in the court’s case file without
charge to the parties, and without regard to whether a more complete transcript
of the proceedings is later prepared. Such a system satisfies the requirement of
written findings imposed by these Principles. It does so because it requires the
decisionmaker to articulate the specific factual findings relied upon to justify
departure from the rule, and it produces an accessible record for study and for
appellate review of whether the findings satisfy the substantive standard re-
quired for exceptions to the rule.
The requirement of this section is not satisfied by oral findings made “on
the record” unless the findings are actually transcribed and placed in the physi-
cal record of the case. Oral findings that have not been transcribed cannot pro-
vide the basis of an appeal and are not accessible to investigators studying the
operation of the system.
REPORTER’S NOTES
Comment b. Federal law requires states to have child support guidelines. It
also requires state law to compel courts to follow the guideline in the absence of
written findings that justify departure from them. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2); 45 C.F.R.
§ 302.56. Examples of state implementations of this requirement include Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 25-320(A) (The amount of child support determined by application
of the guidelines “shall be the amount of child support ordered unless a written
finding is made, based on criteria approved by the supreme court, that applica-
tion of the guidelines would be inappropriate or unjust in a particular case”);
Cal. Fam. Code § 4056 (similar). Some states apply a similar rule to the division
of marital property. E.g., Florida Statutes § 61.075 creates a presumption of equal
division of marital assets and requires the trial court to enter written findings of
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facts supporting the property division ordered by the court. See Segall v. Segall,
708 So.2d 983 (Fla. App. 1998).
